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 American diplomatic historian’s consideration of the role of ideology in the 
formation of American foreign policy has only recently begun to receive more attention. 
Traditional focuses on economics and relations among great nation-states have 
predominated the historical literature. This work examines the powerful effect that 
ideology, particularly race and anti-communism, played in developing the U.S.’s 
relationship with a small power nation-state, Australia, between 1933 and 1953. This 
work is comparative in nature, relying on archival research in both American and 
Australian archives and examines the attitudes of both elite policymakers as well  
common individuals in shaping the alliance between the two states. Theoretically, this 
work draws upon theories about whiteness that historians such as Theodore Allen and 
Matthew Frye Jacobson have formulated over the past twenty years. This dissertation 
concludes that a commitment to an ideology of race and anticommunism played a central 
role in the development of the American – Australian alliance contrary to standard 
historical interpretations that have placed economics or pragmatic national security 
interests at the center of the bond between the two states. The outcomes of this study 
offer new insights into the nature of alliance building by the U.S. in the twentieth cen ury 
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Chapter 1: Old Friends and New Strangers 
On Thursday, August 1, 1950, Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies 
looked out over the assembled members of the United States House of Representatives 
from the speaker’s rostrum. Menzies had come to Washington to consult with President 
Harry Truman in the early, dark days of the Korean War, a time when once again 
American and Australian soldiers found themselves engaged in a war against nother 
common enemy in Asia. The Prime Minister had come to remind Congress, and the 
American people, of the shared sacrifice being made by Australians in Korea, the speed 
with which Australia had answered America’s call for aid and of the long-standing ties 
between the two countries. Early in his speech Menzies remarked with great earnestness, 
“The truth is that when we Australians think about the other people of the world we think 
of some as foreigners and some of them as not.  I want to tell you that except in the 
jaundiced eyes of the law, Americans are not foreigners in Australia.”1 In this brief 
moment Menzies articulated an accepted and often stated fact of American and 
Australian diplomacy, that the United States and Australia were bound together 
inextricably by bonds of culture and shared experience. The relationship between the 
United States and Australia has been considered by historians, primarily Australian, but 
few Americans have scrutinized the bond between both parties as well as the important 
issues that are raised in considering the American – Australian alliance. 
                                                          
1 U.S. Congress, House, Australian Prime Minister Robert G, Menzies address to the House of 
Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd sess. Congressional Record 151, vol. 96 (August 1, 1950): 11656 – 
11657.  Menzies also had come to attempt to get a commitment from the Truman White House for an 
American – Australian security agreement in the Pacific, a longstanding objective of Australian foreign 
policy stretching back to the 1930s. 
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 This dissertation will examine the development of American – Australian 
relations in the twenty-year period between 1933 and 1953, a period of momentous 
change in a relationship that until 1952 had never been formalized or codified by treaty. 
The traditional interpretation of the U.S. – Australian relationship has stressed the 
centrality of economics and a cultural affinity between the two nations as the primary 
pillars upon which this partnership was founded. The importance of economics in the 
American – Australian relationship has been overemphasized while cultural affinities 
have often been vaguely defined. However, the ideological underpinnings of this bond 
have been less explored despite the central role that ideology has played in this 
relationship. This work will demonstrate that there were two primary ideological fa tors 
that cemented this bond: a shared commitment to a racial ideal and to anti-communis 
during the early Cold War period. However, unlike earlier traditional interpretations, 
which focused on World War II, it will be argued that it was the early Cold War period 
(1947 – 1953) that truly brought Australia and the United States into a structured 
association that has continued as an enduring hallmark of both nations’ foreign policies in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. An examination of the American – Australian 
alliance can also broaden our understanding of American foreign policy towards 
“middle” powers and to gain a better understanding of how American policymakers 
constructed alliances in the twentieth century. It also seeks to demonstrate the important 
role that ideology has played in American foreign policy in this century and how 
ideology served to both strengthen American foreign policy but also to blind American 
leaders to the complexities of a rapidly changing world after 1945 as well as demonstrate 
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differences with the very partners with whom they were working.2 Specifically the role of 
race, or more precisely “whiteness,” as an ideology in American foreign policy forms the 
cornerstone of this inquiry.3 
 Over the past thirty-five years, the historical profession’s numerous sub-fields 
have undergone drastic changes as each has incorporated new methodologies and theories 
from fields outside of history. This infusion of theory has led to new approaches in 
numerous historical fields, in particular leading to new research in the fields of gender, 
social and world history. While historians have debated the applicability of these new 
methodologies, a general consensus has emerged which looks on these changes as  
positive. However, diplomatic historians have been engaged in strenuous debate over the 
role theory should play in the field. Mark Stoler commented in a brief piece written to 
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Society of Historians of American Foreign 
                                                          
2 American small power diplomacy can be defined as American foreign policy, primarily culturally and 
economically based, towards nations that came to beregarded as important corollaries to American national 
security policy. Many of these nations gained importance in the eyes of American policy makers due to the 
onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s. Some works to consult which can give a general impression of 
traditional American small power diplomacy include John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, C nada 
and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens, GA, 1994), David Schoenbaum, The United States and 
the State of Israel (New York, 1993), W. Dirk Raat, Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas 
(Athens, GA, 1992), Gerald Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy 
in the Third World, 1945 – 1954 (Wilmington, DL, 1989), James Bill, The Eagles and the Lion: The 
Tragedy of American – Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT, 1988), M. Srinivas Chary, The Eagle and the 
Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards India Since Independence (Westport, CT, 1985) and Robert 
Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York, 1968).  Works to consult on the role of culture in 
American foreign policy include Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. 
III The Globalizing of America, 1913 – 1945 (Cambridge, 1993), Cecil Crabb, American Diplomacy and 
the Pragmatic Tradition (Baton Rouge, 1989), Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
Haven, 1987), Robert Dallek, The American Style in Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs 
(New York, 1983) and Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural 
Relations, 1938 – 1950, (New York, 1981). 
3 Works to consult on race in American foreign policy include Rubin F. Weston, Racism in U.S. 
Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy (Columbia, SC, 1972), 
Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American R cial Anglo-Saxonism 
(Cambridge, MA, 1981), and Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A 
History (Boston, 1992). 
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Relations (SHAFR) stating diplomatic history had become “marginalized by the social 
and cultural historians who came to dominate the profession for our supposedly dated 
methodologies as well as politically incorrect focus on dead white males.”4 
 This debate reached a crescendo with a testy public exchange of views on this 
subject between John Lewis Gaddis, Bruce Cummings and Melvyn Leffler. In his 1991 
presidential address to SHAFR, Gaddis came out strongly against the influence ex rted 
on the field by William Appleman Williams. Gaddis openly criticized Williams and his 
supporters for what he perceived as their tendency towards self-criticism and infatuation 
with theory that in Gaddis’s estimation served only to draw attention away from the 
horrors committed by Stalin’s regime, while focusing attention on the perceived 
shortcomings of American foreign policy.5 
 In response to Gaddis’s attack on the methodological model and theory applied by 
Williams to American diplomatic history, Bruce Cummings published an article in 
Diplomatic History which lambasted Gaddis and others, including Melvyn Leffler, for 
their perceived lack of theory in their work. Cummings argued that traditional approaches 
to diplomatic history had been staid for some time and that the old guard of diplomatic 
historians, chief among them Gaddis and Leffler, continued to resist the changes 
necessary to bring the field in line with modern historical practice and increase its 
relevance to the larger discipline.6  
                                                          
4 Mark A. Stoler, “‘What A Long Strange Trip It’s Been,’,” Diplomatic History 31 (June 2007): 430. 
5 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History 17 (January 1993): 1 – 16. 
6 Bruce Cumings, “‘Revising Postrevisionism,’ or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History,” 
Diplomatic History 17 (October 1993): 539 – 570. 
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While this debate could be seen as nothing more than a tempest in a teacup, it 
provides an important example of how self-aware diplomatic historians have become 
about the state of their discipline in relation to its cousin fields. And as is true with many 
things, the best answer lies somewhere between the supposed orthodoxy of Gaddis and 
the theoretical work of Cummings. Diplomatic historians over the past twenty-five ears 
have demonstrated that the field has moved beyond its traditional focus on white male 
elites while still tackling the major questions that have always provided the 
underpinnings of diplomatic history.7 
 But even with this new movement incorporating more theory into diplomatic 
history, the trend remains to compartmentalize works on American foreign policy, 
especially when examining a traditional topic such as state to state relations, by focusing 
solely on economic or political relations. The story of American – Australian relations is 
one example of this compartmentalization by historians.  The vast majority of the 
histories have been interpretations based primarily on the diplomatic and political record 
groups found in the national archives of the American and Australian governments.  
These works generally ignore the social or cultural aspect of the diplomatic rel ionship 
taking form between the two countries. Social histories that have dealt with the 
experiences of American soldiers in Australia, and Australians’ reactions to the American 
                                                          
7 Important works to consult include those of Michael J. Hogan, America in the World: The Historiography 
of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (Cambridge, 1995), Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New Haven, CT, 1987), Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic 
and Cultural Expansion, 1890- 1945 (New York, 1982), Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American 
Foreign Relations Vol. III  The Globalizing of America, 1913 – 1945 (Cambridge, 1993) Frank Ninkovich, 
The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900, (Chicago, 1999 and Petra Goedde, GIs and 
Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945 – 1949 (New Haven, CT, 2003). 
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G.I.s, have conversely not considered the important role that government decisions 
played in directing these interactions between common Americans and Australian .   
Methodologically, this work will seek to combine traditional diplomatic history 
with a cultural approach. The story of American – Australian relations cannot be fully 
told from either a top down or from a bottom up perspective.  Rather a combination of the 
two is necessary in order to fully understand this story. Diplomatic historians have made 
important strides in incorporating social or cultural perspectives into their discussions on 
the formation of American foreign policy.  One recent work that has contributed to this 
process is Petra Goedde’s study on the American occupation of West Germany from 
1945 to 1949. In her introduction Goedde specifically states her intent to broaden “the 
definition of foreign relations to mean not only the interactions among politicians and 
diplomats but the relationships among ordinary Americans and Germans, more 
specifically the interactions between U.S. occupation soldiers and the civilian populati n 
in Germany.”8 The blueprint that Goedde lays out provides an excellent theoretical 
framework for historians to explore in more detail traditional nation-state relationships. 
This work will draw on Goedde’s ideas on the interplay between low-level 
interaction and high-level decision-making. I argue that the governments of the United 
States and Australia drew on perceptions held by their citizens in order to cement a bond 
which did not always come about naturally, contrary to older historical interpretations of 
the alliance. The use of American technology as a means of cultural diplomacy, or soft 
power, also informed how the relationship between the two nations developed.  Cinema 
                                                          
8 Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945 – 1949, (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), xiv. 
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in the twentieth century has been one of America’s greatest diplomatic tools and in 
Australia the effect of American popular culture went a long way towards establishing 
Australian perceptions of America.9 Often these perceptions proved to be a great 
hindrance in the American – Australian bond because movies provided Australians with 
many false images of the United States and its inhabitants. 
Akira Iriye, who has written extensively on the formation of American cultural 
diplomacy, has argued that the automobile, motion pictures and radio linked together the 
various parts of the United States into a cohesive whole as well as linking the world to 
the United States, leading to what Iriye refers to as the “cultural Americanization of the 
world during the 1920s.”10 In Australia, the effects of American cinema were especially 
strong. In fact, that the Australian government felt that steps should be undertaken to 
lessen the influence that they exerted on Australian society. In an undated report p a ed 
by the Intelligence Division of the Australian Army, this concern can be plainly seen 
when the authors of the report wrote, “Further to that, Australia came under the influence 
of America’s propaganda to an extent not previously experienced, and this propaganda 
had its effect.  This influence was most strongly felt through the Cinema.”11   
                                                          
9 See Diane Collins, Hollywood Down Under: Australians at the Movies, 1896 to the Present Day (North 
Ryde, NSW, 1987).  Collins works still stands as the most comprehensive treatment of the effect of 
American cinema on Australia and Australian perceptions of the United States. 
10 Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. III The Globalizing of America, 
1913 – 1945, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 113.  Other important works to consult on 
the use of technology as an American diplomatic tool include Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
Dream (New York, 1982), John Morton Blum V Was For Victory (New York, 1976) and Charles Frankel, 
The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad (Washington 
D.C, 1965).  These works are in addition to those list d in footnote #2. 
11 “Some Thoughts on British – Australian Relations,” File #124 4/464, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, Australia.  Records from this archive hereafter cited as AWM. 
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Even before the 1940s, Australian government and social leaders voiced concern 
over the effect of American “talkies” on Australian society and morals. Joy Damousi 
articulated those concerns in a recent article on the influx of American film into Australia 
in the 1920s and 1930s when she wrote, “Critics deemed the American ‘sound’ offensive, 
coarse, and harsh, with a consensus that the American accent was not considered 
appropriate for Australian audiences.  They felt that the American ‘twang’ was 
undermining the foundation on which the Australian sound was based, which was 
English, proper, formal, and precise.”12 To what degree the American government took 
advantage of the inroads created by motion pictures is debatable but the perceived eff ct 
on the bond between the two states is an important to demonstrate how cultural forces 
helped to mold political decisions. Such concerns highlight another important, and 
oftentimes overlooked, aspect of the rapport: the presence of Great Britain. The presence 
of Great Britain exerted an opposite pull on Australia, who faced the decision of forgoing 
to old imperial relationship in favor on the untested one with the U.S. 
 This relationship between the two nations has often been simplified as the basic 
axiom that the United States and Australia are, similar to the United Statesand Great 
Britain, kith and kin for whom it is natural to look to for support in the international 
arena. This standard interpretation of American – Australian relations has dominated the 
small amount of historical writing on this topic for decades. There are two principal parts 
to this interpretation: first, that both nations share a common bond based primarily on the 
shared culture of Great Britain, which includes language, political institutions and 
                                                          
12 Joy Damousi, “‘The Filthy American Twang’: Elocution, the Advent of American ‘Talkies’, and 
Australian Cultural Identity,” The American Historical Review 112 (April 2007): 410. 
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historical development and second, World War II provided the catalyst for cementing the 
natural bonds between both countries. Sir Richard G. Casey, the first Australian 
ambassador appointed to Washington in 1940, provided evidence of this first principle in 
a speech he gave to the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on March 12, 1940. 
Casey told the assembled reporters: 
There are many points of similarity between our two countries.  We both occupy 
countries of great size.  We are both barely through the pioneering stage.  We 
have great variations of climate and terrain and productivity.  We have both 
adopted the device of a Federal form of government to bind together a number of 
pre-existing states.  Actually our Federal system is largely based on yours.  
Neither of us have any neighbors whose hostility gives us any concern – and, in 
consequence, we have been able to avoid growing up as military countries with 
great standing armies.  One could draw many striking comparisons between our 
countries.13 
 
Historians have for the most part agreed with Casey’s statement and used it as the 
primary paradigm through which relations between the two countries has been viewed 
with little consideration for differences between the two parties and how those 
differences were overcome.14 
 The second point, concerning the role of World War II in the development of 
relations between these two nations, is evident in an examination of the historiography.  
Australian historians have focused much of their attention on that brief period between 
1941 and 1945 when American servicemen met with Australian servicemen and civilians 
and the governments of both countries seemingly melded together to combat Imperial 
Japan in the Pacific. American historians have not delved into this topic in any gret 
                                                          
13 Richard G. Casey, “Text of Speech to National Press Club,” Speech given to the National Press Club of 
Washington D.C. on March 12, 1940, R.G. Casey Papers, 3DRL 2418, File #419/18/6, AWM. 
14 See Roger Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian – American Relations and the Pacific War (Clayton, Victoria, 
1977), Norman Harper, Pacific Orbit: Australian – American Relations Since 1942 (Melbourne, 1968) and 
Raymond Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance: U.S. – Australian Relations, 1931 – 1941 (Seattle, 1964). 
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detail and the majority of U.S. histories that do touch on American – Australian relations 
present a picture of the United States suddenly “discovering” Australia in 1942 and just 
as quickly forgetting about it as the Allied offensives in the Pacific shifted away from the 
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) further north.  By 1945, as the last American soldier  
and seamen departed from Australia, many historians have made it seem that the relations 
between the two countries simply came to a halt.15   
 But as is true with many perceived historical truths, the story of American and 
Australian relations is a far more complex and, in many ways, less triumphant story than 
has been thought. This bond has not been a simple and harmonious relationship that came 
about of its own volition but rather was constructed and cultivated by a generation of 
leaders in both countries to satisfy national security concerns and to meet the dangers that 
swept over the globe in the middle of the twentieth century. 
 A reexamination of the U.S. – Australian relationship has been long overdue. An 
in depth inquiry into this topic reveals that the governments of both the United States and 
Australia continuously molded and shaped a relationship based on the most pragmatic of 
reasons, national security, but also that both sides continuously used the idea of a special 
                                                          
15 Works to examine which detail this predominant hisor ographical view include David Day, Reluctant 
Nation: Australia and the Defeat of Japan 1942 – 1945 (Melbourne, 1992),Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A 
Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1988), T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War (New York, 
1978), Roger Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian – American Relations and the Pacific War (Clayton, 
Victoria, 1977), Norman Harper, Pacific Orbit: Australian – American Relations Since 1942 (Melbourne, 
1968) and Raymond Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance: U.S. – Australian Relations, 1931 – 1941 (Seattle, 
1964). Each of these works places World War II in the center of developing American – Australian 
relations. Other historians have also placed great emphasis on the importance of World War II as a means 
of developing cultural or social bonds between America and Australia.  Prime examples here include 
Anthony Barker and Lisa Jackson, Fleeting Attractions: A Social History of American Servicemen in 
Western Australia During World War II (Nedlands, Western Australia, 1996), Kate Darian-Smith, On the 
Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939 – 1945 (New York, 1990), E. Daniel and Annette Potts, Yanks 
Down Under 1941 – 45 (Oxford, 1985) and John Hammond Moore, Over-Sexed, Over-Paid and Over 
Here: Americans in Australia, 1941 – 1945 (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1981). 
11 
 
bond to rationalize what was a sometimes stormy relationship to both their citizens and to 
themselves.    
   The ties between the two nations were never as serene as has been presented to 
the public. The picture presented often is one of the United States leading and Australia 
following lockstep behind. This work will demonstrate this was not the case. The 
relationship between these two nations has been punctuated by periods of strong 
disagreement over a number of issues. Some of the most important have been the conduct 
of the Pacific War on the part of the United States and Great Britain, the peace settlement 
with Japan in 1945 and the subsequent treaty of peace signed in 1951, the issue of 
international wool markets in 1947 and the long standing issue of Douglas MacArthur 
and his role as Allied commander in the SWPA during World War II and his subsequent 
handling of United Nations forces in Korea from 1950 until his relief in late 1951.   
 The peace settlement with Japan was perhaps the greatest point of contention 
between Australia and the United States. Australians felt they had been left out in the 
cold when the Big Three issued the Cairo Declaration in 1943 outlining the conditions for 
Allied victory in the Pacific and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 in which the Allies 
hinted at the possibility of the Emperor Hirohito being allowed to retain the Japanese 
throne. In a broadcast to the United States, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, the Australian Minister 
for External Affairs, stated: 
Australia is not a party to, and cannot subscribe to, the terms of surrender offered     
Japan in the Potsdam ultimatum. The recent Potsdam ultimatum to Japan is 
published without prior reference to the Australian Government.  The ultimatum 
was of fundamental importance to the Australian Government.  Yet the 
Government’s first knowledge of it came from the press.  Steps had been taken to 
secure Chinese concurrence to the ultimatum but Australian interests and 
12 
 
concurrence were no less significant.  While Australia fully recognizes the right 
of initiative of the main belligerents, nations like Australia which have been most 
active in the war were entitled to participate in all relevant conferences before 
final decisions were taken.  This principle had been conceded, yet in the present 
case a departure had been made from it.16 
The issue of how large a role Australia should be accorded in international affairs would 
become a longstanding sticking point in the relations between both nations and would not 
be resolved until the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. And even then, observers in 
Australia and the U.S. would recognize that ANZUS was a flawed settlement that lef  
some of the longstanding issues between the U.S. and Australia unresolved. 
 When examined, though, all of the contentious issues which arose between 
Canberra, Washington and London all boiled down to one concern: Australia’s perceived 
lack of input on major allied and British Commonwealth decisions. For a nation whose 
very idea of self- identity was built on the notion of misuse by more powerful nations, 
usually by their former colonial masters in London, it is not surprising that Australians 
and their government would want to make sure that the past did not repeat itself. This 
sense of abuse by London became prevalent after the 1915 Gallipoli campaign. The 
failure of the Australian forces at Gallipoli was blamed wholly by Australian politicians 
and the general populace on the British planners and commanders of the invasion. The 
long standing bitterness that Australians felt about Gallipoli colored many of their 
perceptions about their treatment in the international sphere. 
As stated previously, there have been two main precepts in the historical writings 
on this topic. The first, that the United States and Australia are culturally bound is a  
                                                          
16 Military cable from Colonel Bowen to Captain Vardam n, July 19, 1945, SMOF: Naval Aides File Box 




issue this work will dispute. A close examination of the historical records reveals that 
while both governments utilized fraternal language, the Australians were quick to point 
out the vast differences that existed between the two nations. In a speech delivere  to the 
Advertising Club of New York, Sir Richard G. Casey, one of Australia’s greatest 
proponents of close American – Australians relations, told the gathered crowd, “We have 
grown up under very much the same set of conditions, and we are both free of the 
restraints and formalities that inhibit the old world.  However, I am not going t make the 
mistake of believing that we are blood brothers.  We are not.  We are different 
nationalities.”17 Casey, and others on both sides of the Pacific, made comments like this 
on many occasions which leads one to ask how accurate has the traditional emphasis on 
this idea of a special relationship been? A more concrete example of how vast 
dissimilarities existed between Australians and Americans can be found in the 
experiences of American servicemen who passed through Australia during World ar II. 
One serviceman recounted how quickly he learned to ask for “servettes” in restaurants in 
Australia instead of “napkins” – a term Australians used when discussing feminin  
hygiene products.18 And while this may seem to be a trivial incident, one is reminded of 
Winston Churchill’s famous quote concerning Americans and the British being a 
common people separated by a common language. This insight could be equally applied 
to American – Australian relations. Edward Drea’s comment that few Americans who 
                                                          
17 R.G. Casey, “Text of Speech Given to the Advertising Club of New York,” Speech given to the 
Advertising Club of New York on May 22, 1941, R.G. Casey Papers, 3DRL 2418, File # 419/18/6, AWM. 
18 Anthony Arthur, Bushmasters: America’s Jungle Warriors of World War II , (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1987), 182. 
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encountered Australians during World War II could fully appreciate the cultural gap 
between the two nations is borne out upon a closer examination of the relationship. 
The second point, which posits that World War II was the seminal moment in 
shaping American – Australian relations, will also be challenged. One of the principal 
arguments of this work is that the early Cold War period (1947 – 1953) was key in the 
development of the American – Australian alliance. One glaring problem in the
historiography of American – Australian relations is the lack of attention paid by 
historians to the early Cold War period. The little that has been written about this 
association has generally argued that in the aftermath of World War II, the United States 
and Australia reverted to a pre-war relationship, driven by economics. An examination of 
some major studies of the early Cold War era reveal that few historians have considered 
the role that Australia played in influencing shifting American conceptions of the post-
war Pacific region.  Walter LaFeber includes only a fleeting discussion of the formation 
of the Australia – New Zealand – United States Tripartite Agreement (ANZUS) in 1951. 
Melvyn Leffler includes only brief mentions of U.S. and Australian confrontations over 
the peace treaty with Japan and only a terse one-sentence acknowledgment of ANZUS.19   
This work will demonstrate that the United States and Australia both reached the 
conclusion that their shared interest in a secure Pacific region, protected from the 
encroachments of communism spreading from Asia, made it imperative to develop a 
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strong bond to combat what each saw as the single greatest threat to the world and their
own security. In a memorandum prepared by the State Department for President Truman 
before a meeting with Prime Minster Menzies gives evidence of how aware the United 
States was of this point, “Australia is very conscious of the dangers of communist 
expansion in South East Asia.  Australian initiation of plans for [British] Commonwealth 
technical and economic assistance in this area was prompted in the first instance by a 
desire to ameliorate conditions of poverty and underdevelopment which are conducive to 
the spread of communism.  We, of course, share the Australian interest of maintaining 
stability in the area.”20   
As stated earlier, the majority of writings on American diplomacy in the early
Cold War period have viewed American actions primarily through an economic 
perspective. Such works can be attributed to the influence of William Appleman 
Williams on American diplomatic historians.21 An examination of American – Australian 
relations reveals that while economics has played a role in determining the tone and 
direction of the relationship, its importance in this case is more secondary, although it is 
interesting to note the economic relationship between America and Australia has often 
been rather testy and again goes against the idea of a relationship free from discord. A 
prime example of this tempestuous bond can be seen in an October 7, 1936 note in the 
papers of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. In this note, Morgenthau 
reveals that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had denied most-favored-nation trading
status to both Nazi Germany and Australia because of the discriminatory practices used 
                                                          
20 Background Memoranda on Visit to the United States of the Right Honorable Robert G. Menzies Prime 
Minister of Australia, July 1950, OF 48d, Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
21 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 2nd Ed. (New York, 1972). 
16 
 
by both countries against American business. It is interesting to consider that a country 
which five years from this point would be one of America’s primary allies in World War 
II is here being grouped together with Nazi Germany.22 While economics provides an 
avenue of insight into the connection formed between America and Australia, the relativ  
unimportance of Australian trade for the United States makes it difficult to accept this as 
the primary lens to view American – Australian relations.   
 Much of the historical literature makes it seem as though relations between the 
two countries has been a recent phenomenon. This is not the case. Americans and 
Australians have a long, albeit intermittent, history of interaction with one another. In the 
early 1800s, American whaling ships in the Pacific used ports along the coast of Australia 
to restock supplies and to rest before setting out on their long journey back to New 
England. The latter 1800s saw little in the way of official interaction taking place 
between Australia and the United States as the U.S. focused on internal development and 
Australia left its foreign policy in the hands of Great Britain. It is true that there were 
some Americans entering into Australia from San Francisco and vice-versa inspired by 
the California gold rushes and similar findings occurring in Australia but the numbers 
were negligible and had little effect on relations between the nations.23 
One of the first notable points of interaction occurred in August of 1908 when 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet sailed into the harbors of Melbourn  
and Sydney as stops along their world tour. The greeting the American ships received 
                                                          
22 Press Release to Dow Jones, October 7, 1936, Henry J. Morgenthau Diaries: Depression and New Deal, 
1933 – 1939, Reel 11, Diary 38, p. 71, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1995). The 
above collection is a three part series of Morgenthau’s diaries that have been microfilmed.  




was overwhelmingly positive as thousands of Australians turned out to see and cheer the 
American Navy. This reaction was in part due to growing Australian fears over Japanese 
ambitions in the Pacific in the wake of the latter’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1905, a fear shared by many American policymakers, including Roosevelt.24 Important to 
the future story of American – Australian relations was the clear role that race played in 
American and Australian concerns over Japan even in 1908. The Japanese, for both 
Washington and Canberra, became the Other by which both nations could define 
themselves and their place in the Pacific. 
The first occasion where large numbers of Americans and Australians had the best 
possibility to encounter one another was in the trenches of the Western Front during 
World War I fighting against Imperial Germany. Many American units were first led into 
battle under the watchful eyes of Australians. The memories of this period for both 
nations revolve around the doughboys and the diggers sharing the horrors and burdens of 
the trenches and their deep respect for the fighting ability of the other. But again the 
numbers of Americans and Australians who fought side by side were never on the level 
that both Australians and Americans have claimed. Australia and the United Stas had 
the most exposure to each other not on the battlefields of France but in the halls of 
Versailles during the Paris Peace Conference after the war.   
President Woodrow Wilson had come to the peace conference hailed as the savior 
of western democracy and intent on seeing his idea of a peace without vengeance put into 
action. Wilson’s idealism was roughly greeted by the cold political realism of Australian 
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Prime Minister William Hughes. They clashed over the issue of German territori s in the 
Pacific. Hughes demanded that Australia be granted a mandate for the control of these 
territories in repayment for the bloody sacrifice of Australian soldiers at places like 
Gallipoli. This old-style territory grabbing flew in the face of what Wilson had come to 
Paris to see done. Both men, well known for their stubborn natures, had several heated 
clashes over the course of the conference.25 So the first close meeting between Australia 
and the United States had been far less than the familial relations that have been 
presented by past historians. 
The 1920s saw both nations turn their attention to domestic concerns. Americans 
enjoyed the spoils of the economic growth engendered by their involvement in World 
War I. Mass production techniques were becoming more widespread and allowing the 
majority of Americans for the first time to enjoy items that hitherto had been 
unaffordable. It truly was a time when, as President Calvin Coolidge is famous for 
remarking, “America’s business was business.” The high point of interaction between 
Australia and the U.S. in the 1920s came during 1925 when several ships of the U.S. 
Navy paid a call on Sydney. Again the reception to the Americans was overwhelmingly 
positive, one that matched in intensity the greeting which had been given to Roosevelt’s 
Great White Fleet seventeen years earlier.26   
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Australia was content to leave its external affairs in the hands of the diplomats in 
London and secure in the knowledge that the British navy protected their shores. 
Australians gained a new sense of their place in the world because of their involvement in 
World War I which began a debate as to whether or not Australia was truly a nation equal 
to the others of the world, or still an extension of the British Empire. This debate would
have implications for the future development of American – Australian relations. The 
triangular relationship of Australia, Great Britain and the United States forms ne of the 
most crucial aspects of understanding American – Australian relations. This issue is not 
simply one of historical conjecture. It weighed on the mind of Australians, Americans 
and British. In a 1947 editorial in the magazine Pacific Neighbors, an unnamed author 
posited that Australia, “Standing as she does midway between the traditionalism of the 
old world and the more fluid patterns of the new,” was well qualified to serve as a bridge
between the U.S. and Great Britain.27  Numerous questions remain unanswered about this 
triangular relationship. Was American policy towards Australia simply an extension of its 
policy towards Great Britain? Was Australia able to exert its own independent way 
between the two great powers? How did anti-British sentiment so prevalent among 
American policymakers in the 1930s and 1940s influence their views on Australia? This 
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work will address these questions, among others, in an attempt to present a holistic 
picture of American – Australian relations.28  
There was little contact, official or unofficial, between Australians and Americans 
in the decade leading up to the 1930s. The onset of the Great Depression in some ways 
reinforced the isolationist impulses of Americans and Australians. However, the growing 
threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan brought leaders in both countries to 
the conclusion that it was now necessary to re-engage with the wider world and with each 
other. The primary issue that would face these leaders would be how best to overcome 
the differences between them. 
This work will show that this relationship was built primarily upon two distinctive 
ideologies, in opposition to the traditional emphasis on economics. One was a shared 
racial ideology that helped to motivate fears about the spread of Japanese power in the 
1930s and helped lead both nations to come together during the Pacific campaigns of 
World War II and the early Cold War period. Second was a shared fear of communism 
and a subsequent commitment to stop the perceived spread of this ideology in Asia. 
Interestingly race and anti-communism have a connection. In the United States in late 
1940s and early 1950s, persons and groups who worked to attain better race relations 
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were often labeled as communists or communist sympathizers. While evidence of the 
same phenomenon occurring in Australia is somewhat more difficult to see, it could be 
argued that the one often informed opinions about the other.  What is notable is the use of 
racial language that was used against Japan in the 1940s made an easy transition to being 
applied to communist states in Asia after 1945. 
The issue of race provides us with an intriguing view into relations between the 
U.S. and Australia. Both had legalized forms of segregation the American South had Jim 
Crow laws and in Australia the White Australia Policy existed to maintain the 
homogeneity of the nation. Most Americans are familiar with the history of Jim Crow 
and many were cognizant of the apartheid system of South Africa, but are not familiar 
with White Australia. The White Australia policy operated in a somewhat different 
manner from Jim Crow and apartheid. As a result of the gold rushes of the mid and late 
1800s, many companies in Australia imported a large number of Asian workers to meet 
growing labor demands. The traditional Anglo-Saxon powerbase in Australia feared th t 
this influx of Asians would overwhelm the once perceived outpost of European 
civilization in the Pacific and so created an immigration system that sought to keep out 
persons on the basis of race. A booklet prepared for Australian soldiers serving outside of 
the country during World War II contained this explanation of the White Australia policy, 
“To the principle of ‘White Australia’ all political parties in the British Commonwealth 
subscribe, for the economic reason that the white man’s standard of living would be 
endangered by the introduction of colored labor.  Thus, the flow of English-speaking 
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investor-settlers is especially encouraged.”29 This was a sentiment many in the United 
States, in both the North and the South, could agree with. It is also important to note the 
emphasis not just on race but on ethnicity as well. Southern and Eastern Europeans were 
often discouraged from immigrating to Australia because they were not considered 
“white.” The same phenomenon has been well documented in the U.S. through the latter 
half of the 19th century and into the mid-twentieth century.30 
Aside from the distinct political dimension that race played in fostering this 
relationship, there was a two-tiered racial fear that helped to animate Americans and 
Australians alike. The specific aspect of this racial fear was a fear o  Japan. This mindset 
supplemented and arose out of a more generalized concern over the threat of the “Yellow 
Peril.” John Dower’s seminal work on the interplay between race and the savagery of the 
Pacific War has clearly highlighted this process.  As he states in War Without Mercy, 
“anti-Japanese sentiment in the Anglo-American camp became entangled with larger 
fears concerning Asians in general (the Yellow Peril) and ‘colored’ peoples as a whole.”31   
The specific fear of Japan for both the United States and Australia can be traced 
to the early years of the twentieth century. When Japan defeated Russia in the 1905 
Russo-Japanese War, it represented the first time that an Asian power had defeated a 
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Western power in modern history. Western powers with holdings in the Pacific feared 
that the native populations under their dominion would begin to clamor, or even worse 
openly revolt. In 1902, Great Britain signed a formal alliance with Japan in order t 
lessen the threat to its Pacific holdings. Australians viewed this move with horror as they 
felt that London had betrayed the interests of the European powers by aligning with an 
Asian people. This move by Great Britain further aggravated Australian nationalists who 
felt that allegiance to the Empire would only lead to ruin for Australia. Over the next 
decades, Australians kept a wary eye to the north fearing Japanese territorial aspi ations 
would inevitably lead them south and threaten Australia. In the 1930s, as Japan’s war in 
China intensified, Australian policymakers considered their position. Many feared Great 
Britain, due to the threat posed by Nazi Germany in Europe, would be unable to come to 
their aid in the event Japan began southward expansion.  Some Australians placed their 
hope in the British Commonwealth’s naval base at Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East,” 
as a deterrent to Japan. Others began to consider it necessary to look across the Pacific to 
United States. It is during this time that calls for a formal security all ance with the 
United States appeared in Australia. 
The American relationship with Japan in the twentieth century leading up to the 
outbreak of war in 1941 was equally rocky. Robert Ferrell outlined the first thirty years of 
American – Japanese relations in the twentieth century in his work on American 
diplomacy. He wrote, “ever since the victory of Japan over Russia in 1904 – 1905 and the 
subsequent refusal of the Japanese to be houseboys for the open door, distrust had existed 
between the two Pacific nations, Japan and the United States, a distrust which on several 
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occasions before 1931 had overcome the normal reticences of international discourse.”32  
Several of the incidents that Ferrell alludes to include the segregation of Japanese 
schoolchildren in San Francisco public schools in 1906 and the exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants from the United States in the Immigration Act of 1924. With the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, American opinion swung decidedly against Japan, much 
of which was animated by a deep-seated racial animosity.   
With the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific in December of 1941 the racial 
aspect of the war came to the foreground. In a memorandum outlining his general 
thoughts concerning American policies for the upcoming war in the Pacific, Admiral 
Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations 
(COMINCH – CNO) and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, “Australia – and 
New Zealand – are ‘white men’s countries’ which it is essential that we shall not allow to 
be overrun by Japan – because of the repercussions among the non-white races of the 
world.”33 King here articulates both the specific fears related to Japan as well as the more 
general concerns about the “non-white races” as he terms it. The manner in which the 
United States executed the war in the Pacific was marked by heavy racial rhetoric fueling 
the already enflamed passions of the nation in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.34 Both 
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Americans and Australians found their racial attitudes provided them a with a shared 
understanding of the nature of the enemy, and the goals of the war. 
One interesting corollary to the racial aspect of the relationship this work will 
address is the ambiguous issue of the introduction of African-American servicemen into 
Australia during World War II. Blacks were among some of the first American troops to 
arrive in Australia starting in 1942. They did not come as combat soldiers but mostly as 
members of construction companies and manual laborers. The Australian government 
was placed in a precarious position. On the one hand it was the official policy of 
Australia to deter non-whites from entering the country to perform work that otherwise 
could be done by a white Australian. On the other hand, the black servicemen arrived as 
part of the force that many Australians felt were there to save them from an impending 
Japanese invasion. The treatment many black Americans received in Australia can only 
be defined as ambiguous. Often they were warmly greeted and welcomed into Australian 
society, in contrast to the treatment they received from their own white superiors. But 
many in Australia also worried about the possibility that these black Americans would 
take advantage of the young daughters of Australia. This issue has not received any in-
depth study from historians even though it offers a unique view on the issue of American 
– Australian relations. It will be the contention of this work that this issue helped to 
familiarize both Americans and Australians with the others’ attitudes towards r ce and 
reveals another aspect of the uncertain attitudes Australians had for their Amer can 
counterparts.35 
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The second part of the foundation of American – Australian relationships was a 
shared commitment to anti-communism. Historians of both countries have produced a 
sizeable body of work that examines the experiences of their respective countries in 
dealing with this topic. However few works have attempted to look at anti-communis  i  
the United States in a comparative manner with anti-communism in Australia. An 
examination of the relationship demonstrates how this issue helped to further bring both 
governments together.36 
Among the many allies of the United States during the early Cold War perhaps 
only Australia matched America’s preoccupation with communism in Asia. In the case of 
Australia this can be attributed to the fact that after World War II, Australians came to 
think very clearly of themselves as the leader of the free nations of the Pacific, as well as 
the geographic nearness of the threat. Communist expansion in China in 1949, 
Communist insurgency in Malaya, the Huk rebellion in the Philippines in 1946, and Ho 
Chi Minh’s independence movement in Indochina made many in Australia take notice 
that a new peril had appeared on their northern doorstep that appeared every bit as 
menacing as had the Japanese threat during World War II.   
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Sir Richard Casey, writing in 1955, stated “Australia is a link in the world-wide 
chain of democratic countries that comprise the grand alliance against international 
Communism. The survival of democracy as a whole depends on all the links of the chain 
holding good.”37 For Australians, this meant ensuring the support of their nation by the 
U.S. Anti-communism proved to be as powerful a political tool in Australia as it was in 
the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Labor Party, which had been in 
power in Australia since 1942, was defeated in general elections in 1949 by Robert 
Menzies’s Liberal Party primarily because of the strident anti-communist rhetoric used 
by Menzies and his cohorts In 1951, the Menzies government attempted to pass a 
national law that would have outlawed the communist party. It must be noted that, as 
anti-communist as the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were, neither ever 
attempted such a measure in the United States.38 
Historians have written volumes on the anti-communist phenomenon in the 
United States that occurred after World War II. It is difficult for many to understand the 
drastic effect that American fear of communism had on the implementation of American 
foreign policy. It was the central dictate of American policymakers and oftentimes other 
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nations’ level of anti-communism was used as a measuring stick by which the Uni ed
States judged those nations worthiness to receive aid or support from the U.S. 
This litmus test was applied to Australia. Many in the American government 
became deeply interested in the possible strength of communism in Australia or the 
seeming indifference they perceived among average Australians. American ambassador 
Pete Jarman revealed this concern in a 1951 letter to Alexander Wiley, a former 
colleague in Congress, writing, “The Communist situation is interesting and intrigu ng 
and difficult to understand. While they are entirely too ‘rampant’ for your and my way of 
thinking, this does not seem to greatly disturb the average citizen.”39 In many ways, 
Americans did not know how much to trust Australia when it came to the issue of 
communism.   
On the one hand Americans recognized Australia had been one of the first 
countries to answer the UN’s call for aid to South Korea in 1950. President Truman was 
reminded of this in a background briefing report prepared for him before a meeting with 
Prime Minister Menzies in July 1950. The memorandum stated, “The prompt reaction of 
Australia to the invasion of Korea and the unanimous vote of approval given by the 
Australian parliament to the military measure taken by the Government afford  good 
indication of the close identity of views between the United States and Australia on 
matters of fundamental importance.”40 The fiscally conservative Truman administration 
heeded the proposition of NSC 162/2, which argued that the United States could not 
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afford to meet the exorbitant defense costs that the Cold War would bring on without the 
support of allies like Australia.41   
But at the same time, fears abounded in Washington over how deeply communists 
had burrowed into Australian government and society. A 1949 briefing book prepared by 
the CIA for President Truman reveals how interested the American government was in 
this question. The findings of the report reveal the U.S. was unsure of how strong 
communism was in Australia but even this uncertainty did not deter the CIA from 
maintaining that, “Although the extent of Communist influence within the government is 
not clear, the Australian Communist Party is undoubtedly a significant factorin the labor 
movement.  Communists occupy key positions in 7 of the 9 most important trade unions.  
The strength of Communist influence has been demonstrated in a series of large-scale 
postwar strikes which have followed a common pattern.”42 This strain of distrust colored 
how close the United States would take Australia into its confidence and would prove to 
be yet another point of friction between the two. 
The continued importance of the Australian relationship for the United States in 
today’s world cannot be undervalued. Australia has repeatedly demonstrated its 
commitment to support the United States in even some of its most ill-advised foreign 
policy ventures. Few Americans fully understand the nature of the relationship that has 
been built between the two countries in the twentieth century and the importance that th
Australian government attaches to its friendship with the United States. In many ways, 
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Americans are as much in the dark about U.S. – Australian relations now as they were in
the 1930s. The same could not be said of Australians, whose history in the past fifty years 
has often been dominated by the presence of the United States. Some would wonder why 
expatriate Australian and media mogul Rupert Murdoch, son of Australian newspaper 
mogul Sir Keith Murdoch, pushed for the creation of a U.S. Studies Center to be housed 
at the University of Sydney. The answer lies in the continued importance of the U.S. 
alliance for Australia. In many ways, a relationship forged by the exigenc es of war has 
become institutionalized, with few in either country fully questioning how or why the 
alliance began.  
 A study of the bond forged between these two nations reveals an important 
number of insights into not only American foreign policy making in the twentieth century 
but also into how crucial cultural tools and perceptions have become in helping to spread 
American influence in the twentieth century. It is a story that does not have a glamorous 
or auspicious beginning but it touches on several of the most important issues concerning 
the spread of American power and influence during this century. The American – 
Australian story also provides another avenue to explore the centrality of race to the 
American experience by demonstrating how American interactions with both non-white 
and white nations were driven by perceptions of race in the twentieth century. This work 
also provides insight into how the United States consciously constructed foreign 
alliances, a significant transition in American foreign policy given the previous 
dominance of unilateralism in American foreign policy thinking. The development of the 
Australia rapport constitutes one of the few major successes that the U.S. enjoyed i  
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cultivating a continuous and friendly relationship with a Pacific nation in the twentieth 
century. The story is long and complex and has been misunderstood by both parties and 



































Chapter 2: An Acrimonious Time: 1933 - 1940 
The inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency of the United States
in March 1933 marked for many Americans a brief respite from the bleakness of the 
economic depression that had gripped their country and the world since 1929. Roosevelt 
defeated Republican incumbent Hebert Hoover by calling for a new direction to help 
restore hope to a defeated populace. Historians have primarily remembered Roosevelt’s 
first term for its aggressive and sometimes unorthodox policies to help end the Great 
Depression.1 But it was not only in the domestic sphere that his administration sought to 
break with past policies. In the realm of foreign policy, Roosevelt sough a new path in a 
world precariously balanced between peace and war. 
 After World War I, American foreign policy had been marked by isolationism. It 
should be noted that isolationism in this period did not mean a complete cutting off from 
all outside contact. Rather, isolationism in the 1920s was characterized by a pronounced 
withdrawal of governmental guidance in American foreign policy in favor of using 
private individuals and corporations to act as American proxies.2   The horrors of World 
War I, the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 by the United States Senate, and 
the Allies’ inability or unwillingness to repay war debts created a dour mood in the 
country. Many Americans felt that sacrifice made and the lives lost had been worthless. 
                                                          
1 For the best accounts of Roosevelt’s first term see Anthony Badger, FDR: The First Hundred Days (New 
York, 2008), Paul Conkin, The New Deal 2nd Ed. (New York, 1975) and William E. Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932 – 1940 (New York, 1963). For a complete recounting of 
Roosevelt’s life and time in office see James McGrego  Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New 
York, 1956) and Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York, 1970) as well as Jean Edward Smith, FDR 
(New York, 2007). 
2 For a discussion of this phenomenon see George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign 
Relations  since 1776 (New York, 2008), 436 – 483. There were noted exceptions to the American 
governmental withdrawal from foreign affairs in the 1920s, notably the Washington Naval Conference of 
1921 – 22 and the Kellogg – Briand Pact of 1928. 
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Other factors also shaped the nation’s attitudes about foreign policy. Robert Dall k 
argued that an outpouring of nativist thinking in the 1920s played a significant role in the 
isolationism that marked American foreign policy between World War I and World War 
II. Dallek wrote, “This nativist upsurge, this fear that insidious alien influences were 
endangering America’s unique institutions, was the central force behind the isolationist 
impulse in the country’s foreign policy between the wars.”3 It is easy to see the upsurge 
Dallek refers to when examining the inter-war period.  The revival of the Klu Klux lan 
in 1915 was based as much on fear of immigrants, anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism, as 
hatred for African-Americans. The Johnson – Reed Act of 1924 imposed quotas on the 
number of immigrants who could come to the United States and excluded all immigrants 
from Asia. This final point was aimed specifically at Japanese and Chinese immigrants 
moving to the West Coast.4 
 The Roosevelt Administration linked its foreign policy to its domestic efforts t  
end the Great Depression. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, along with Roosevelt, worked 
to end autarky and restrictive barriers to free trade, arguing that the creation of reciprocal 
free trade treaties and zones would drastically alleviate the economic woes of th  world 
and remove many of the impediments to world peace that had arisen since 1929. The 
effort to create free trade became one of the hallmarks of Roosevelt’s foreign policy 
during his time in office, primarily championed by Hull. Robert Ferrell points out, 
however, that Roosevelt’s policies proved to be no more effective in helping ease either 
                                                          
3 Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Policies and Foreign Affairs (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 113. 
4 See Peter Wang, Legislating “Normalcy”: The Immigration Act of 1924 (Saratoga, CA, 1975). The Reed 
– Johnson Act limited the number of immigrants who could be admitted from any country to 2% of the 
number of people from that country who were already living in the United States in 1890. 
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the economic or political tensions of the 1930s.5 The reasons for the failure of 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the 1930s are myriad, but historians have often identified 
one primary cause, the byzantine nature of the Roosevelt Administration. Jonathan Utley 
provided one such critique, “Rather than a smoothly functioning, harmonious machine, 
the foreign policy establishment in the Roosevelt Administration was a snake pit of 
influential leaders and faceless bureaucrats working at cross-purposes, striking deals, and 
not infrequently employing sleight of hand in order to move the nation in the direction 
each thought was most appropriate.”6 Roosevelt himself was often seen as the main 
reason for the shortcomings of his administration’s foreign policy because of his 
unwillingness to ever give subordinates clear insight into what he desired from them.7 
 Australia welcomed the seeming reemergence of the United States onto the world 
scene. John Hammond Moore contends that American – Australian ties were almost non-
existent prior to World War II because of the insignificance of trade and commercial ties 
between the countries, noting that “Australia, among the most loyal of dominions and 
generally ruled by conservatives who thought any independence from London was high 
treason, found it extremely difficult to develop significant trans-Pacific relations.”8 
Moore’s point is partially valid.  American – Australian relations in the twenty-year 
period between the wars was sporadic at best.  Australia continued to rely on the Britis  
Embassy in Washington as its primary contact with the Americans while the American 
                                                          
5 Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 185. 
6 Jonathan Utley, Going to War With Japan 1937 – 1941 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 
1985), xii – xiii.  
7 An excellent insight into this phenomenon can be found in Warren Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin 
Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991). 
8 John Hammond Moore, Over-Sexed, Over-Paid, and Over Here: Americans in Australia, 1941 – 1945 
(St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981), 1. 
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consular service in Australia was considered a backwater post among the foreign policy 
establishment. But even taking these factors into account, it is wrong to contend that 
American – Australian relations in the 1930s stayed in this state.  
 There were several factors that conspired to bring the United States and Australia 
into closer contact as the decade wore on. Roosevelt’s appointment of Jay Pierrepont 
Moffat as America’s consul-general in Australia in 1935 signaled a change in American 
interest in Australia. Moffat was one of the bright stars in the State Department who had 
previously served in several other important posts abroad. His appointment to Australia 
indicated Roosevelt was beginning to take more interest in the Pacific and Australia.9 
Moffat quickly became an invaluable source of information on the state of American – 
Australian relations for Washington as he traced the steady decline in the association 
prior to World War II. 
 Before World War I, Australia had a romanticized vision of the United States 
owing mainly to the American fleet visits of 1908 and 1924. George Pearce, Australian 
Minister for External Affairs between 1934 and 1937, highlighted this for Consul-
General Moffat during a conversation between the two in 1935. Moffat recorded in his 
diary, “Sir George started his recital with the visit of the American Fleet to Australia in 
1908 when American influence was at its apex. Popular songs were being sung, ‘We have 
a big brother in America.’ From one end of Australia to the other the visit of the Fleet 
                                                          
9 Moffat had previously served in the Netherlands, Poland, Japan, and Switzerland. He would later serve as 
Chief of the State Department’s Western European Division and as ambassador to Canada during World 
War II.  
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was regarded as a demonstration of white solidarity against the yellow races.”10 Pearce’s 
statement deserves attention because it draws attention to how prominent a role race 
played in the Australian mind when considering the U.S., even at this early point. In the 
aftermath of World War I, though, Australian perception of the United States began to 
sour due to several factors. Raymond Esthus delineated just a few of these in his work on 
American – Australia relations between 1931 and 1941. He listed America’s long delay 
in entering World War I, the refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty and the subs quent 
refusal to join the League of Nations and American insistence on the full payment of war 
debts from its Allies as four of the primary reasons why Australians soon became 
disillusioned with their Pacific neighbors. He went on to argue, “When world economic 
depression came in 1929, Australians were quick to hold American economic policies as 
responsible for the disaster.”11 Moffat added two other possible explanations for the 
decline in American – Australian relations that occurred over the 1930s. In an 
unpublished essay written in 1937 Moffat wrote, “First, a conscious drive on the part of 
British organs of public opinion to diminish our influence, and second, a form of 
inferiority complex which makes the Australian resent in others the accomplish ents he 
most craves for himself.”12  
 Even while Australian attitudes about America began to change, American 
cultural power continued to influence the nation’s perception down under. The American 
                                                          
10 Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay 
Pierrepont Moffat 1919 – 1943 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 129. For discussion of 
the Great White Fleet see Robert Hart, The Great White Fleet: It Voyage Around the World, 1907 – 1909 
(Boston, 1965) and James Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet (Annapolis, MD, 1988). 
11 Raymond Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance: U.S. – Australian Relations, 1931 – 1941 (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1964), 6. 
12 Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers, 124 – 125. 
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cinema in Australian life most strongly contributed to the romanticized image of the 
United States. Few other American exports did more to spread an idealized version of 
America and its people than the movies. The American sociologist Robert Park wrote the 
cinema “may be regarded as the symbol of a new dimension of our international and 
racial relations which is neither economic nor political, but cultural.”13 In few countries 
were American films as popular as in Australia. By the end of the 1930s, 75 per cent of 
all films being shown in Australian cinemas were from Hollywood.14 The movies offered 
an opportunity for Australians to get to know a people and a land that very few of them 
would ever have the opportunity to visit in person. But it also helped them to form an 
often exaggerated and idealized version of the United States and its citizens. Th  world 
depression contributed to the growth of American cinema both at home and abroad as 
people escaped to the movies. Consequently, American films came to be a point of 
contention between segments of Australian society and the United States. Some cinemas 
insisted on only showing British films that were deemed to be more cultured than their 
American counterparts. Ray Aitchison also pointed out that the movies sowed the seeds 
of future misunderstandings between the two nations.15 Australian preconceptions of 
Americans, created by the films, often failed to match expectations when the two groups 
came together. 
                                                          
13 Quoted in Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. III, 113. Some works to 
consult on soft power and its uses in international diplomacy include Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass 
Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire (New York, 2005), Jan Melissen, The New Public 
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York, 2005) and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004). 
14 Damousi, “’The Filthy American Twang’,” 415. 
15 Kate Darian-Smith, On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939 – 1945 (New York: Oxford 




 This growing cultural chasm was only a minor point in American – Australian 
relations as more substantive points of division became more common. The American 
decision to grant independence to the Philippines and withdraw from that area of the 
Pacific was one such point of contention. In 1932, the Hawes – Cutting Act provided for 
Filipino independence after a ten-year transitional period and the plan for independenc  
was finalized in the Tydings – McDuffie Act of 1934. Raymond Esthus remarked that the 
U.S.’s action “was resented by Australians. They interpreted it as an American 
withdrawal from the Western Pacific and therefore a blow to Australian security.” 16 Jay 
Pierrepont Moffat informed Hull in a letter that “There is an increasing bitterness at our 
policy of withdrawal from the Philippines as step succeeds step in its realization.”17 Much 
of the Australian anger was fueled by fear over the ominous threat of imperial Japan to 
the north. The onset of the Chino – Japanese War that began with the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria in 1931 had brought old fears back to the forefront of Australian’s minds.  
Visions of a vast Asiatic horde sweeping south to topple the only fully white man’s 
country in the Pacific had long been a fear of Australians and with the Americans 
seeming withdrawal from that region there appeared no impediment standing in Japan’s 
way. The Roosevelt Administration, however, was not aware of how their move would be 
interpreted by the Australians and saw the movement towards Filipino independence to 
be consistent with the anti-imperialism component of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. 
                                                          
16 Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance, 10. 
17 Jay Pierrepont Moffat to Cordell Hull, February 11, 936 in United States Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1936 Vol. IV The Far East (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
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 A popular work, Pacific Peril or Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands, written by 
Australian E. George Marks in 1933, highlights how pervasive the fear of Japan was for 
Australians and how strongly this fear was motivated by race.18 Japan, Marks pointed out, 
had carved out an empire by military might and the rhetoric emanating from Japan
concerning the end of European colonialism in Asia was a direct challenge to Australia. 
“She [Japan]”, Marks wrote, “is looked up to by the colored peoples of the world as the 
real instrument of their liberation from the domination of the white man – her gigantic 
fleet is regarded by the colored races as the first means of their emancipation from their 
white overlords.”19 Because of this, Australia, Marks contended, could look only to one 
nation for support: the U.S. Both nations were bound by a shared bond of race that made 
them both targets for Japanese aggression. Marks argued that, “The U.S.A. is vitally 
interested in the supremacy of a White Pacific; it has barred and bolted its doors again t 
Asiatics; so has Australia. Therein is unison of sentiment. Australia’s ideal is White 
Australia – it is a challenge to Asia!”20 Calls like Marks’s were not rare even in the mid-
1930s and would only gain urgency as the shadows of war lengthened over the Pacific. 
 Australia’s deep-seated fear of Japanese encroachment was as prevalent among 
policymakers as it was among the common populace. In 1935 Australian Prime Minister 
Joseph Lyons attempted to coax the United States into agreeing to a broad based security 
pact entailing all nations bordering the Pacific. This, and subsequent efforts by the 
                                                          
18 Marks was well known for his strident anti-Japanese writings. In 1924 he published a work entitled 
Watch the Pacific!: Defenseless Australia (1924) that highlighted many of the same arguments pu  forward 
in Pacific Peril. 
19 E. George Marks, Pacific Peril or Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands (Sydney: The Wynnard Book 
Arcade, 1933), 12, Series # A1336, Control # 23924, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australia. 
Records from this archive hereafter cited as NAA. 
20 Marks, Pacific Peril, 27, Series # A1336, Control # 23924, NAA. 
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Australians, were rebuffed by Washington which wanted to steer clear of any 
entanglements which would bring them into even closer conflict with Japan. American 
Ambassador to Great Britain Robert W. Bingham informed Lyons of this reality in June 
1937. Bingham wrote to Cordell Hull, “I assured him [Lyons] that in my opinion it would 
be impossible to secure any form of agreement which would bind our Government in any 
way whatever looking towards the protection of Australia from attack by Japan.”21 The 
Roosevelt Administration sought to steer a course between condemnations of Japanese 
actions in China on the one hand and avoiding open military conflict on the other. Lyons 
received a vague promise from Roosevelt in 1937 that “if serious trouble arose in the 
Pacific, the U.S. would be prepared to make common cause with the members of the 
[British] Commonwealth concerned.”22 This lack of a concrete commitment from the 
Americans was unsettling to Australians with the memories of the perceived Am rican 
isolationism of the 1920s still fresh in their minds. In 1939, Stanley Bruce, acting on 
behalf of the government of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, emphasized to 
Roosevelt Australia’s anxiety about a possible Japanese move towards Australia. Bruce 
stressed that “everywhere I have been asked as to the attitude of the United States 
towards any move southward by Japan.”23 Roosevelt, in his usual fashion, refused to give 
Bruce any clear assurances of American intentions. 
                                                          
21 Robert W. Bingham to Cordell Hull, June 4, 1937 in U ited States Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1937 Vol. II The British Commonwealth (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1954), 141. 
22 Quoted in Roger Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian – American Relations and the Pacific War (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1977), 12. 
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 Also troubling to Australians was the fact that the Roosevelt Administration’s 
commitment to internationalism failed to translate into action. American foreign policy 
still seemed to follow the seeming do-nothing policies of its predecessors. An 
examination of the numerous foreign policy crises that arose in the early and mid-1930s 
revealed to the Australians that the United States remained quite content to stay clear of 
the volatility that was engulfing the world. The aggressive foreign policy pursuits of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy were often met by nothing more then strongly worded protests 
which did little to provide support for nations like Australia who looked to the new 
American administration to provide a strong example of leadership in the international 
realm. Keith Officer, who served as Australian counselor in the British embassy in 
Washington D.C., wrote to his colleague Alfred Stirling that “This country [United 
States] is not interested in events outside its own border.”24 Oftentimes, American 
suspicions of “old Europe” lay at the heart of its inaction. The Sudeten crisis and 
subsequent Munich agreement between Germany and other European powers to many 
Americans smacked of old style power politics that many felt had been the prime caus  
of World War I. Fred Alexander, an Australian observer in the U.S, stated “American 
suspicions of British policy in the Far East, which had been smoldering since 1931 – 32, 
were fanned into flame by the ‘betrayal’ of Czechoslovakia.” This division between the 
United States and Great Britain also affected Australian relations with the Americans as 
Canberra found itself pulled between traditional loyalties to Empire but also a very real 
                                                          
24 Sir Keith Officer to Alfred Stirling, August 2, 1937, Sir Keith Officer Papers, MS2629, Box 1, 
Correspondence May 1937 – August 1937, National Library of Australia, Canberra, Australia. Records 
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need to form closer ties to the United States to defend against possible Japanese 
aggression.25 
 While events in Europe had an influence on the course of American – Australian 
relations, events in the Pacific had a far more significant effect.  The singl  most 
important event of the early part of the 1930s on American – Australian relations was the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent founding of the puppet state 
of Manchuko. The Japanese used the supposed attack by Chinese “bandits” on a rail line 
near Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931, as pretext for launching an invasion of 
the whole of Manchuria with an eye to incorporating the rich natural resources of the 
region into the Japanese empire. Japan’s use of force was the first open challenge to the 
mandate of the League of Nations. The member nations of the League had to consider 
how best to respond to this newest crisis in world affairs. In the United States two dis inct 
approaches come to the fore. First, the Far East specialists in the State Dep rtment argued 
for taking a hard line approach to Japan and the growing spirit of military nationalism 
that was ascending to primacy in Japan. The second response came from men such as 
Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo who argued for a far more cautious approach in 
dealing with Japan in hopes of undercutting the ideological basis for the military 
nationalists in Japan.26 Such conflict created the appearance of inaction to observers of 
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the U.S. who hoped for the Americans to take the lead in blunting Japan’s growing 
power. 
 To the south, the Australian government looked to Great Britain and to the United 
States in hopes of finding some direction on how best to craft its own response to the 
Japanese attack on China. The British, unwilling to needlessly sacrifice their commercial 
interests in China proper and with Japan itself, adopted a cautious approach to the 
problem, choosing neither to recognize the Japanese gains nor to repudiate them either. 
The United States responded with the issuance of the Stimson Doctrine that stated hat 
the United States would not recognize any territorial charges brought about by f rce. 
While strongly worded, the Stimson Doctrine was a hollow document that failed to bring 
any American actions against Japan since it provided for no mechanism with which to 
openly challenge Japanese aggression.27 
 Faced with a perceived weak response from the U.S., Canberra found itself facing 
renewed fears of Japanese expansion into the south Pacific. Jay Pierrpeont Moffat 
highlighted this point in a letter to Cordell Hull in which he wrote, “there can be no doubt 
but that recent Japanese moves in the Orient, coupled with the attitude of her delegation 
in London, have seriously disturbed the Australian government and to a lesser degree th  
Australian public.”28 Australians found the middle path adopted by the British and the 
Americans was really the only option open to them. Australian politicians loathed to 
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antagonize a country that had become an important buyer of Australian raw goods during 
the 1920s and 1930s. Shipments of Australian wheat and iron regularly made the trip 
north to the Japanese home islands and all-important hard currency made the reverse trek 
back to Australia. In the dire economic climate of the Great Depression, Australian policy 
makers recognized that upsetting this arrangement would hardly be to their benefit. Many 
also adopted the cynical attitude of “better the Chinese than us.”29 The general feeling 
was that the longer Japan’s attention focused on the Chinese mainland then the more time 
Australia had to make security arrangements with its partners, especially Great Britain 
and the United States. But even having adopted a similar attitude to that of Great Britain 
and the United States, Australians harbored a sense of being left out in the cold by their 
more powerful benefactors. This was especially true in the case of the United Stat s 
because of how quickly the Hawes – Cutting and Tydings – McDuffie acts followed the 
outbreak of the Sino – Japanese conflict. 
 Australian Fred Alexander observed that the Manchurian incident demonstrated 
that even as Australia reached out to the Americans a gulf in their understanding of the 
Pacific region continued to separate them: 
The Manchurian incident is, nevertheless, worth recording in an analysis of the 
political relations between the United States and Australia, because it emphasized 
the absence of what the present writer regards as an essential predisposing 
condition of Australian – American political collaboration on Pacific questions. 
This condition is the readiness of both parties to base their collaboration not 
merely on sentiment and goodwill but on a conviction of common interest which 
will carry both peoples, if necessary, from gestures into action.30 
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Part of the problem was a misunderstanding on the part of the United States as to how 
exactly the British Commonwealth functioned. Many American policymakers insi ted on 
seeing Australia not as an independent actor but as a subservient country to Great Britain. 
As one Australian governmental reported, Americans held a “widespread belief that the 
Dominions, being controlled by Empire headquarters, are not real democracies.”31 This 
gulf would widen as the decade wore on thanks primarily to the actions of the Australian  
themselves. Political and strategic considerations had dominated Australian – American 
relations through the first half of the decade but that soon changed as disagreements over 
trade brought Australia and the United States into a period of open conflict that would set 
back the development of the association between the two. 
 While trade had never formed a cornerstone of Australian – American relations in 
the twentieth century it had been a point of consistent contact for both sides, especially 
after World War I.32 But often that trade was a one-way avenue. Between 1918 and 1929 
twenty to twenty-five percent of Australia’s yearly imports came from the United States. 
Conversely, however, in that same period American imports of Australian goods fell 
from eleven to four percent. During the economic boom period of the 1920s this 
discrepancy in trade was not overly bothersome to the Australians. With the onset of the 
Great Depression, though, this drastically changed as Australians “turned a jaundiced eye 
on the statistics of the United States – [British] Commonwealth trade.”33 But even before 
the economic morass of the 1930s trade issues were a key point of contention between 
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the two countries. In 1927 Australian Prime Minister Stanley M. Bruce met with 
American Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg to discuss what Bruce’s government saw 
as the discriminatory practices of the United States in the admittance of Australian 
businessmen into the United States.  
 T.B. Millar made reference to this meeting in his study of Australian foreign 
policy: 
American businessmen were given unrestricted entry into Australia and freedom 
to operate there. Australian businessmen, on the other hand, had great difficulty in 
entering the United States. They were required either to enter under the tiny 
Australian quota for migrants (at that time filled two years in advance), or as
temporary visitors, which allowed no freedom to establish and maintain business 
offices.34 
 
In 1933, the British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay took the same issue up again with 
the new Roosevelt Administration on behalf of the Australian government. Lindsay met 
with the new Secretary of State Cordell Hull to point out the perceived inequity in the
treatment of Australian businessmen by the American government. Lindsay noted tha  
businessmen from Great Britain, Canada and the Irish Free State were all allowed to enter 
the U.S. freely at any time without having to bother with travel permits. Hull assured 
Lindsay that the American government would consider the issue. However, the system of 
permits stayed in place and Australian businessmen entering into American continued to 
feel themselves at a disadvantage.35 
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 The treatment of Australian businessmen was only a minor point in the larger 
debate. The adverse trade balance that Australia ran with the United States was at the 
core of the acrimony that marked the last half of the decade. 1934 was the beginning 
point of what became an open and quite serious disruption in the diplomatic relations 
between Australia and the United States. In that year alone the United Stats only bought 
one-sixth as many goods from Australia as it sold.36 Initial Australian efforts to remedy 
this situation were taken up by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons and other government 
officials who attempted to find a way to even trade with America while avoiding any 
disruption in formal relations between both nations. American responses to these 
overtures were markedly negative. The Roosevelt Administration, led principally by 
Cordell Hull, maintained its adherence to a policy of free trade that meant that o 
favoritism would or should be shown to any other country. The Australians, finding their 
initial efforts rebuffed by Washington, began to hint that they would take a tougher 
stance in regard to American trade if steps were not taken to equalize trade bewe n the 
two. Stanley M. Bruce, now serving as Australian High Commissioner to GreatBrit in, 
first broached this in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Frncis Sayre in 
Washington. Bruce stated “that Australia’s problem was an immediate one and that if he 
found a country which was prepared to purchase at once any considerable quantity of the 
above mentioned Australian products [butter, meat, wool] we must not be surprised if a 
deal were made which might react to the disadvantage of American trade.” A member of 
Sayre’s staff made reference to Australia’s adherence to unconditional most-fav red 
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nation trading status. Bruce shot back that Australia was not formally bound by anytre ty 
commitments and would pursue any line of trade which would best benefit Australia.37  
 Starting in 1934, Australia began to place higher tariffs on American goods 
coming into the country in an effort to stem the Australian appetite for American goods. 
It was hoped that these tariffs would encourage the American government to reconsider 
both its policy towards Australian businessmen entering the U.S. as well as allowing for 
more imports of Australian staple commodities into American markets. In a speech 
before the Australian Parliament, Sir Henry Gullett outlined the Australian governmental 
plan to curtail American imports. He framed it in such a manner as not to appear critic l 
of the U.S. but everyone understood clearly that the U.S. was the principal target of such 
a plan. “In other words,” Gullett claimed, “we have resolved to give more room in this 
market to those who are our great buyers, and somewhat less room to those who are 
indifferent buyers.”38  
The Roosevelt Administration was taken aback by the audacity of the Australian 
actions. They were even more angered when they received a proposal from Canberra that 
the United States should purchase from Australia 50,000 tons of beef and butter without 
duty or at a greatly reduced rate of duty in an effort to help balance the trade gap b tween 
the two powers.39 Joseph Lyons’s request that the United States limit the sale of its 
agricultural exports to Great Britain and to other European countries in order to allow 
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Australia an opportunity to find more markets for its own agricultural exports was, in the 
words of one American official, “unexampled in commercial negotiations.”40 The 
Australian actions had the opposite of their intended effect. Cordell Hull wrote to th
American consul general in Sydney and informed him, “In your discretion you may 
convey our feeling that the discrimination against American goods referred to above is 
considerably more irksome and damaging to American interests than the present 
necessity of obtaining visitor’s visas can be irksome or damaging to Australian 
interests.”41 Tensions between the two nations continued to escalate for the remainder of 
1934 and into 1935.  
 In a bid to help ease those tensions, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons planned a state 
visit to the United States in 1935 with the intent of securing a security pact with the 
Americans as well as to reach a consensus on the trade issues dividing the two parties. 
The majority of Lyons’s time in the U.S. was spent in meetings with Cordell Hull. It was 
made clear to Lyons that Washington did not feel that a security pact with Aus ralia 
would be to their benefit at that moment because of other concerns the Roosevelt 
Administration had at the moment, including a growing fight over some of the key New 
Deal initiatives like the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. On the issue of trade 
Hull and Lyons both agreed that an agreement had to be reached but neither party was 
willing to meet the other halfway.42 The Australians still maintained that it was the 
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Americans who were most responsible for the current economic discrepancies their 
country faced while Hull insisted that Australia discontinue its bullying trade tactics. In 
the end no final agreement was reached and Lyons left Washington with relations 
between the two countries still in decline. 
 The trade disagreement reached its apex in 1936. The trade balance between the 
two nations had continued to run in favor the United States much to the chagrin of the 
Lyons government who had put so much effort into balancing trade between the two. 
Moffat wrote to Hull informing him that, “the fact that imports from the United States are 
continuing to advance while exports to America are increasing only slightly, if at all, is 
causing the Commonwealth Government acute embarrassment.”43 Facing an upcoming 
general election in which the issue of trade with the United States would be a key issu , 
the Lyons government decided to move beyond the realm of words and into the realm of 
action. If there was any hope of re-election then the Lyons government had to at least 
portray itself as acting tough with the Americans.  
The key moment came on May 22, 1936 when Lyons introduced an act to the 
Australian Parliament that would become the Trade Diversion Act of 1936. Assistant 
Secretary of State William Phillips outlined the act for President Roosevelt in a letter on 
June 26, 1936: 
On May 22, 1936 the Prime Minster of Australia presented to Parliament a 
measure that became effective as soon as tabled providing, inter alia, for the 
creation of an import licensing system. Under this system a list has been 
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established of products for the import of which into Australia, from a country with 
which Australia has a passive trade balance, a license is required. The collectors 
of Australian customs have received instructions to refuse licenses to import from 
the United States all goods on this list, with the exception of chassis and 
typewriters for which special treatment is reserved, unless applications re 
accompanied by documents setting forth the goods are unprocurable except at 
greatly increased cost from the countries with which the balance of trade is in 
Australia’s favor.44  
 
The act was designed to seriously curtail the growing trade gap between the Australians 
and Americans by basically not allowing the free and easy import of American goods into 
the country except under the most special of circumstances. While it must be pointed out 
that the act affected the imports of other countries, there was no doubt in anyone’s mind 
that it was specifically aimed at the United States. Many in Canberra saw this as a 
suitable retort to the American’s system of visitor’s visas for Australian businessmen. As 
George Pearce told Moffat in a personal letter, “in our view, it matters little whether 
exclusion is brought about by licensing, quotas, or prohibitive duties. The effect is the 
same, and we in particular have been sufferers.”45 Australia had moved beyond the realm 
of threats with the Trade Diversion Act and into what one historians has termed “a 
declaration of economic warfare by Australia on Japan and the United States 
simultaneously.”46 
 The actions taken by the Australian government caught many in the Roosevelt 
Administration by surprise. Washington had thought that the proclamations of the Lyons
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government were purely for show and that no action, at least on a scale such as this, 
would be undertaken. To those officials in the State Department stationed in Canberra 
and other Australian cities it quickly became obvious that the Australians were through 
with trying to bargain with the United States. Moffat attempted to forewarn his superiors 
in Washington of the change of attitude occurring among Australian policy makers. He 
stated, “I think that we must look forward to some formal adverse action (probably 
discriminatory) if for no other reason than that the Government must try to shift on to 
other shoulders the blame for a condition of affairs where imports have increased to  
point which is causing concern as to the future of Australia’s financial credit.”47 Even 
with the benefit of Moffat’s keen insight, Washington still found itself blindsided by the 
actions of the Lyons Government. In the immediate aftermath of the Trade Diversion 
Act, the United States sought to understand how this new action taken by the Australian 
government would affect them. Moffat was asked to go over the act and report back on 
the bearing this would have on U.S. trade with Australia. The day following the passage 
of the act, Moffat cabled his superiors in Washington stating that the new act would leave 
80 percent of American trade untouched but would eliminate twenty percent, chieflyto 
the benefit of British goods.48 The United States was forced to respond to what Moffat 
openly decried as Australian blackmail.49 
 The Roosevelt Administration found itself faced with two possible avenues of 
action. First, they could have accepted the validity of the Australian claims and actions 
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and sought to balance their trade with that country. This however would have been a 
repudiation of the basic free trade ideas that Hull and others had consistently espoused 
not only to Australia but also to the world in general. The second option was to maintain 
the same position that had been held throughout the negotiations with the Australians. 
This position maintained that any discriminatory trade policies would only further retard 
world economic recovery and serve to further isolate each nation from its neighbors. Hull 
and other administration officials made it quite clear to the Lyons government that they 
would choose the second option. Hull cabled Moffat on May 27 with orders to pass along 
the text of his cable to the Lyons government. The cable was classic Hull, stressing the 
need for the removal of artificial trade barriers and strongly remonstrati g against 
Australia’s actions: 
The Government of the United States recognizes the rights of every nation to 
determine its commercial policy and to enact measures and administer them in 
any way which the Government concerned see fit for the purpose of carrying out 
these policies. Nevertheless, in view of the conviction which it has frequently 
urged upon other governments that only a mitigation of existing trade barriers can 
restore and adequate volume of international commerce for the benefit of all 
nations, the Government of the United States deplores the fact that Australia has 
seen fit to impose new and substantial restraints upon its import trade.50  
 
Hull’s message to Lyons was a clear indication that the Australians’ bid to end 
discriminatory American practices against Australian imports would not work and, if 
anything, would only serve to harden American resolve not to be bullied by Canberra on 
this issue. 
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 The Trade Diversion Act created tension between representatives of both natins. 
A constant theme in Australian communications to the Americans was one of perceived 
indifference on the part of the United States about Australia’s economic plight. In March 
1936, Henry Grady, Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements in the State Department, 
had made several conciliatory comments on the issue of U.S. – Australian trade in a bid 
to help lessen the recent tensions between both nations and return both parties to the 
negotiation table. Grady’s comments were greeted with skepticism in Canberr  as Moffat 
made clear to his superiors. In a cable to Washington, Moffat related how “Lyons gave 
out an interview the gist of which was that the United States is indifferent to Australia … 
and that it was evident that we were willing to underrate Australia’s help or position.”51 
In separate meetings with George Pearce, Minister for External Affairs, and Sir Henry 
Gullett, Minister for Directing Negotiations for Trade Treaties, the theme of American 
indifference reappeared. Pearce again highlighted the economic issues that Australia felt 
had to be addressed in order for a meaningful dialogue to take place between both 
nations. However, he also linked the issue of American indifference to foreign policy
issues. Pearce argued that America’s seeming intent to pursue an isolationist foreign 
policy in both Europe and in the Pacific “had convinced the average Australian that he 
could not count on our [American] assistance in case of peril.”52  
 Gullett issued a scathing critique of American economic policy toward Australia 
in his conversation with Moffat. He accused the United States of excluding Australian 
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goods from American markets through the use of restrictive and arbitrary taiffs, of 
driving Australian shipping out of American waters by subsidizing American lines a d 
even of throwing Australian fruit overboard from ships so that it would not reach 
American consumers. Gullet turned the moral table on Hull and Washington by pointing 
out that American tariffs remained too high “to be consistent with your high 
professions.”53 Gullett also placed the blame for the continued disagreement on the 
shoulders of Hull and others in Washington. He maintained that the Australian 
government was quite willing to work to end the trade war but that U.S. government had 
refused to even begin any such negotiations.54  
The effect of the remonstrations of men like Pearce and Gullett was minimal on 
the American government’s resolve to maintain their policies in regards to Australia and 
trade. American tariffs on Australian goods and the visa system for Australian 
businessmen remained in place. If anything, the fight initiated by the TradeDiversion Act 
strengthened American resolve to maintain their position. After all, from the viewpo nt of 
Washington, the United States was far more important to Australia than Australia was to 
Washington at this moment. As Moffat wrote to Hull, “There is a rather naïf belief that 
Australia can be deliberately anti-American in matters of trade and yet count on 
American political assistance and cooperation.”55 For the time being this was not to be 
the case. 
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 The Australian insistence on confronting the Americans over the trade issue can 
be linked to an older debate within the Australian body politic over the nature of 
Australian statehood. Australia had been fully self-governing only since 1901 and for 
much of that time, especially in the realm of foreign relations and economics, it had 
continued to rely on the offices of Great Britain to carry out its affairs in the world. In the 
aftermath of World War I an internal debate between traditional imperial loy lists on one 
hand and those who agitated for a more independent path for Australia dominated the 
internal politics of the nation.56 This debate often translated into a pervasive sense of 
being overlooked or under appreciated by the world community that was shared by both 
sides. This can plainly be seen in the statements of men such as Lyons, Pearce and Gullet 
during the Trade Diversion Act crisis with the United States. 
 Neither side was willing to make concessions to the other as both governments 
had invested large amounts of political capital in the fight. The final settlement of the 
American – Australian trade struggles of the latter half of the 1930s was tied to the 
bettering of relations between the United States and Great Britain and not any gre t 
change in the American – Australian relationship. The bond between Washington and 
London during most of the decade had been icy at best. Inherent mistrust of British 
imperial policies and aims was commonplace among American political and military 
planners who viewed British motives with reserve at best. British Prime Minister Neville 
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Chamberlain’s decision to sacrifice the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia in order to 
avoid the outbreak of a general war in Europe was seen by many in America as a thinly 
veiled effort to ensure the protection of the British Empire.57 Australian Richard Boyer 
made note of this American distrust in a speech he gave in San Antonio during a tour of 
the U.S. Americans wondered, Boyer stated, if the British and French were for “human 
freedom and a better world, or just for the integrity of the British and French empires, and 
if for both, how much for each and in what proportion.”58 
 Trade had also been a barrier to better relations between Great Britain and the 
United States during the decade. With the onset of the Great Depression, the Britis  
conceived of a plan that became known as “imperial preference” in order to ensure 
continued markets for British and British Commonwealth goods. The imperial preference 
system formed a self-contained trade zone where British manufactured goods could be 
exchanged for raw materials from the British Commonwealth nations, such as wool, meat 
and butter in the case of Australia. Foreign goods faced high tariffs and duties. This in
effect curtailed American access to these markets and was seen by Roosevelt, Hull and 
others in Washington as a prime example of the sort of autarkic system they hoped to 
eliminate with the creation of free trade zones. The British hoped that the system of 
imperial preference would allow them to maintain their slowly eroding position as a 
world manufacturing power as well as help to shore up the bonds of the Empire that had 
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frayed in the aftermath of World War I. But even with the dire economic landscape of th  
world depression, British leaders recognized that they could not afford to alienate 
American political and business leaders, especially with the renewed threat of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy.59 
 The British relationship with the United States was often affected by Australia. 
Traditionally one of the most loyal dominion states, Australia’s attempts to more closely 
align themselves with the Americans upset many in London. Looking back on the Great 
White Fleet’s visit to Sydney in 1908, British newspapers expressed disapproval over the 
fact that Australians gave such an enthusiastic welcome to the American fleet and feared 
that the Australians would look to the United States Navy instead of the Royal Navy for 
its protection.60 The Lyons Government’s bid to secure a Pacific security treaty with the 
United States in 1935 was received coldly by the British who pointed out that they had 
clearly indicated their commitment to Australian defense in the Pacific t the 1923 
Imperial Conference.61 However, such a promise was looked on with skepticism by some 
elements of Australian political life.  In the wake of World War I, relations between 
Great Britain and Australia were strained as the Labor Party in Australia pushed to 
separate their country from its traditional ties with the British in an effort to finally 
establish Australia as a fully independent actor on the world stage.  
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 But even with the differences that arose between Canberra and London there was 
little doubt that the ties of Empire were still strong between both mother country and 
former colony. The upper strata of Australian society continued to look to Great Britain 
as its cultural and political paradigm. Politically, American democracy was viewed with 
some distaste by Australian observers. Interestingly, the Australian’s low opinion about 
American politics was driven by seeming racial and cultural factors. In a letter to his 
colleague W.R. Hodgson, Sir Keith Officer pointed out that, “Democracy works in 
England because the educated and able play their part in politics. The same to a lesser 
degree applies in Australia. Here [U.S.] to a large extent politics have become the 
plaything of the professional and the ‘boss’.” Many of these bosses, Officer pointed ut, 
were “low-call alien (that is to say non Anglo-Saxon) political bosses.”62 The 
heterogeneous population of the U.S. was never viewed by Australians as a strength o  a 
positive. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Australian commentary consistently pointed 
to this aspect of American life as a principal reason to defend the policy of White
Australia. 
Culturally, Australians continued to discount the offerings reaching their nations 
from the U.S. As Kate Darian-Smith pointed out, “Australian intellectuals were 
concerned with the conflicts between American and British cultural influences … 
Americanization … became equated with trash and corruption, in contrast to British 
highbrow culture and the ‘quality’ of British institutions and society.”63 Australian 
schools still focused on teaching children the importance of the Empire while subject 
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matter on the United States was virtually non-existent. This lack of formal education 
concerning the U.S. ensured that the general Australia populace was as ill-informed about 
Americans as Americans were about Australia. This would have an effect, generally 
negative, on the development of the relations between the two powers during war time. 
 Australian businesses greeted the imperial preference system with enthusiasm 
because it offered a guaranteed outlet for their commodities. But this windfall proved to 
be a pitfall in British – Australian relations and helped to contribute to Great Brit in’s 
role in ending the American – Australian trade war. In 1932, British Commonwealth 
nations held an imperial economic conference in Ottawa, Canada, to discuss ways to
weather the economic storm buffeting the world markets. As mentioned previously the 
end result of the conference was the creation of the imperial preference system. But 
another important result was that the British left the conference with a profound dislike of 
the Australian delegation’s motives. Great Britain agreed to accept raw material from 
British Commonwealth nations at significantly reduced tariffs. For the British this meant 
that all British Commonwealth nations should have an equal opportunity to offload their 
excess goods. However, the Australian delegation pushed for special treatment for 
Australian goods, such as meat, wool, wheat and tallow, over those from the other British 
Commonwealth nations. Because of the inability of the other nations to band together to 
stave off the Australian demands, the British delegation had little choice but to agree to 
grant special tariff rates and concessions to Australian goods entering into Great Britain, 
with the exception of meat products. 
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 Both parties left Ottawa with distinctly differing views on the outcome of the 
conference. For the Australians, Ottawa had been a windfall. As John O’Brien stated,
“with the exception of disappointment in the case of meat, Australia achieved all that it 
desired – free entry for most of its goods to Britain with nearly all of them enjoying a 
preferential tariff over foreigners.”64 The British left with a far different outlook on the 
outcome of the conference. The stated aim of the Ottawa Conference had been to 
strengthen economic ties between Great Britain and the British Commonwealth nations 
by providing some small measure of relief from the declining world markets. These 
altruistic aims were ignored, and indeed completely bypassed by the Australian  at 
Ottawa. The Australians adamant insistence on special treatment for their own goods left 
the British frustrated with the “naked opportunism” displayed by Australia.65 
 Negative feelings from Ottawa tainted Australian – British relations throughout 
the remainder of the decade but were on display most prominently during the late 1930s. 
During the Trade Diversion Act fight with the Americans, the Australians were taken 
aback by the very negative reception their actions received in London. Great Britain was 
shocked that such a dire action was taken unilaterally and without prior consultation. The 
primary reason for the British reaction was the fact that they were seeking to negotiate a 
new trade treaty with the Americans and were afraid that the Australian act o s would be 
blamed on them because of the American view of the British Commonwealth as a 
monolithic entity. In trying to negotiate a trade treaty with the United States, Great 
Britain walked a very fine line. Any trade concessions granted to the Americans would 
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have to come at the expense of imperial preference, meaning that the agreements r ached 
at Ottawa four years earlier would be almost worthless. This would be especially galling 
to Australia which had pushed so hard to come out of Ottawa with special benefits.66 In 
the end, the British decided that the benefits of a trade agreement with the Americans 
would outweigh any possible repercussions from the British Commonwealth nations, 
including Australia. For the Americans, the British offer of negotiating a trade treaty 
offered an opportunity to apply leverage against Australia in its own trade fight with that 
country. The Americans insinuated to the British that no treaty would be forthcoming as 
long as member countries of the British Commonwealth maintained discriminatory tr de 
practices. This was clearly aimed at the Australians and the British understood this.  
 The British pressured the Australians to soften their stance towards the United
States. The Lyons Administration was at first reluctant to give in to the British pressure 
after having spent so much energy on the issue. However, the Australians came to realize 
that the British – American trade negotiations would continue and the only outcome for 
them would be to be left out from both countries’ trade. Because of this, starting in late 
1937, Australia began to remove the barriers that had been erected under the Trade 
Diversion Act of 1936. For the Americans, however, the trade restrictions that they had 
placed on Australian goods as retaliation stayed in place until 1938. This of course 
provoked another round of recriminations from Canberra. In a formal telegram to the 
American government, the Lyons government indicated their profound disappointment 
over the American decision to not remove their own trade barriers and that the Lyons 
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government was shocked at what it saw as the “non-cooperative attitude of the American 
government” on this issue.67 
 By early 1938 American trade barriers had been lifted but lingering dissatisfaction 
tainted the American – Australian relationship. Jay Pierrepont Moffat confirmed to his 
superiors in Washington that this continued to be the case. In a conversation with Sir 
Earle Page, Moffat recorded that he was informed: 
The Australian public knew that Australia had made definite sacrifices in order to 
being about a U.K. – U.S.A. trade agreement; that Canada had done the same; that 
Canada was rewarded with new negotiations and Australia was shut out in the 
cold. He went on to say that that not only had she been shut out in the cold but 
that we had made a proposal to her six weeks that were it made public would so 
anger the Australian people that negotiations between the two countries would be 
out of the question for twenty years.68 
 
It was obvious that the issues over which the Australians and Americans had clashed 
during the previous two years would not soon be forgotten. The end result was a very real 
deterioration in the relations between both nations. So real in fact, that Joseph Lyons 
cancelled a 1937 state visit to the United States because of fears of public outcry fr m the 
Americans over Australia’s decision to implement its trade diversion scheme.69 While the 
official blocks between both countries had disappeared by the end of the decade, 
suspicion and a latent hostility still existed.  
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 Only the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939 eased tensions between 
the United States and Australia. When the government of Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain in Great Britain observed its treaty obligations with Poland and declared 
war on Nazi Germany, Australia found itself once again preparing to send its young men 
to Europe to fight alongside their British cousins. Australians had worried that the 
outbreak of war on the continent would once again drag them into a conflict far away 
from their own sphere of interest and they, like the British, concluded that any war fought
against Germany would require the assistance of the United States in order to be 
successfully concluded.  
In May 1939, B.S. Stevens, Premier of New South Wales, wrote Roosevelt to 
address the issue of the American – Australian – British relations. In his letter Stevens 
harkened on a theme that would become a popular and consistent message used by the 
Australians throughout the war in an effort to court American support. Stevens wrote, “in 
this country [Australia] there is at the present time a sense, keener perhaps than ever 
before, of the basic affinity between the English-speaking people in all parts of the world, 
and also, I think, a realization that upon those people there has developed a supreme task 
of leadership in the present dangerous state of world affairs.”70 This idea of an Anglo-
sphere would be one that dominated relations between the three powers, but especially 
between the United States and Australia. It was also one that, as the war spread to the 
Pacific region, would take on a predominantly racial tone that would form the foundation 
of the American – Australia alliance. 
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 Events once again, however, conspired to limit progress being made to improve 
the relationship. Australia looked to the United States in hopes that it could supply the 
needed materials necessary for Great Britain and its allies to fight. The new Australian 
Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, addressed this issue in a letter to Roosevelt on 
September 7, 1939. He wrote, “We are greatly perturbed by the immediate result of yo r 
Neutrality Proclamation since it cuts off from us not only military aircr ft already on 
order and approaching delivery but actually makes it impossible for us to purchase from 
the United States civil aircraft for civil training purposes.”71 Menzies here is making 
reference to the 1936 Neutrality Proclamation Act passed by the United States Congress 
which forbade trade in war materials to belligerents as well as the extension of loans and 
credit. The strong backlash from the American public against being dragged into another 
European war convinced Australian observes that eventually American suspicion, at that 
time aimed at Great Britain and France, would eventually be turned on them. Sir Keith 
Officer informed the Department of External Affairs to be prepared for such a 
development. He wrote, “The sentiment against this latter danger [entering into World 
War II] is as strong, perhaps stronger than ever, and we may see next a period of criticism 
of us, our aims, and efforts as part of the effort to maintain peace.”72 
In the aftermath of Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the subsequent declarations of 
war by Great Britain and France, who were joined by the British Commonwealth nations 
such as Australia, the American Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939, which 
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amended the earlier Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937. Known as the “cash and 
carry” policy, the Neutrality Act of 1939 was seen by its supporters in Congress and the 
American public as a way to keep Americans out of another wasteful war in Europe. For 
Roosevelt, the 1939 act represented the best compromise he could get at the moment in 
moving America towards greater involvement on behalf of the Allies. It officially kept 
America neutral in the conflict but was clearly intended to aid the British and French in 
the struggle against Nazi Germany.73 The Australian reaction to news of the American 
decision to remain neutral was decidedly negative. For many in Australia, it brought back 
memories of the American decision to not enter World War I at the start. Few in 
Canberra could truly understand the precarious balance that Roosevelt had to maintain in 
his approach to the outbreak of the war. An editorial in The Washington Post gave voice 
to the concerns of American isolationists who hoped to keep the U.S. out of war. The 
editorial stated that, “Vigilance against war sentiment and war propaganda is perhaps 
even more important now than it was before the Neutrality Act was passed.”74 In the face 
of such sentiment Roosevelt, ever the consummate politician, recognized that the 
American public was not ready to commit their own sons to war and yet he also 
recognized that America had to begin to prepare for its eventual entrance into the conflict 
on the side of the Allies. For now, Australia, and Roosevelt, would have to be satisfied 
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with what aid the Congress and the American people were willing to allow to be given to 
the Allies.  
1940 brought the realities of war in Europe into the Pacific. The rapid victories of 
Nazi forces on the continent served to embolden the military in Tokyo to make advances 
in the Pacific and on the mainland in Asia. The Japanese government exerted pressureon 
the Vichy regime to close off aid to China from Indochina and on the Dutch government 
for concessions from the oil rich colony of the Netherlands Indies (now modern day 
Indonesia).75 The Japanese pressure proved highly successful. By September of 1940, 
Japanese forces were allowed to establish military bases in the region. Saburo Ienaga 
noted in his study of the Japanese war effort that these early moves on the partof the 
Japanese were primarily extensions of their war effort against China. As he remarked, “In 
effect, the China war zone of operations was expanded by a flanking operation.”76 
However, the movement into Indochina and the beginning encroachment on the Dutch 
East Indies also provided a better jumping off point for any future offensive actions in the 
south Pacific. 
The American response to these initial Japanese actions represented President 
Roosevelt’s and Secretary of State Hull’s quandary. The American general public was 
only beginning to swing in favor of more active intervention in Europe and there was 
almost no interest outside of official policymaking circles of becoming involved in the 
Pacific. Traditional appeals to international law and morality had proven useless but the 
U.S. did not want to go as far as a proposal put forth by the British and supported by 
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British Commonwealth nations like Australia that the full force of the American Pacific 
fleet be transferred to Singapore as a deterrent. The compromise that was reached by the 
Roosevelt Administration was to move the fleet from its traditional base in San Diego to 
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in April – May 1940. This decision has received much attention 
from historians who argue that it portended an inevitable decision on the part of the U.S. 
to go to war with Japan. Jonathan Utley contended otherwise in his insightful analysis of 
the diplomatic maneuverings that led to the outbreak of war in December of 1941. He 
pointed out that Roosevelt had not ordered a mobilization of the fleet, which found itself 
still severely understaffed and underequipped.77  
Through the spring and summer of 1940, the American government began to 
prepare itself for war in Europe, and most likely in the Pacific as well. Roosevelt brought 
on Republicans Henry Stimson and Frank Knox to serve as Secretaries of War and Navy 
respectively. In July 1940, Congress authorized the National Defense Act which gave the 
president authorization to declare certain items vital to American national security and 
thus exportable only with a license. This act was designed to insure that key military 
goods such as aviation gasoline, oil and steel went only to those nations considered 
friendly by the Roosevelt Administration. This act would provide the basis for the first 
major challenge to the growing military power of Japan, economic embargo.78 
The Japanese responded to such actions by formally aligning themselves with 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1940 Tripartite Agreement. Such a move inspired 
fear in Washington and London about a global coordinated effort among the militaristic 
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powers. However, as Mark Stoler details in his study of war time alliances, “In reality, 
this pact was nothing more than a diplomatic bluff designed to scare the United States 
into inaction.”79 As the events of World War II would demonstrate the Axis alliance 
proved to be nothing more than window dressing. There was never any serious attempt 
by the Germans or Japanese to coordinate their military planning and an inherent dist us  
of each other that marked the relationship. A prime example of this was the German 
decision not to inform Japan about their planned invasion of the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1941 or the Japanese decision not to inform Berlin about the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. It is ironic that Hitler’s decision to observe the Tripartite Agreement and declare 
war preemptively on the U.S. on December 11, 1941 helped seal the fate of Nazi 
Germany in Europe. 
American military officials were alarmed by the lack of coordination that existed 
between the U.S. and its potential allies in Europe and the Pacific. In January 1941, 
British and American staff meetings began in Washington D.C. to begin to lay out 
combined military plans. The British, pushed by Australia and New Zealand, hoped to 
convince the U.S. Navy to transfer a bulk of its forces in the Pacific to the great naval 
base at Singapore.80 American Navy officials, however, resisted the British efforts and 
instead offered to transfer the bulk of their forces to the Atlantic theatre which ould 
allow the British to move forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Unilateraly, the 
American government decided through the summer of 1941 to step up the embargo war 
against Japan moving from aviation gasoline to scrap metal and eventually oil. In a 
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greater effort to coordinate efforts against Japan, a loose affiliation between the 
Americans, British, Dutch, and Chinese (the ABCD) took form to create “an economic 
noose around Tokyo’s ambitions.”81 However, declining British fortunes in Europe and 
the Mediterranean drew their attention away from the Pacific and the fall of the 
Netherlands in May 1940 rendered Dutch aid against the Japanese almost nil.  
To the south, Australia looked on these developments with growing frustration 
and worry. British demands for Australian military aid in the Middle East and North 
Africa had placed a severe strain on Canberra’s ability to defend itself from the growing 
threat of Japanese militarism. Australia began to clamor for a greater voice in Alli d 
planning and for more access to the halls of power in Washington. However, the rancor 
of the decade leading up to the outbreak of World War II made any immediate fruitful
partnership almost impossible.  
The decade of the 1930s had been rocky at best for American – Australian 
relations. The opportunity for a possible friendship stemming from World War I was
wasted by both parties. Australians, for their part, showed remarkable insight by 
recognizing that in many ways, they bore a large part of the blame for the acrimony that 
marked the decade. As one Australian report reflected, “After the War [World War I] an 
unexpected friendship spread throughout the American people for the people of Australia. 
We can scarcely claim that this feeling was returned.”82 However, neither side was truly 
blameless in their actions. 
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Issues of trade, regional security, American reaction to the growing meace of 
militarism in the world and the United States’ sometimes icy relationship with Great 
Britain all conspired to weaken the efforts of leaders in both countries to bring ther 
peoples closer together. The exigencies of the war would help to ameliorate these issues 
somewhat but a sense of suspicion still pervaded Australian views on the United States 
and to a lesser extent American views of Australia. The cleavages that had appeared 
between the two during this decade seemed incapable of being bridged. But in the next 
six years, the alliance between these two powers would be strengthened beyond th hopes 
of men such as Joseph Lyons and Jay Pierrepont Moffat as the threat posed by a common
challenger in the Pacific brought the two powers closer together. Even more importantly, 
though, a single ideological tenet that had lain under the surface of the American – 
Australian relationship from the beginning would bring both parties into a closer 












Chapter 3: A Two-Front War: 1941 - 1945
By late 1941 many Americans had reached the conclusion that entry into the war 
raging around the globe was only a matter of time. Opinion over the past year and a h lf, 
since the fall of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940, had swung in favor 
of active American support of Great Britain and the Dominions. American attention was 
focused on the German bombing campaign against Great Britain and on the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union.1 In the Pacific, relations with Imperial Japan had 
deteriorated over the course of 1941 due to increased economic embargoes put in place 
by the Roosevelt administration as a means of trying to undercut the Japanese war 
machine.  
 When war did break out, it happened in a manner that caught the country by 
surprise. At 7:48 A.M. Hawaii time, dive-bombers and torpedo planes of the Japanese 
Imperial Navy launched a surprise attack on the American fleet moored at Pearl Harbor 
Naval Base. The attack left 2,388 Americans dead and numerous naval vessels damaged, 
some beyond salvage.2 Michael Hunt wrote, “For Americans this ‘sneak attack’ was an 
extraordinary outrage (though entirely consistent with assumptions about the wily 
oriental character).”3 While many in Washington had concluded that war was inevitable 
with Japan, the way the war began came as a shock to them and the American people. 
The Pearl Harbor attack was timed to coincide with Japanese attacks on the Philippines 
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and the opening of a general offensive in Southeast Asia aimed at expelling the British 
and Dutch from their colonial holdings. In Australia, traditional fears about the expansion 
of an Asian power into their region were being realized. With Great Britain involved in a 
seeming life or death struggle with Nazi Germany in Europe and North Africa, the 
Australians began to turn to the one power who they hoped could help them stave off the 
Japanese, the United States.  
 The first joint effort between the Australian and American government in the 
Pacific came out of the ARCADIA Conference in Washington D.C. in December 1941 – 
January 1942. In order to coordinate the efforts of American, British, Dutch and 
Australian forces spread over several thousand miles of the southeast Asia and the 
Pacific, General George Marshall proposed the creation of a unified command structure, 
ABDACOM. From the beginning, ABDACOM was not expected to meet with any 
success. But, as Ronald Spector pointed out, the importance of the body lay in 
establishing the principles of a unified, multi-national command.4 ABDACOM proved 
incapable of halting the Japanese advance. Japanese victories in Malaya, Singapore, the 
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies placed the existence of ABDACOM in great doubt. 
The destruction of the main joint naval force of American, Dutch and Australian ships at 
the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942 effectively ended ABDA as an Allied 
organization and would lead to the creation of the Southwest Pacific theatre and the 
Central Pacific theatres under overall American command. The first attempts at a joint 
American – Australian effort had been an abject failure. 
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However, over the course of the war in the Pacific, the Americans and Australian  
developed an alliance that lead to the defeat of Japan in 1945. The Pacific was primarily 
an American operation throughout the war, and some in Washington fought hard to keep 
it that way. However, during the first two years of the war Australia was central to the 
American effort.5 Both nations found themselves allies due to the exigencies of war and 
after the acrimony that marked the previous decade’s relationship it remained to be seen 
if the relationship would be a smooth one or one marked by continued disagreement.6 
Trying to put aside past differences, even in a time of war, proved to be a difficult 
chore for the Americans and the Australians. Their wartime relationship was marked by 
sharp divisions at the official level and on the unofficial level as for the first time 
numerous Americans and Australians became familiar with one another. In the end 
though, the relationship did function, despite the obstacles that both nations placed in the 
way. The primary factor in overcoming the problems that arose was not simply the 
pressures of the war, which failed to halt the development of these problems in the first 
place. Rather, the primary issue that bound Americans and Australians together was a 
shared ideal of race. Their complementary views on this issue provided a common 
ground for both parties that bridged the divisions that separated them. 
On the official level, relations between Washington and Canberra were strained 
from the start of the war. The central issue between the two was the American insistence 
on seeing the Pacific War as their sole domain and Australian insistence on having teir 
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voice heard by Washington. In March 1942, the United States and Great Britain had 
agreed to divide the globe into three zones of responsibility. The Americans had sole 
responsibility for the Pacific; the British for the Middle East and the two shared the 
burdens of the European theatre.7 American forwardness in pushing their agenda for the 
Pacific campaign was tempered initially by the realization that Australia, due to its 
location and industry, would have to serve as the primary Allied base in the southern 
Pacific until American forces established a foothold elsewhere in the region.8 But even 
this realization did not force Washington to abandon the premise that “should differences 
develop between it and Australia (or indeed any Allied power in the Pacific), its own 
policies should prevail.”9 
One area of struggle was the issue of supplies and reinforcements to the 
Southwest Pacific theatre (SWPA). Established in 1942 under the command of General 
Douglas MacArthur, the SWPA was created to provide support on the flank for the 
American drive through the central Pacific and as the main area from which to launch the 
freeing of the Philippines. Australians and their government saw the SWPA primarily as 
a means to prevent the invasion of their country. Because of this both MacArthur and 
Prime Minister John Curtin developed a close working relationship since each of their 
own needs complemented the needs of the other. MacArthur needed more men and 
material to launch his drive north. For Curtin, this meant more men and material to keep 
Australia out of the hands of an Asian invader.  
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The seemingly incessant pleas for more material that emanated from MacArthur’s 
headquarters in Brisbane and from Canberra was a constant source of annoyance to 
Washington. In a meeting of the Pacific War Council, an advisory body created to 
assuage Australian fears about being left out of planning, President Roosevelt openly 
expressed his frustration with Australian complaints about shipping priorities for the 
Pacific. He exclaimed, “We have troops on the West Coast and planes ready to go to he 
Southwest Pacific, but as I remarked above the problem is entirely one of ocean 
transportation, and I must ask, ‘How the hell do we get stuff there? We have just about 
half enough troop transports. If anyone has a substitute for any of the items listed above, 
please come and tell me about it.”10 Roosevelt finally sent a formal cable to Macarthur 
signaling his agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s estimation that troop levels in 
Australia were enough to allow MacArthur to undertake an offensive against the Japanese 
in New Guinea and to defend Australia from any possible invasion.11 
American recalcitrance to send the materials deemed necessary by Curtin and his 
government for the defense of Australia and the perceived American indifference to the 
viewpoint of Australia in the Pacific War Council led to a growing dissatisfac ion in 
Canberra. Sir Owen Dixon, who replaced Sir Richard Casey as Australian ambassdor at 
Washington in 1942, gave voice to many of Canberra’s complaints in meetings of the 
Pacific War Council. Dixon “wondered whether or not everything possible was being 
done about cutting down turnarounds on shipping, labor and dock facilities in remote 
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parts of the world.” Dixon inferred that perhaps American shipping was not being used to 
its utmost advantage, which contributed to the supposed dearth of materials earmarked 
for Australia. Roosevelt shot back that the last American convoy that had arrived in 
Australia had found the dockworkers on a week’s holiday and that American soldiers 
were forced to unload the ships themselves.12 
Eventually, Dixon reached the conclusion that the Pacific War Council was 
useless as an instrument to allow Australian views to be heard.13 The endless stream of 
negative reports coming from Washington soured Curtin somewhat on the United States. 
Curtin had gained a reputation as the man who moved Australia away from Great Britain 
and towards a closer relationship with the United States. But the inability or 
unwillingness of the Americans to meet what he thought to be perfectly reasonable 
requests led the Prime Minister to reconsider his decision to forgo the traditional imperial 
relationship for the untested American one.14 Australian policy began to shift towards 
considerations of the post-war region and how best to situate Australia to take advantage 
of the political and economic opportunities brought on by the war. Roger Bell argued that 
by 1944, when the fighting had shifted north away from Australia, “Australia assigned 
co-operation with America a secondary role in its general foreign policy and defense 
planning. Increased Dominion diplomatic and military independence, combined with 
active support for a reassertion of British power and influence in the Far East under 
                                                          
12 Memorandum of Minutes of Pacific War Council, Oct. 7, 1942, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, Map Room 
File, Box 168, Folder 2, FDR Library. 
13 Department of Information Background Letter, April 30, 1943, Theodor Bray Papers, Dept. of 
Information – Background Information – 1943, MS 2519, National Library of Australia. Records from this 
archive hereafter cited as NLA. 
14 Glen St. John Barclay, “Australia Looks to America: The Wartime Relationship, 1939 – 1942,” Pacific 
Historical Review 46 (1977): 271; Christopher Thorne, “MacArthur, Australia and the British 1942 – 1943: 
The Secret Journal of MacArthur’s British Liaison Officer (Part III),” Australian Outlook 29 (1975): 209. 
78 
 
Australian leadership, was the principal feature of Australian policy during 1944 –6.”15 
The relationship between the two powers had not been smoothed by the war. Continued 
disagreement brought back memories of the bitterness of the 1930s and insured that both 
countries continued to view each other with sometimes thinly veiled contempt. 
For the Australians, the lack of regard for their views was a central problem in 
their external relations throughout World War II. Curtin and others maintained that 
Australia, as a Pacific nation and as the most important British dominion in the region, 
could not be ignored in the formulation of war strategy and post-war planning. Jeffrey 
Grey concluded that, “despite attempts to influence the distribution of forces between he 
Atlantic and Pacific theatres, the Australian government had no say in the strategic 
decisions of the Anglo – American alliance as they affected the Far East.”16 Chief among 
these strategic decisions was the American and British decision to pursue a Europe first 
strategy.  
Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs in the Curtin 
government, addressed this issue in a meeting with Cordell Hull. Evatt revealed that a 
plan “for a second military front in Western Europe against Germany had occasioned 
fears that the Pacific situation might be minimized or neglected and that this phase of the 
question should not be and need not be overlooked.”17 The Australians feared, correctly, 
that the push for the Europe first strategy would draw resources away from the war in the 
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Pacific. A key resource was modern aircraft, which the Australians felt were being 
siphoned away from areas in the Pacific where they were sorely needed, such asthe 
British naval base at Singapore, the centerpiece of Australian pre-war defense planning.18 
Australian exclusion from high level meetings such as Arcadia (December 22, 
1941 – January 14, 1942), Casablanca (January 14 – 24, 1943), Cairo (November 22 – 
26, 1943), Tehran (November 28 – December 1, 1943), Yalta (February 4 – 11, 1945) 
and Potsdam (July 16 – August 2, 1945) helped foster the idea in Canberra that their 
American and British allies were making wide reaching decisions which could not help 
but to affect Australia. David Day noted that, “Although Australian interests were
intimately involved in the Casablanca discussions, Curtin was neither informed nor 
consulted about them.”19 After learning about the decisions reached at Casablanca in the 
press, Curtin and other members of his government flew into a rage. The Prime Ministr 
addressed a tersely worded letter to Roosevelt that stated “The simple fact is th t we had 
no voice in the decisions. We were confronted with a fait accompli and we had no 
alternative but to accept the decisions, much as we disliked them.”20 Evatt told Hull flatly 
that not enough attention was being paid to the Pacific campaign and that the Japanese 
were reaping the benefits of the Europe first strategy. Owen Dixon related to Sumner 
Welles that he feared the creation of “a very unhealthy situation … which might
degenerate into a serious difficulty” between the two allies.21 American ambassador 
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Nelson Johnson related to his colleague R.B. Stewart that, “Australia is bombarded with 
stories of what we are doing and going to do to Germany and eventually Japan, but 
Australia feels left out in this Pacific area, and it feels very sharply the threat of Japanese 
domination in the Pacific.”22  
Sympathy for the Australian view was hard to find in Washington. Key members 
of the Roosevelt administration and the military, among them Roosevelt himself, Cordell 
Hull and George C. Marshall, often felt that the Australians were purposefully overstating 
their case in an effort to gain more material through Lend-Lease and thus build up their 
own secondary industries in order to take advantage of the economic opportunities the 
war presented in the Pacific region. Personal animosities also played a role in making 
American – Australian relations worse. The chief target of American dislike was Herbert 
V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs. Few men engendered as much 
anger as did Evatt. His outspoken views on Australian rights of representation and 
necessity of supply led P.G. Edwards to mark Evatt as “a significant factor in the course 
of Australian – American relations.”23 Evatt refused to recognize that the relationship 
between Australia and the United States was anything more than a relationship between 
equals. Because of this, Evatt pushed the United States hard for the creation of a formal
military alliance that would formalize the alliance between the two natis.24 This push 
recalled the efforts of the Australian government in 1935 to achieve a similar formal 
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military alliance. However, American leaders realized that any formal alliance would 
undercut their ability to dictate the course of the war in the Pacific as well as the post-war 
peace. The Americans also found little likeable in how Evatt approached his dealings 
with representatives of the United States. Richard Marshall, a member of MacArthur’s 
staff in Brisbane, related how Evatt “criticized the American Minister for not getting 
round the country more to find out the continual irritations arising, and stated that the 
Australian Government felt that its support of General MacArthur both here and in 
Washington was not sufficiently appreciated.”25 Evatt’s brusqueness often resulted in 
American leaders bypassing him to talk directly with Prime Minister Curtin o  using the 
Australian Ambassador in Washington as their primary contact with Australia. 
Evatt played a key role in one of the more important events that transpired in 
American – Australian relations during the war, the Australia – New Zealand Agreement 
of 1944 (ANZAC Treaty). The ANZAC Treaty was based on Australian and New 
Zealand objections to having been excluded from the Cairo Conference in November 
1943 and aimed at limiting perceived American hegemony in the South Pacific region.26 
The Roosevelt administration took particular exception to two clauses in the treaty. The 
seventh clause stated: 
The two Governments [Australia and New Zealand] declare they have vital 
interests in all preparations for any armistice ending the present hostilities or any 
part thereof and also in arrangements subsequent to any such armistice, and agree 
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that their interests should be protected by representation at the highest level on all 
armistice planning and executive bodies.27 
The second clause that caused consternation in Washington was Clause 27, which stated 
that Australia and New Zealand would not recognize any change in the sovereignty of 
any island in the Pacific if they were not included in the discussions about those islands.28 
It was obvious that these two clauses in particular were aimed at the UnitedSta s and 
“designed to restrict American post-war influence in the Pacific to the northern 
hemisphere,” while establishing Australian and New Zealand pre-dominance in the 
south.29 
The effect of the ANZAC Agreement on Washington was decidedly negative. 
Whereas the Americans had previously ignored Evatt’s demonstrations about Australian 
rights as being solely the views of one man, the ANZAC Agreement created the 
impression that there was a larger movement within the Curtin government that aimed to 
wean Australia away from the United States in favor of a renewed bond with Great 
Britain. Prior to meeting with Prime Minister Curtin in April of 1944, Roosevelt was
given a memorandum on the ANZAC Agreement prepared by the State Department. The 
memorandum highlighted the clauses aimed at the United States and reminded the 
President that, “The Australian – New Zealand Agreement of January 21, 1944 is the 
principal question outstanding between the United States and Australia at present.”30 
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Cordell Hull hoped to persuade the President to take a hard line stance in dealing with the 
Australians after the ANZAC Agreement had been signed.31  
Roosevelt, instead, adopted a different tact. In his meeting with Curtin, the 
President told Curtin that he guessed that the ANZAC Agreement was solely the creation 
of Evatt and that the Australian Government had merely gone along with it and had not 
intended it as an affront to the United States. Curtin stated that really the ANZAC 
Agreement had been meant to discuss “ … the future of the white man in the Pacific,” 
and was not meant as a barrier to future American – Australian relations.32 Roosevelt did 
not wish to spend more time then necessary on the matter as the end of the war in Europe 
was within sight and Allied forces in the Pacific were beginning their offensiv  push that 
would carry them to the Japanese home islands. The ANZAC Agreement was one of the 
last major diplomatic ruptures that occurred while both Roosevelt and Curtin were aliv  
but it would not be the last in the relationship between the two nations.33 
The strains in the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Australia were 
mirrored in the military relationship between the two during the war. This could be 
considered unusual given the popularity that the American military enjoyed in Australia, 
especially after the beginning of war in the Pacific in late 1941. These clashes, however, 
demonstrate that the relationship between the United States and Australia was never a 
natural or easy one for either side. Australian military planners placed great emphasis on 
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the role that the United States had to play if Australia were to successfully turn back any 
Japanese attempt to conquer Australia. Starting in the late 1930s, Australia, along with 
Great Britain, had urged the American military, primarily the U.S. Navy, to place more 
forces in the Pacific region, principally at the British naval base at Singapore.  
American naval leaders would not agree to the stationing of American ships at 
Singapore but Roosevelt did decide in late 1941 to transfer the bulk of the American fleet 
stationed in the Atlantic Ocean at Norfolk, Virginia to the naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii. Jonathan Utley pointed out that such a move would satisfy Australian demands 
for American action in the Pacific while allowing the British to keep the whole of their 
fleet in the Atlantic where it was desperately needed to combat the U-boat men ce.34 
Both Washington and Canberra hoped that this action would curtail any action on the part 
of Imperial Japan. To further demonstrate its commitment to involvement in the Pacific, 
the U.S. Navy sent a force of two cruisers and five destroyers on a tour of the South 
Pacific, which included calls at Sydney and Brisbane in March 1941. Recalling past visits 
of American ships to Australia, the Americans were greeted by large and enthusiastic 
crowds who thought the fleet visit would act as a deterrent to the Japanese.35 The 
harmony engendered by the stress of the war would be short lived however, on both the 
official and unofficial level. 
 While Australia hoped that they would figure prominently in American military 
planning in the Pacific, the reality of the situation was far different. In early 1942, then 
Brigadier-General Dwight Eisenhower released an assessment of necessary military 
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tasks: securing the British Isles and the Atlantic shipping lanes, preventing the collapse of 
India and the Middle East and keeping the Soviet Union in the war. All other matters, 
“even the defense of Australia, New Zealand, Alaska and the rest of South America, were 
‘merely’ desirable’ in the present crisis and therefore secondary.”36 The American 
military, especially the Navy, who assumed primary responsibility for the Pacific 
campaign, believed that a thrust through the central Pacific was the shortest and most 
effective way to strike at Japan. Thus, Australia initially held little a traction for the 
United States. 
 The fall of the Philippines in April 1942 altered American military plans in the 
Pacific. American troops and material that were headed for the islands were rerouted to 
Australia. It was decided that General Douglas MacArthur, commander of American 
forces in the Philippines, would be evacuated to Australia in order to assume command of 
Allied forces in the recently created Southwest Pacific Area. The first sizeable American 
contingent landed in Brisbane on December 22, 1941 after having been rerouted from the 
Philippines. Almost immediately, numerous problems arose between the American 
military command in Australia and the Australian government. One of the major
problems that faced U.S. forces in Australia throughout 1942 was the shortage of food 
that the influx of American troops brought about. Australian manpower, in a nation of 
seven million, was already strained because of commitments to the military effort and the 
massive food subsidies Australia was providing to Great Britain.37 A study of the 
reciprocal aid in foodstuffs offered by the Australians gives evidence to the sacrifices 
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made by the country to support American forces in the Southwest Pacific. Australian  
provided 69,440,000 pounds of beef and veal, 35,840,000 pounds of pork, 222,880,000 
pounds of breads and cereals, 73,920,000 pounds of potatoes, 213,024,000 pounds of 
fresh, canned and dehydrated vegetables and fruits, 15,232,000 pounds of fresh butter, 
49,728,000 pounds of sugar and 38,800,000 dozen fresh eggs.38 To put this in further 
perspective, it should be noted that Australia provided 65 to 70 percent of all foodstuffs 
consumed by American forces in the SWPA during the last half of 1942. Also, by 1943 
48,000 Australian civilians were working directly on projects related to U.S. military 
construction.39 
 Materials and wastage remained a key point of friction between Australian and 
American military officials. The American reliance on firepower to overwhelm Japanese 
positions was seen by Australians as incredibly wasteful while Americans viewed 
Australian tactics with contempt, seeing high Australian casualties as an example of the 
poor leadership indicative of Australian officers. General Sir Thomas Blamey, head of 
Australian army forces and Supreme Allied Commander of Allied Land Forces in the
SWPA, received a memo from his quartermaster’s office revealing the frustration that the 
Australian military felt over the issue of supplies. “None know better than we do,” the 
memo stated, “the avoidable waste of manpower and materials that went on without
question and the lavishness and extravagance which characterized U.S. demands whilst 
Australian Army and Australian Services demands were being subjected to rigid scrutiny 
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and economies.”40 Oftentimes the conflict over materials filtered down to the military 
level from the civilian government’s clashes. But this issue was also indicative of a larger 
problem between the American and Australian militaries. 
 Both sides saw the other as amateurs at war, making sometimes unforgivable 
blunders in their prosecution of the war. The Australians viewed the Americans as 
Johnny come latelys who would rather spend all their time lobbing shells at an enemy 
position than seizing it. The Americans saw their counterparts as being unskilled in the 
doctrine of fire and maneuver and wasteful with manpower. As Eric Bergerud state, 
“Americans lacked their [Australians] experience and battle technique. They also had a 
more measured and less aggressive style of combat, which frustrated Australian 
commanders. Australians fought harder but paid the price for it.”41 In no instance was this 
division more obvious than during the Allied campaign to push the Japanese from their 
foothold on Papua and New Guinea. 
 In early 1942, Japanese forces established a foothold on the northern coast of New 
Guinea, having taken the towns of Lae, Sanandana, Buna, Gona and Wau. The primary 
aim of the Japanese was the capture of Port Moresby on the southern coast of the island. 
This would allow them to interdict the shipping lanes to Australia and to cut off the 
supply lines from the United States to Australia. The Japanese army also temporarily 
toyed with the idea of using New Guinea as a jumping off point for an invasion of 
northern Australia but this idea was quickly abandoned when it was decided that such an 
undertaking would prove too great a drain on resources. An initial Japanese attempt to 
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seize Port Moresby by an amphibious landing was thwarted by the Allies at the Battle of 
the Coral Sea (May 4 – 8, 1942). A subsequent Japanese thrust over the imposing Owen 
Stanley Mountains forced the small Australian force holding the mountain passes to fall 
back almost all the way to Port Moresby. Eventually, lengthened supply lines and the 
rough terrain helped to stave off the Japanese threat.  
However, this initial clash between Australians and Japanese gave American 
commanders a bad impression of the Australian Army. General George C. Kenney, who 
had replaced General George Brett as Allied Air Commander in August 1942, related his 
concerns about Australian troops to MacArthur. In a private conference with MacArthur, 
Kenney stated, “That there was a definite lack of inspiration all over the Australian 
ground show and a don’t care attitude that looked as though they were already reconciled 
to being forced out of New Guinea.”42 In a strategy conference on the Pacific war held on 
September 25, 1942, at Palmyra Atoll, more American concerns were raised over the 
quality and ability of the Australian forces fighting in New Guinea. Admiral Chester 
Nimitz was informed that New Guinea was all but lost because Prime Minister Curtin 
would not allow American forces to intervene because of the political repercussions it 
would have on the home front. One attendee opined that: 
The Australians won’t fight. This war has been a series of withdrawals and 
disasters for them. They now have the habit. All their plans in New Guinea have 
been withdrawal and routes by which to retire … The sons of the Australians of 
the last war have all the bad habits of their fathers but none of the good qualities. 
They just don’t want to fight and won’t.43 
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Of course, the reality of the situation was far different than the perception held by the
American command structure. By the time American troops entered into combat in New 
Guinea, Australian forces had pushed the Japanese back over the Owen Stanley 
Mountains and were beginning their offensive to push the Japanese out of their footholds 
on the northern coast. Harry Gailey pointed out that it was primarily Australian forces 
who earned the victories in New Guinea of which General MacArthur was so proud while 
Edward Drea related how, “The casualty list serves as a sharp reminder of American 
dependence on its Australian ally: of 8,500 battle casualties, 5,689, or two of every three, 
were Australians.”44 
 The headquarters of Douglas MacArthur, often for purely personal reasons, 
consistently downplayed the sacrifices of the Australians in New Guinea. MacArthur 
came to play the same role on the military side that Herbert Evatt played on the
diplomatic. His imperious manner and reluctance to share the glory of the Allied victories 
over the Japanese created a great sense of resentment among Australian soldiers on all 
levels. Initially, the Australians welcomed MacArthur as a savior, a fulfillment of the 
promise of American support against the Japanese. In the end, MacArthur created more 
divisions between two allies already faced with numerous others.  
 Much of the problem created by MacArthur’s imperious manner could be 
attributed to the situation he was faced with upon his arrival in Australia in March 1942. 
General Robert Eichelberger, who would become one of MacArthur’s most trusted 
commanders, confided that the Australia MacArthur arrived in was “in chaos” and that, 
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“There was confusion everywhere; a spirit of defeatism and despair cloaked the nation.”45  
The specter of Japanese invasion hung over the country and influenced many of the 
decisions made by Prime Minister Curtin, including his decision to align himself as 
closely as possible with the newly appointed Supreme Commander, SWPA. Curtin’s 
action represented, according to historian Jeffrey Grey, a “significant surrender of 
national sovereignty.”46 David Day concluded that by welcoming MacArthur as a savior, 
Australia committed itself to being a de facto American colony for the duration of the 
war.47 This point is overstated. As has been shown, the Australian government never 
became a subservient partner to the United States during the war. On numerous 
occasions, Australia demonstrated its intention to be seen as an equal partner who could, 
and would, dictate its own policies. 
 Two central problems arose between MacArthur and the Australians. First was his 
decision to exclude both Australian civilian and military leaders as much as possible from 
the planning and prosecution of the war in the Southwest Pacific. MacArthur received 
several entreaties from Washington to include Australians on his staff, many of which 
MacArthur totally ignored. In fact, there are several examples of MacArthur instructing 
his officers not to work with the Australians. The most famous example was MacArthur’s 
order to Robert Eichelberger, prior to the latter’s departure to take over U.S. forces in 
New Guinea, to “pay your respects to the Australians and then leave them alone. Don’t 
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have anything to do with them.”48 This was a pattern that continued throughout the 
remainder of the war. When the time came for the Allies to launch their campaign to free 
the Philippines, MacArthur made sure to exclude the Australians by directing them to 
conduct operations in Papua and New Guinea to “mop up” the remaining Japanese forces 
there. This action ran contrary to the Allied practice of island hopping, bypassing iolated 
Japanese forces instead of wasting men and material retaking each small island and atoll. 
This led to numerous casualties for the Australians and led to further anger being dir cted 
at MacArthur.49 
 The second issue that arose between MacArthur and the Australians was 
MacArthur’s low opinion of the quality of the Australian soldier. This was exceptionally 
difficult for Australians to take, especially given the important role that the Australian 
soldier played in the national mind. Soldiering had formed a key element of the 
Australian sense of national identity that had emerged in the first half of thetwentieth 
century.50 Numerous historians have commented on MacArthur’s dislike of the 
Australian military. Eric Bergerud stated that MacArthur’s questioning of the Australian 
retreat over the Owen Stanley Mountains led to a shake up in the Australian command 
structure, which was a blow to Australian pride and to some officers’ careers, a point 
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which earned MacArthur numerous enemies throughout Australia.51 R y Aitchison 
argued that MacArthur’s point of view was influenced by the fact that, “He was a 
defeated general who had to be given another American army to try again.”52 The 
Australian retreat in New Guinea provided the initial impetus for MacArthur’s low 
opinion of Australian troops and it was one that, regardless of the successes enjoyed
subsequently by the Australians, would not disappear.  
 Reports swirled around MacArthur’s headquarters in Brisbane that the Australian 
retreat had become the butt of many jokes between MacArthur and his staff. General 
Eichelberger recorded that his chief of staff reported to him that,  
High ranking officers and he [Eichelberger’s COS] mentioned Sutherland [Lt. 
General Richard Sutherland, MacArthur’s COS] and Kenney [General George 
Kenney, Allied Air Commander] had made fun of the fighting ability of the 
Aussie, particularly when the Australians retreated to the outskirts of Port 
Moresby down the Kokoda trail. There was some indication that General 
MacArthur had made remarks.53 
 
Eichelberger also related that one Australian officer remarked to him: 
 American officers with their Australian girls around the Lennon Hotel have made  
joking remarks about the surrender at Singapore and the Australian retreat over 
the Kokoda Trail to Port Moresby. This has been contrasted with the great 
fighting ability of the Americans at Bataan. The Australian girls have repeated 
these jokes and they have spread over Australia. A number of your highest-
ranking officers were included. No matter how hard you have fought, the 
Australian troops would like to show up the Americans.54 
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Actions like these earned MacArthur many powerful enemies in Australia; among them 
the powerful newspaperman Sir Keith Murdoch and the commander of Australian ground 
forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey.  
Murdoch was among the most enthusiastic supporters of increased relations 
between Australia and the United States but he, like many, soured on the relationship 
because of MacArthur. General George Kenney related to his diary an argument that he 
had with Murdoch over the sudden anti-American tone appearing in the editorials in 
papers owned by Murdoch. Murdoch retorted that MacArthur’s strategy “was no good”, 
and that “we needed a new Allied commander whom he trusted and could back.”55 
Murdoch’s dislike towards MacArthur could be explained by MacArthur’s influence over 
John Curtin, something which irked Murdoch who wanted to have a strong say in the 
development of Australian policies during the war.  
The situation with General Thomas Blamey symbolized the numerous differences 
that existed between the American and Australian militaries. One of the reasons for the 
poor rapport between the two men was that MacArthur thought Blamey harbored political 
ambitions. To this end, Macarthur often did everything in his power to keep American 
forces from under Blamey’s control, even creating special separate commands for 
American troops to operate under.56 Another point of contention between the two was 
Blamey’s views on American troops, which was as poor as MacArthur’s was on the 
Australians. During the Allied fight to force the Japanese out of the town of Buna, the 
American 32nd Division, under the command of General Edwin Harding, suffered several 
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setbacks that caused embarrassment to MacArthur. Blamey insisted that Austr lian 
troops, “who knew how to fight,” be sent in to aid the Americans.57  
On a separate occasion, an American special command, Alamo Force, landed on 
the undefended Woodlark Island. MacArthur’s headquarters celebrated the operation as 
an important tactical victory over the Japanese. Blamey confided to his memoirs: 
It [the Woodlark operation] was hailed as a fine operation of war by the news  
hungry. It was in fact, one of the jokes of the war. There was not one Japanese  
on the island and had been occupied by a small number of troops for some time. It  
had the effect, however, of holding up materials and vessels urgently required for  
following up operations against Lae.58 
 
The theme of waste was a constant one in Blamey’s criticism of his American allies. 
When ordered by MacArthur to mop up in Papua and New Guinea while American forces 
liberated the Philippines, Blamey called it “a colossal waste of manpower, material and 
money.”59 Whether this or the fact that American troops were receiving more press 
coverage bothered Blamey is not clear. Both were men of strong egos and belief in the 
fighting quality of their respective nationalities. It is natural that fric ion would occur 
between allies in times of war but the personalities of men like MacArthur only served to 
exacerbate those differences. 
 The ill will fostered by MacArthur and his commanders was ameliorated to some 
degree by the work of American and Australian commanders in the field. Robert 
Eichelberger, in his personal papers, made continual reference to the high quality of the 
Australian fighting man and the officers who led them. “Both the Australian 7th Division 
and the 18th Brigade,” Eichelberger wrote, “were excellent, battle-tried units. General 
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Vasey (Gen. George A. Vasey, commander Australian 7th Division), the top Australian 
commander at the front, was a superb soldier, courageous and capable.”60 General 
George Kenney, the American commander of Allied air forces in the SWPA, also held 
the Australian military in higher opinion than did those in MacArthur’s immediat 
coterie. He was impressed by the Australian’s ability to shake off what would have been 
severe blows to morale and unit cohesion. As he related to D. Clayton James in 1971, “I 
liked the Australians because their ground troops and their air men were sterling 
characters who would take losses and laugh about them whereas most other countries’ 
forces with the same percentage of losses would be out of action.”61  
These attempts to lessen MacArthur’s harsh criticisms were appreciated by those 
within the Australian command structure. It must also be pointed out that generally, in 
New Guinea, where the ardors of combat and terrain lessened cultural differences, 
average Australian and American soldiers enjoyed a strong solidarity. As T.J. Baker, a 
private with the 42nd Battalion of the Australian Imperial Force stationed in New Guinea 
reminisced, “They [Americans] were pretty good jokers and were telling us how they 
liked Aussies, and even though they got a few hidings off some of the jokers, they still 
reckon the Aussies are the goods, so they must have had a good time.”62 However, the 
cordial relations that existed in New Guinea on the ground level were overshadowed by 
the contentious relationship that existed in the higher echelons of command. 
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One can see that the official relationship between the United States and Australia 
during World War II was never a smooth one, contrary to popular belief. The divisions at 
the higher levels were often mirrored by conflicts among ordinary Americans and 
Australians who for the first time were meeting each other in large numbers. This should 
come as no surprise as both peoples were generally ignorant about the other. Kate Darian 
– Smith pointed out, “Australians were generally ignorant about American history, 
politics, literature and social life.” This lack of knowledge was reinforced by the 
Australian educational system’s emphasis on ties with the Empire and Great Britain.63 
Americans were equally uninformed about their new hosts. The G.I. Pocket Guide to 
Australia informed soldiers, “There’s one thing you’ll run into – Australians know as 
little about our country as we do about theirs.”64 R.R. Farnes, a flight sergeant with the 
Royal Australian Air Force, recorded his impressions of Americans during a trip to 
Canada. He wrote, “I have spoken to quite a few people and most of them know nothing 
about Australia.”65 In a commemorative booklet about the American presence in the town 
of Mackay, Australia, several Australians remembered the amazement of the Americans 
that Australia had towns and cities and that Australians were white and spoke good 
English. Some of the Americans were under the impression that they were going to 
Austria.66 
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 With little actual knowledge about each other, both Australians and Americans 
sought to find frames of reference with which to interpret each other. For Australians, the 
primary reference was American films. Robert Eichelberger wrote to his wife that, “Their 
[Australians] only constant recreation is to watch American movies so of course they 
know more about us than we know about them.”67 John Lardner, a writer for The 
Saturday Evening Post, revealed to his readers in the U.S. that, “It’s a certain truth that 
much of what Australians know of our manners, customs and speech before our troops 
came in large numbers was gleaned from movies.”68 K.R Cramp, an American officer 
who worked in procurement, wrote that, “Go to the movies and you see mainly the 
product of Hollywood. Listen to the radio and you hear music that is chiefly American 
recordings.”69 Australian reliance on American film as the primary means of 
understanding Americans was bound to lead to conflict. The idealized image, that of the 
American gangster or starlet, many Australians held about America was vastly different 
from the reality of the men and women who entered their country after 1942. 
 For the Americans, there was little, if any, popular culture on which they could 
rely for a frame of reference. Instead, American servicemen in Australia did what many 
Americans did while abroad during World War II. They placed the strange new lads and 
people they came across into patterns of historical analogy drawn from American 
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history.70 In Australia, a nation that was still in many ways a frontier country, it was only 
natural for Americans to look to their own frontier past. Peter Schrijvers remark d that: 
 Many a GI reported that Australia bore an uncanny resemblance to the Old West.  
 Hunting kangaroos from jeeps and playing poker into the night, a submarine crew  
 on leave in western Australia claimed that both Perth and the much smaller town  
 of Fremantle breathed a ‘certain frontier town atmosphere,’ which by the time had 
 ‘become unfamiliar and strange to us Americans.’71 
 
As there were pitfalls with the Australian reliance on film, American’s i sistence on 
seeing Australia through the lens of the American experience could not help but lead to
conflict. When Australians did not behave in the manner in which Americans thought 
they should, conflict was quick to ensue. General Thomas Blamey offered an important 
insight to Australian officers visiting the United States. He told them, “In may ways 
they [Americans] are very like us but there are, at the same time, big differences. We do 
not talk the same language; shades of difference in meaning can cause quite serio s 
misunderstanding.”72 Events would bear out Blamey’s estimation as Americans and 
Australians quickly found out that their ideas about each other were vastly different rom 
the reality they faced. 
 American troops’ initial impressions of Australia were often quite favorble. 
Welcomed as heroes by the Australians, Americans were treated much like movie stars. 
Australians of all classes and political leanings courted them with food and drink. E c 
Bergerud pointed out that for American troops fighting in the Pacific, “Australia was big 
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steaks, strong drink, real cities, hotels and girls.”73 G.J. Stuart, among one of the first 
American servicemen to arrive in Australia via convoy, wrote “Seldom have so many 
been welcomed to anyplace as we were. It was in fact impossible to walk down any main 
street in Melbourne without getting stopped by an Aussie and asked to tea (their dinner),
a drink, play golf, or just plain ‘welcome, we sure are glad to see ya, Yank’.”74 This 
initial honeymoon period was short lived, however. After the threat of Japanese invasion 
had been lessened by the Allied victories at the Coral Sea and in New Guinea, the 
differences between U.S. servicemen and Australians came to the fore, much of it caused 
by the lack of appreciation for the cultural gap between the two peoples.75 
 While both parties spoke Englishthey did not speak the same form of English. The 
Australian language relied heavily on slang terms peculiar to that country. Many of these 
terms caused confusion and consternation among the American GIs attempting to deal 
with the local populace. One member of the 158th Infantry Regiment recalled how one 
particularly attractive Australian woman asked him “if he had been ‘screwed’ yet – 
meaning paid.” The GI mistakenly took this innocent question for an invitation for an 
amorous meeting and was rebuffed by a sharp slap to his cheek.76 While events like this 
may seem trivial, in the larger context of the meeting of two cultures unfamiliar with one 
another, simple events such as this provided the impetus for violence.  
 Other important cultural factors caused problems between the two groups. For the
Americans, used to a society based on speed and efficiency, the slower pace of life in 
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Australia was a constant source of annoyance. Many among the Americans came to see 
an inherent laziness in the Australian people or lack of commitment to the war effort. The 
Australian wharf laborer became the symbol of this lack of effort for many American 
GIs, who often ended up having to unload American supply ships themselves.77 Thomas 
R. St. George, a member of the U.S. 32nd Division, wrote a series of articles for The San 
Francisco Chronicle which detailed life in Australia. St. George recorded that 
Australians “refused to recognize that we [Americans] were a mechanized army and 
continued to move at a top speed of about four miles an hour.”78 The War Department 
killed an article that Collier’s Magazine was preparing to run which highlighted the 
lackadaisical attitude of the Australians. The article stated, “Instead of preparation for 
war, one sees in Australia a life of horse-racing, beer drinking, and long vacations on its 
beaches. The feeling among a great many people is that conquest by the Japanese will b  
no worse than capitalistic domination by the United States.”79 American’s strong feelings 
about Australia’s commitment to the war effort led not just to sharp words but overt 
violence in some instances. 
 By mid-1942 the combination of wartime shortages, overcrowding in Australia’s 
few urban centers and increasing dislike by both Americans and Australians for the other 
led to numerous incidents of violence.80 The article from Collier’s Magazine related that, 
“Fighting among the soldiers occurs continuously and the Australian soldiers have a bit 
of waylaying single American soldiers. Up to June, more American soldiers were kill d 
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and wounded on the continent of Australia by such waylaying than by Japanese action.”81 
There is little doubt that the article overstated the situation in Australia but t also cannot 
be ignored as sensationalist either. Coral Bell noted that a confluence of factors, 
including competition for women, liquor and battlefield glory, made the outbreak of 
violence almost a certainty.82 One example involved two troop trains in northern 
Queensland, one carrying American GIs south for leave, the other carrying Australian 
soldiers north for embarkation to New Guinea. The two trains pulled alongside each other 
at which point both groups “began exchanging friendly banter about women, and then 
insults, and then swarmed into each other’s trains to fight it out.”83 Throughout 1942 and 
early 1943, events such as this became more commonplace across Australia.  
 The most well known act of violence to occur between Australians and Americans 
was the infamous “Battle of Brisbane” on November 26 and 27, 1942. The incident is 
unique because initially the clash occurred between American and Australian servicem n 
on one side and military police on the other. The impetus for the riot sprang from a 
decision made by the American military which disallowed Australian servicemen from 
shopping in American canteens, where prices for items were far lower and the selection 
much larger. The Australian government protested this point and eventually a 
compromise was reached in which Australian soldiers could buy limited amounts of 
certain items in American canteens. However, American soldiers were forbade by the 
U.S. military from shopping in Australian military stores, the fear being that the 
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American’s superior purchasing power would cause dissatisfaction among the Ausralian 
military. 
 The catalyst for the larger riot occurred on November 26, 1942, when an 
American MP stopped an American serviceman from entering into an Australian cnteen 
with two Australian soldiers. The American ignored the MP’s instructions which led to 
the MP knocking him unconscious. The two Australian soldiers, upon seeing this, came 
to the American soldiers’ aid and attacked the MP.  The resulting fracas spilled out into 
the nearby street turning into a larger brawl between nearby MPs and American and 
Australian servicemen.  Eventually a truckload of American MPs from a nearby b se was 
sent in to restore order.  During this time an Australian soldier seeking to take aw y one 
MPs gun attacked the MP.  The gun accidentally discharged killing the Australian 
serviceman.  This proved to be the impetus in turning what had been up to this point a 
U.S. – Australian servicemen against MP battle into an Australian – American one and 
also highlighted another important cultural division between the two groups.  Australians 
always thought that American GIs were quick to go for the knife or a gun in a fight, 
something that was considered cowardly in Australia, where fights were to be settled with 
fists and boots.84 
 In response to the killing, gangs of Australian servicemen throughout Brisbane 
began to attack lone GIs, severely injuring several.  Reports of GIs being lashed by 
Australian soldiers with their belts was common during the incident as were reports of 
Australian and American soldiers leaving their bases armed with hand grenades and 
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bayonets. These attacks continued throughout the night and into the following day.  In an 
effort to curb the violence all US soldiers were restricted to base and any gathering of 
more than three soldiers was broken up.  In the aftermath of the incident, it is intereti g 
to note that the American military command placed the blame squarely on the shoulders 
of the Australian military while the Australians took the opposite tact.  
Larry H. Vaughan, the U.S. Provost Marshal in Brisbane and later President Harry 
Truman’s military advisor, issued a report that stated, “(1) That the Australian Military 
police had failed to perform their function of maintaining order among the Australian 
troops.  (2) That the Commandos utilized by the Australian Military Police had turned at 
least four (4) of their guns over to the rioters (the Australian Provost Marshal later denied 
to me that this had been done). (3) That a considerable number of the Australian Military
Police removed their M.P. arm bands when trouble occurred.” Vaughan concluded his 
report by stating that while Americans were not always innocent in matters such as this, 
in this particular instance it was obvious that the blame lay wholly with the Australians.85 
Other Americans contributed the violence to inherent flaws in the Australian character. 
General Henry “Hap” Arnold, after touring Australia in September of 1942, concluded 
that “the Australian is not a bushman; he is not a field soldier. He is nothing but a city 
slum dweller.”86 Thinking similar to Arnold’s was prevalent among many in the 
American command structure, many of whom refused to recognize the contributions of 
the Australian military and civilians to the war effort against Japan. 
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The Australians, on the other hand, saw the Americans as to blame for the 
episodes of violence around the country. A report prepared by the intelligence serviceof 
the Australian army offers an insight into what the Australians thought the motivating 
factors in these clashes were. Several key factors were identified as playing a role in 
starting altercations between Americans and Australians: drunkenness, differing rates of 
pay, discrimination in shops, hotels, cafes and by taxi drivers in favor of the Americans, a 
general hostility towards Americans and the “girl” question.87 At the heart of this issue 
was the fact that Australian soldiers felt like second-class citizens n their own country 
when forced to compete for scarce items like alcohol and women. Pat Frank, who worked 
for the Office of War Information (OWI), wrote to his colleague Harold Guinzburg that,  
“And of course, that American troops get all the pretty girls, and they have more money, 
and the American canteens are cleaner and better equipped, and the Americans have snap 
and drive and are eager for a scrap. The Aussies who came home after being mauled in 
Egypt and Singapore can only brood and drink.”88 Knowingly, or not, American troops 
alienated a large segment of the Australian populace who saw the frequent episodes of 
poor treatment that Australian troops had to endure.89  
The Australian government moved quickly to help shore up what was already a 
rocky relationship with the Americans. Pressure was applied to the Australian press who 
were asked to “refrain from unduly playing up incidents of the kind which have occurred 
in capital cities recently and to publicize sporting fixtures and fraternization meetings 
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which are sponsored by both Americans and Australians.”90 Explicitly, the media was 
ordered to carry no coverage or make no mention of the riot in Brisbane in any way.91 
The Australian press complied with the government’s wishes and no official record of the 
Brisbane incident was kept. However, it was difficult to get those who saw the riot not to 
talk and word of the fracas spread throughout both American and Australian military 
camps. Abraham Felber, a member of the 1st Marine Brigade, recorded in his diary 
hearing rumors of the fights between Australian and American soldiers in Melbourne and 
Brisbane. The proof for him lay in the fact that, “I note in today’s paper that there will be 
a ‘get-together’ held this coming Sunday at which 4,000 Australians and 3,000 
Americans are to be expected. There will be free beer and sandwiches … so it looks as 
though there might be some grounds for all the stories, and that the authorities are taking 
energetic measures to cope with the situation.”92 The efforts of the Australian government 
and American military to foster good will between the two groups were a mixed success. 
In the end, free sandwiches and beer could not overcome the very real issues that served 
to sour relations between the GIs and Diggers. 
Of the several factors identified by the Australian military intellignce, the two 
most important were the economic and labor issues and the issue of women. The influx of 
American troops into Australia added new pressures onto an economy already stretched 
thin by the demands of wartime production and rationing. Jane Fidcock stressed this 
point, “There was a growing resentment as American demand stretched out into the 
                                                          
90 Department of Information Background Letter, March 8, 1943, Theodor Bray Papers, MS 2519, NLA. 
91 Censorship Instructions June 9, 1942 – December 29, 1942, November 27, 1942, Theodor Bray Papers, 
MS 2519, NLA. 
92 Abraham Felber, The Old Breed of Marine: A World War II Diary (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 
Inc., 2003), 167. 
106 
 
community-at-large. Besides the truckloads of timber and meat, the acres of ground and 
the thousands of workers procured by the Australian government to meet American 
requirements, the civilian community became conscious of the American demand for a 
share in their entertainments.”93 Abraham Felber recorded in his diary that the American 
accumulation of money, and the ease with which it was spent, led to shopkeepers refusing
to sell to Australian soldiers.94 Paul Kincade, an American Navy signalman who served 
aboard an Australian destroyer in 1944, related how when the special stores he was 
promised were not delivered to the Australian ship he proceeded to buy up all of the 
ships’ chewing gum and canned fruit. He wrote in his memoir that, “Since the Aussies 
don’t go much for chewing gum, my cornering the market didn’t create too much of a 
problem. But when word got around that I had bought all of the tinned fruit available, I 
became as popular as Typhoid Mary, if not less so.”95 The disparity in pay scales between 
the American and Australian militaries ensured that scenes such as these wer  r peated 
through out the whole of the country during the war.96 
The American military also encountered problems in dealing with the Australian 
labor force. The strong Labor party and movement in Australia was something with 
which very few Americans had previous experience dealing with. George C. Marshall 
identified the Australian wharf laborers as one of the largest obstacles standing in the way 
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of better American – Australian relations.97 Hanson Baldwin, a writer for The New York 
Times, wrote a series of scathing articles attacking the apparent lack of effort by the 
Australians to help win the war in the Pacific. He noted that American soldiers had to 
unload convoys and replaced stevedores “who were not to work after the whistle had 
blown”; Baldwin concluded from this that, “The Australians helped but in so far as Labor 
is concerned, its help has by no means been what we hoped for.”98 U.S. Ambassador 
Nelson Johnson commented to his colleague William Lancaster that the Australian 
worker “seems more interested in his basic wage than he is in defending himself against
invasion.”99 The situation was not helped when Australian labor unions filed complaints 
with the Australian government claiming that the Americans were depriving them of their 
livelihood or when the labor unions issued proclamations condemning “the usurpation of 
our industrial and civilian rights by American authorities.”100 The division between 
Americans and Australian labor served as another example of how the relationship 
between the United States and Australia was never an easy or pragmatic one for either 
side. 
Perhaps the issue that caused the largest rift between the average Australian and 
American GIs was the matter of women. The conflicts that arose between Australian and 
American military personnel over women had several different causes. First was the 
feeling among Australians that with a population of only seven million, a sizeable portion 
                                                          
97 George C. Marshall to Harry L. Hopkins, October 5, 1942, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Box 132, Folder 1 – 
Australia, FDR Library. 
98 “Labors Help Not What We Hoped,” The Argus, October 29, 1942, Series # A5954, Control # 2068/6, 
NAA. 
99 Nelson Johnson to William Lancaster, March 13, 1942, Nelson Johnson Papers, Box 40, LOC. 
100 Moore, Over – Sexed, Over – Paid, and Over Here, 230. 
108 
 
of which was male, they could ill afford to lose any sizeable number of women to the 
Americans.101 Population growth was of central importance to the Australian people, who 
felt that increasing the native white population of their country would help to provide 
some security against the masses of Asia to the north. It is clear that the influx of 
Americans into Australia did have an effect on the rates of marriage, which peaked in 
1942 – 1943, but it should be pointed out that the marriage rates had been on the rise 
since 1940, long before the Americans set foot in Australia.102 The number of Australian 
women who became “war-brides” was never significant in terms of sheer numbers. By 
January of 1945, between 1,200 and 1,500 Australian women had moved to the U.S. as 
brides of American GIs, while another 10,000 waited in Australia to join their new 
families in the U.S.103 However, the psychological effect that this emigration had on the 
Australian mind cannot be underestimated. The perception existed that that the 
Americans were stealing Australia’s daughters or, if not stealing them, contributing to the 
soaring divorce rate among Australian couples during the war.104  
One must also keep in mind that the Australian woman was not a passive actor in 
these events. They exhibited a strong willingness to challenge the traditional cultural 
norms of Australia by engaging in romantic or amorous relationships with American GIs. 
Australian society in the 1940s was a male oriented one. Ray Aitchison acknowledged 
that Australian women lived in a male world, one in which the women were often 
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neglected or ignored. Because of this Australian women were quite happy to accept the 
attention of American servicemen, many of who had not seen or been with a woman in 
several months and were often unsure of when they would be again. As Aitchison stated, 
“The Americans made the Australian women feel like princesses – and the Australian 
women avidly wanted to be taught more of the ways of the wider world then they had 
previously known.”105 Aside from the ability of American soldiers to provide hard to find 
items and luxury goods, Australian women noted a marked difference in the manner of 
the new arrivals.  
The average American GI was often seen as better dressed, more polite and more 
interesting then the average Australian male.106 Numerous sources have commented on 
this. Leslie L. Grubin, a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army, noted that, “… when a guy 
treats a lady like a lady in Australia they take it to mean more than is meant … It’s just 
that the American male is different in certain respects to the Australian male.”107 The GI 
Pocket Guide to Australia informed soldiers that, “As a matter of fact, the Australians, 
especially the girls, are a bit amazed at the politeness of American soldier .”108 The 
American GI was the embodiment of everything that Australian women had seen in th  
American films that had dominated the Australian cultural scene for the previous fifteen 
to twenty years. Thomas St. George recounted how Australian women reacted to the 
introduction of American style jazz. “The girls as a rule,” he wrote, “being pretty 
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impressed with the Yanks anyhow, took to this violent form of exercise with enthusiasm, 
discarded formal evening wear in favor of slacks (to the utter horror of town mothers) 
and learned to cut a pretty decent rug themselves.”109 While many of the interactions that 
took place between American troops and Australian women were innocent affairs, 
Australian males and the American military command saw it differently.  
For the returning soldiers of the Australian military who had fought in North 
Africa, Crete and in New Guinea, the reception given to the American GIs, many of 
whom had not seen combat, was especially galling. The majority of clashes, many of 
which “made John Wayne fights look like high school picnics,” between the two sides 
were attributed to arguments over women.110 Concerns and thoughts on this phenomena 
appeared regularly in letters between Australian soldiers abroad and their wives and 
sweethearts. Alan Francis Hackett, a private in the 2/12 Battalion, Australian Imperial 
Force (AIF), corresponded frequently with his wife Maureen on this topic. One letter 
between the two related to a mutual friend who had started seeing an American GI. 
Hackett wrote asking his wife, “Are you sure she only goes ‘horse riding’ with the 
Yank?” Maureen Hackett responded by assuring her husband, “I am quiet certain she 
goes more than horseback riding.”111 Many of the letters of Australian GIs are filled with 
this type of innuendo. Fear of American sexual conquests was rampant among the men of 
the Australian military as well as among civilian authorities, who saw the young women 
of Australia openly embracing the more open sexual attitudes of the Americans.  
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An intelligence report produced by the Australian army identified this issuea  the 
central one in the deteriorating relations between Australians and American t oops. It is 
interesting to note that the report also places part of the blame on the shoulders of 
Australian women themselves: 
Australians of the better sort are resentful of the loose behavior of many 
Australian women, whose husbands are serving abroad, with American 
Servicemen, and of the cheap regard in which a large number of American troops 
appear to hold Australian girls. In particular, they do not like the way Americans 
“paw” them and embrace them in public. Australians of other types are annoyed 
when Australian girls refuse their company, but soon afterwards are seen to 
accept the advances of the first Americans that offer.112 
The open sexual behavior of both America troops and Australian women was also a cause 
of concern for American military authorities, who worried that venereal disease would 
erode the effectiveness of American troops. By May 1942, venereal disease among 
American troops in Australia was running at 45.8 per thousand. By November of 1944, 
however, that number had declined to 4.2 per thousand.113 One of the ways this decline 
was accomplished was a push by the American military authority to portray Australian 
women as unclean in comparison with the “clean” American girls waiting back home. 
Australian women were also painted as “good time honeys” seeking to fleece the 
unsuspecting American GI of his hard earned money.114 Little was often said, though, 
about the actions of American GIs, who took the friendliness of Australian women to 
mean availability, which led to several incidents of rape and murder, which placed further 
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strain on the relationship between the American military and the Australian general 
public.115 
 One can clearly see that the relationship between the United States and Australia 
during the war was not always a cordial one. The two countries, separated often by 
differences of culture and of political aims, oftentimes found it difficult to find common 
ground, even in the face of a common enemy. While the war certainly provided an 
impetus in developing the bond between the two it is difficult to argue that this was the 
only factor that did so. If this were the case then, given the contentious nature of the 
relationship, after the war both the U.S. and Australia would most likely have returned o 
the status quo of the 1930s. This however was not the case. What other factor could have 
led to the development of as close a relationship that came out of the war period? One 
answer that has not received strong consideration is the ideology of race. For both 
nations, race lay at the center of their worldviews. And given the nature of the war in the 
Pacific, race was a place where both Americans and Australians found commonality.116 
In fact, it was reported to Canberra that both Admiral Ernest King and Franklin Roosevelt 
had stated the prestige of the white man as one of the primary reasons why the Japanese 
could not be allowed to take Australia.117 Race would prove to be the one factor that 
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united Americans and Australians when the numerous other factors of the relationship 























Chapter 4: The Commonality of Race 
Australian ambassador Richard Casey gave a revealing insight into how race 
helped bring Americans and Australians together in a speech he gave at the N ional 
Press Club in Washington D.C. in 1940. Casey told the assembled newspapermen, “We 
[Australians] seem to have the same likes and dislikes as you – and the same prejudices – 
and after all, one can’t feel at home except amongst people that have the same prejudices 
as oneself. Let’s keep our prejudices. They’re consciously or unconsciously, based on 
something.”1 While Casey did not mention racial prejudices specifically, it is not difficult 
to assume that given the importance of race to Australians and Americans in this time 
period, that it is implied in his speech. 
Since the first white settlers set foot on the continent, Australia had been a land 
where race had always been central in conceptualizing the world.2 By the time war broke 
out in the Pacific, the concepts of Australian identity and nationalism were still wholly 
fixed upon this idea of race, something that had changed little since the country achieved 
federation in 1901.3 Many Australians boasted that the country was “98% British,” a 
claim of pride that Australia had managed to maintain a rather homogeneous population 
in the face of the threat of being overrun by the numerous Asian groups who surrounded 
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their country.4 Australia also served as a rallying point for other European whites in the 
Pacific region. In the face of Imperial Japan’s rapid expansion in late 1941 and early 
1942, many whites in the region gravitated toward Australia thinking that would be 
where the white race made its last stand in the region.5 
 While it may be difficult to judge to what degree race influenced an individual’s 
decisions, an examination of a wide range of sources from Australian officials and private 
citizens demonstrates that race was a common frame of reference and that the Australians 
consciously sought to use race as a means of developing a stronger relationship with t e
United States. On the official level, Prime Minister John Curtin made frequent ref rences 
to race in his public speeches and private correspondence. In a letter to Franklin 
Roosevelt seeking additional aid for Australia, Curtin pointed out repeatedly, “We are 
now, a small population in the only white man’s territory south of the equator, beset 
grievously. Because we have added to our contribution in manpower so much of our 
resources and materials we now lack adequacy for forces of our homeland on our own 
soil.”6 When Australian newspaper magnate Sir Keith Murdoch opined that Australia 
should offer full citizenship to all of Australia’s allies, Curtin chastised the publisher for 
suggesting such a thing, pointing out that Australia’s allies “included Chinese a d other 
colored people.”7 Curtin’s use of racism was common to most Australians, who did not 
view race necessarily in terms of a biological sense as was more common in the United 
States. Rather, Australian racism was rooted in a deeply held fear of disposses i n. The 
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constant fear of having their land taken from them by the vast Asian multitude encircling 
them led to the heightened awareness of race that most Australians had.8 It must be noted 
that this fear of dispossession fits squarely into the economic aspects of “whiteness” that 
historians such as Theodore Allen and David Roediger have documented in their works 
on the subject in the United States and provided a strong point of familiarity between the 
two groups.9 
 Many others in the Australian government made use of race in their public 
pronouncements. In another speech in Washington D.C., Casey explained to Americans 
that: 
We are endeavoring to create and to maintain a uniform race in Australia – a race 
which will avoid those difficulties that we believe are inseparable from the 
mingling of two different types of civilization – the East and the West. We don’t 
for one moment attempt to lay down that our Western civilization is superior to 
that of the Far East – but we do say that it is different and we believe that the two 
cannot be mixed to advantage.10 
 
Casey’s pronouncement that he was not attempting to put Western culture above Eastern 
culture certainly was influenced by the political landscape at the time. Relations between 
Western nations, like Australia, and Japan had been deteriorating over the course of 1940 
and any remarks that could be seen as inflammatory would serve only to further 
exacerbate the situation. But when the final part of the quote is taken into consideration, 
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along with the previously cited remark concerning prejudices, it becomes clearer that 
there is a strong racial overtone to Casey’s speeches.  
 An examination of the records of other Australian government officials 
demonstrates that other officials shared these racial assumptions. Frederic Eggleston, who 
served as Australia’s ambassador to China from 1941 to 1944 and to the United States 
from 1944 till 1946, felt race should be a key component of Australia’s immigration 
policy. Eggleston maintained: 
Australia is a democratic community governed under the institutions of the British 
type and that if any considerable body of aliens who could not understand these 
institutions came into the community we would lose what we value most … and it 
is absurd to go to the expense of protecting ourselves from external attack if we 
are going to allow our heritage to be destroyed by floods of alien immigration.11 
 
The fear of dispossession cited by David Day is very prominent in Eggleston’s letter and 
was a concern that crossed over political boundaries in Australia. The members of th  
Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia, a group of veterans whose 
political leanings generally ran counter to those of the Labor Party in Australia, argued 
for a strong immigration policy which defended the livelihood of white Australians. Their 
primary complaint was that the dislocation caused by the war would allow “non – 
British” persons to come to Australia to take work from returned veterans.12 The 
Australian Labor Party made the preservation of the White Australia policy a central 
point of the Empire Labor Talks held in 1944.13 The fear of dispossession mentioned by 
Day was something concrete and real for a vast number of Australians and not simply an 
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ethereal idea that is difficult to pinpoint in the writings of public pronouncements of 
Australian officials. 
 More evidence of this view can be found in the writings of Sir Keith Murdoch, the 
influential newspaperman whose views helped to shape the opinions of the country as a 
whole. In an undated speech, Murdoch pointed out that, “The question of whether 
Australia is part of Asia has been raised not only by Japan in her co-prosperity designs, 
but in the inexorable facts of population, of geography, and of natural law. We have to 
keep answering No, and be able to strongly and effectively answer No.”14 The overthrow 
of white colonial power in Asia, for Murdoch, also meant an end to the restraints placed 
upon the native peoples. He feared that these groups, perhaps unused to the freedoms of 
self-rule, would turn south to eliminate the last bastion of white power in the region. 
Murdoch pointed out some basic facts Australia had to face in the wake of increased 
agitation for the expulsion of European powers from Asia. He told the Combine Clubs of 
Ballarat:  
There are nine million white people in the South-Western Pacific. There are one 
thousand million Asians not far from them. There are ninety million Japanese – 
industrious, warlike, simple in tastes, patriotic, increasing by nearly a million a 
year. There is an awakened China, opening its eyes to new world conceptions 
after its long sleep. There is a resurgent India, claiming freedom to go its own 
way.15 
 
The sheer numbers facing Australia were, Murdoch hoped, enough to force the country to 
take vigorous action to ensure that the dominance of the native Anglo-Saxon stock would 
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be maintained. The rising nationalism in nations such as China and India also continued 
to trouble the mind of both Australian and American policymakers after the guns in the 
Pacific had fallen silent.  
 There was also no doubting that Australians were not shy about sharing their 
racial views with outsiders. In an article published in The Saturday Evening Post, 
Australian journalist Brian Penton wrote a long article that appealed to the American 
public to send more aid to Australia. The crux of Penton’s article centered on a shared 
identity with Americans, one with strong racial overtones: 
One side of Australia’s case for America’s aid I have not mentioned because I do 
not think I need to tell you Americans that this wholly white democracy of 98 
percent British stock looks with horror at any change of its status vis-à-vis the 
little yellow man. We think this country could support four or five times the 
present population, but we want newcomers to be our own color and race. We 
have fought pretty hard to pioneer this oldest and in many ways hardest of 
continents, and we think your own pioneering history will make you understand 
how we feel about our brand new cities and settlements that we have beaten out of 
the bush.16 
 
Penton’s allusion to the pioneering past of the United States was certainly desgne  to 
conjure certain images in the American reader’s mind. The connection of westward 
movement in American history with images of white Americans carving a space out of a 
harsh wilderness and fighting off bands of Native Americans was still a powerful image 
in the American consciousness in the 1940s.17 
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 It is interesting to note that Australians used the United States’ race issues as a 
justification for their own racial views. After Franklin Roosevelt’s death, members of the 
Australian Parliament made speeches memorializing the former American president. 
Senator R.V. Keane hailed Roosevelt for having overcome a vast array of problems 
during his life, among them “the racial diversification present in his own country.”18 An 
article from The Argus, a popular Australian newspaper from Melbourne, carried an 
article on the debate over Australian immigration that made another allusion to the 
problems that plagued the United States because of its multi-racial makeup. Th  article 
argued that, “It is also pertinent to note that similar problems have existed in other 
countries, and that once they have been allowed to go on increasing in complexity, as in 
the case of America’s color problem, they present tremendous, if not insuperable 
difficulties to the generation inheriting them.”19 For Australians, the United States served 
as both a beacon of hope in fighting off Asian domination but also as a warning of what 
would happen should Australian society be opened to other races. 
 Race was an issue in the Australian reaction to the arrival of American troops in 
their country starting in late 1941. The arrival of American forces was interpre d in 
Australia as a signal of white solidarity against the “Yellow Peril” threatening Australia 
from the north. American Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Franklin Roosevelt 
informing him of the positive reception given to the Americans. Johnson felt that the 
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decision to reroute troops and material to Australia was “… concrete evidence that this 
remote island of occidental culture and civilization would not be abandoned to its fateat 
the hands of the oriental hordes that were bearing southward upon it.”20 I  a separate 
letter to American editor William Allen White, Johnson related that the appointment of 
Douglas MacArthur to the role of Supreme Commander of Allied forces in the Southwest 
Pacific had been a stroke of genius. It assured the Australians, Johnson concluded, that 
the United States was not going to abandon their white brethren in the region.21 The 
Australians took these actions as evidence of a racial bond between the two peoples, one 
that was necessary to promote a strong and lasting alliance. Sir Keith Murdoch 
highlighted this same point in an editorial that appeared in The Herald in 1943, in which 
he stated that “… without a lasting friendship with America Australia must, in time, drop 
into the Asiatic bucket.”22 For Australians, this was a very real and palpable fear in late 
1941. 
 Race served as a common language used by both parties, but also caused serious 
disruptions between the Americans and the Australians. The American decision to ship 
labor companies to Australia composed mainly of African – Americans caused great 
consternation among Australian policymakers. This point will be explored further in this 
chapter, but it is worth mentioning here the initial reaction of Australia, which was 
decidedly negative. A memorandum from the Australian Department of Labor and 
National Service suggested that the importation of African-American laborers into 
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Australia “would have the most dangerous consequences.”23 One Australian Royal Air 
Force officer recorded in his diary that during a troop transit to Darwin, several men took 
to a nearby swimming hole to relieve themselves from the oppressive heat. When they 
arrived they found “four black fellows” already swimming there so the Australians 
instead found a spot further upstream.24 Many Americans would hardly have considered 
the reaction of the Australian in this situation strange during this time. One of the primary 
reasons why this would have been was the fact that, like Australia, the American 
worldview was one tinted by the lens of race. 
 The issue of race had dominated American culture since the pre-colonial period. 
Michael Hunt concluded that, “Americans of light skin, and especially of English 
descent, shared a loyalty to race as an essential category for understanding other peoples 
and as a fundamental basis for judging them. They had in other words, fixed race at the 
center of their world view.” This preoccupation with race, Hunt argues, was reinforced 
and refined by those people who Americans came into contact with as they spread across 
their own continent and into the wider world.25 This ideological component of American 
foreign policy was a real and powerful motivating factor in American dealings with non-
white peoples and helped provide the United States with a paradigm to understand the 
rest of the world.26 
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 The Americans who came into contact with Australians during World War II 
found similar racial attitudes. There were slight differences in how Americans and 
Australians perceived race. As mentioned previously, Australian racial fears w re 
generally predicated on a fear of dispossession while more often American raci l 
attitudes were based upon ideas of superiority over non-white races.27 There was also a 
shared concept about “whiteness,” that is, the division of racially white groups into 
various strata based upon their ethnicity. These concepts of race and “whiteness” had led 
the United States, by the 1940s, to adopt a strongly bifurcated racial view of the world. It 
is interesting to note though that World War II posed some challenges to this system, 
especially in the case of the Chinese. By 1938 the Japanese had replaced the Chinese as 
the primary targets of anti-Asian sentiment in the Pacific region. Americans saw 
gradations among the peoples of Asia. By the 1940s, American immigration policy that 
had blocked the majority of immigration from Asian nations was slowly being relaxed. 
The Australians maintained a more traditional view on race, choosing to see shades of 
white for their immigration policies but viewing almost all Asian groups as a potential 
threat to their own racial homogeneity. This difference was a slight one though and never 
came between the two groups. And just as the Australians sought to make race a clear 
connection between both sides, the Americans did the same. Upon his arrival in 
Australia, Douglas MacArthur issued a public proclamation, stating: 
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There is a link that binds our countries together which does not depend upon a 
written protocol, upon treaties of alliance, or upon diplomatic doctrine. It goes 
deeper than that. It is the indescribable consanguinity of race which causes us to 
have the same aspirations, the same hopes and desires, the same ideals and the 
same dreams of future destiny.28 
 
MacArthur’s choice of the word consanguinity, with its implication of blood relation, 
resonated with Australian leaders who saw the world in terms of an “Anglosphere,” a 
conglomeration of the British races of the world who were responsible for the policing of 
the globe. This idea was also certainly not limited to Australia. American historian Allan 
Nevins had pushed for the creation of a “League of Democracies,” similar to the idea of 
the “Anglosphere” popular among Australian thinkers and politicians.29  
American policymakers were also quite open about the importance of race in the 
Pacific campaign. Admiral Ernest King wrote a letter to other members of the American 
military planning circle outlining his reasoning for making the Pacific the primary theatre 
of American interest in World War II. The pervasive racial rhetoric that appears in this 
letter. King stressed that the “prestige of the white man” had been severely hu t by the 
actions of the Japanese in the Pacific and that only the use of force would restore it since 
that was the “only thing the oriental, with his special philosophy, would respect.”30 Given 
King’s passion for seeing the Pacific as the United States’s main sphere of int rest, it is 
perhaps difficult to judge to what degree his use of racial rhetoric was a gambit. It ust 
be pointed out, though, that an examination of King’s other writings, such as his famous 
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memo to Roosevelt concerning the “white men’s countries” of Australia and New 
Zealand, highlight the fact that race was at the forefront of King’s mind. 
The idea of an Anglo brotherhood was central to the American ambassador to 
Australia, Nelson Johnson. Johnson was an ardent proponent of a strong relationship 
between the United States and Australia. He pointed out that it would be difficult for the 
United States to rely on Russia or China to help with problems in the Pacific due to the 
fact that both groups were dissimilar in what Johnson termed “mental outlook.” For 
Johnson, Australia was the only feasible country the United States could turn to in the 
Pacific. In a letter to American editor Roy W. Howard, Johnson wrote that Australia was 
“the largest homogeneous Occidental in the Pacific zone,” and because of this, 
Australians were “… our natural racial allies in the Pacific. We need them, as recent 
months have amply demonstrated; and of course, they need us.”31 One would be hard 
pressed to find a clearer statement of the role race played in influencing the development 
of American – Australian relations. Australian observer Fred Alexander repo ted that on 
the West Coast of the United States that traditional animosity to the Japanese virtually 
ensured that any threat of invasion to Australia would arouse the racial animus of 
Americans there who would bring great pressure to bear on Washington to enter the 
war.32 
The racial attitudes of Australians and Americans can be seen in three separate 
areas during the war. First, and most prominently, was the issue of Japan. It should be 
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pointed out that the specific issues that both Australia and the United States had 
concerning Japan were tied into larger fears over the rise of Asian nationalism and the 
latent fear of the “Yellow Peril.” Several historians have commented on this issue 
including Peter Schrijvers, who contended that the war in the Pacific brought to the fore 
memories “of Orientals as a human flood threatening to wash away Western civilization 
…” which reinforced the primary Australian fear of dispossession.33 John Dower argued 
in his seminal work War Without Mercy that the specific anti – Japanese sentiment of 
Australia and the United States was often tied to larger fears over the “Yellow Peril” and 
the rise of non-white peoples everywhere.34 For white Americans World War II certainly 
highlighted the increased racial awareness of minority groups within the Unit d States as 
evidenced by the Double V campaign carried out by African – Americans during the war 
and a growing racial awareness among Latinos in the western United Stas.35 
Japan’s initial victories over the Americans, British, Australians and Dutch in the 
Pacific region led many observers to conclude that the Western powers had received a 
blow from which they would be unable to recover. One example of this can be found in 
the diary of Eilean Giblin, a native of Canberra, who kept a series of diaries chronicling 
her experiences through World War II. In the entry for January 13, 1942, Giblin recorded 
that, “The feeling of superiority of the occidental for the oriental may not in ma y cases 
be subconscious, but be a feeling of active and conscious superiority.” This feeling of 
superiority, Giblin goes on to say, had been undercut by the Japanese advances in the 
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Philippines, Singapore and in the Dutch East Indies and represented the worst blow to the 
prestige of the white races in Asia since the Russo – Japanese war of 1904 – 05.36 
The Japanese offensive of December 1941 had struck the Americans and 
Australians like a lightning bolt. The speed, precision, and overall success of the Japan se 
military in the first six months of the Pacific campaign sent both nations reeling. In many 
ways, however, the fashion in which the offensive was executed confirmed many of the 
traditional views that whites in Australia and the United States held about the Japanese 
and Asians in general. They were “subhuman yet cunning, unfeeling yet boiling inwardly 
with rage, cowardly and decadent yet capable of great conquests.”37 The Japanese were 
often viewed as children by Australians and Americans, tempestuous in temper but 
lacking the innate technological ability or capabilities to truly challenge white domination 
in the Pacific. Evidence of such views can be found throughout pre-war military 
intelligence reports. One Australian report covering the period of November 7 – 23, 1941, 
maintained that the Japanese air fleet would find themselves at considerable disadvantage 
due to their lack of “mechanical sense” and their inability to grasp advanced aeronautic 
principles.38 Only a few short weeks later, Australians and Americans found out how 
wrong their estimations of Japanese aeronautical ability were with the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  
Another example of this sort of reasoning can be seen in a letter to John Curtin 
from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who cautioned against viewing the 
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Japanese as superhuman fighters because of their early successes. As Churchill stated, 
“so far the Japanese have had only two white battalions and a few gunners against them, 
the rest being Indian soldiers.”39 Of course the Japanese success in storming the British 
base at Singapore would shatter any ideas about superior fighting abilities of Europeans 
in the Pacific. 
The conflict between the Japanese and Australians and Americans in the Pacific 
undoubtedly had an economic aspect. Japanese offensive operations were aimed at 
controlling the oil producing regions of the Dutch East Indies. For the Americans and 
Australians, there was always concern over post-war access to regional markets and raw 
goods. It is important though not to forget that the fighting between these three powers in 
the Pacific was also undoubtedly a cultural conflict.40 Akira Iriye maintained that the 
Allies’ fight against the Japanese was not just a physical struggle but a cultural one as 
well.41 This gaping cultural chasm between the three parties served only to reinforce the 
racial animosity that colored the fighting in the Pacific. Numerous American and 
Australian observers made note of the cultural divide between themselves and the 
Japanese. An examination of these views reveals that there really seemed to be no hope 
of reconciliation or moderation in the Pacific.  
The last minute negotiations between the Japanese and the United States in 
November 1941, in the context of this cultural gulf, had little chance of success. Jonathan 
Utley highlighted how presuppositions about the Japanese character helped to determine 
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s personal outlook on the talks. Hull entered into the 
meetings with long standing assumptions about the Japanese character based on previous 
American involvement in East Asia and key among these assumptions was “the deep an  
abiding belief that Japan was not trustworthy.”42 Hull’s counterpart in Australia, Herbert 
Evatt, delivered an address to the Overseas Press Club of New York on the nature of the 
Pacific War. Evatt concluded his talk by stating that the war against Japan was not about 
regaining or retaining territory but rather retaining civilization in the Pacific. Evatt goes 
on to state that this civilization is implicitly European and from this one can extrapolate 
that he also means white.43 A 1945 letter from Evatt to Norman Makin reveals how even 
at the end of the war a vast cultural divide still existed. In the letter, Evatt summarized the 
findings of a report on Japanese war crimes during the Pacific fighting. He relat d in an 
aside, “It reveals not only individual and isolated acts of barbarity but also practices 
which are beyond the pale of accepted human conduct.”44 The language used by Evatt in 
this letter is by no means isolated. Both Americans and Australians sought to show that 
the Japanese could not be reasoned with and indeed had to be dealt with harshly due to 
their supposed sub-human nature. 
It is common in times of war for adversaries to attempt to dehumanize their 
opponents. The British achieved great success in portraying the Germans in World War I 
as bloodthirsty brutes with exaggerated stories of German atrocities in Belgium. Evidence 
of these dehumanization campaigns in World War II have been well documented by 
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historians especially in the conflicts on the Eastern Front and in the Pacific. The success 
of the American and Australian militaries in painting the Japanese as horrific monsters 
contributed greatly to bringing race into the Pacific theatre as a primary consideration. Sir 
Thomas Blamey, Commander-in-Chief of Allied ground forces in the Southwest Pacific, 
gave voice to these views in an open letter to his subordinates. He wrote that the Japanese 
“were not a European race and it would be of no avail to treat them, or endeavor to 
reason with them, entirely on European standards.”45 This would be a constantly 
recurring theme in the writings of both Americans and Australians. Their inability to 
grasp what they saw as the maniacal actions of Japanese soldiers in combat served only 
to help lessen their own compassion towards their enemy.  
There were several factors that contributed to this phenomenon during the war. 
The first is related to the point made earlier about the cultural gap that existed between 
the Japanese and Americans and Australians. The Japanese way of war, with its empha is 
on the traditional philosophy of bushido, led most Allied soldiers to believe that the 
Japanese naturally valued human life far less than did their own societies. General 
George Kenney related to his diary that the average Japanese soldier would rather 
commit suicide or carry out a futile banzai charge rather than allow himself to be taken 
prisoner. Such actions led Kenney to conclude that, “This looks like a war of 
extermination. The trouble is there are 75 million of them.”46 Percy Spender shared this 
dire assessment of the Pacific conflict in a speech to the Constitutional Club of Brisbane. 
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He told the assembled crowd that, “This is a war which must be fought to the bitter end. 
It is a war of extinction.” He also related that the Australians and Americans ould show 
no mercy towards the Japanese because they could expect to receive none in return.47 
These dark pronouncements certainly help to explain the ferocity of the fighting in the 
Pacific to some degree. Americans and Australians expected no quarter to be given by the 
Japanese so why, they asked, should any be given? 
Many American and Australians soldiers and sailors entered into combat in the 
Pacific with only vague preconceptions of the Japanese based on little actual interactions 
with Japanese culture. Because of this many based their views on that of their leaders ike 
Kenney and Blamey. The realities of combat went a long way towards convincing the 
average Allied serviceman that their enemy was indeed, as one Australian intelligenc  
review stated, “A savage whose conception of the value of human life is totally different 
from ours.”48 The fighting in Papua and New Guinea gave many Americans and 
Australians their first direct encounter with the Japanese. The end result only 
strengthened those numerous preconceptions that the white allies carried into the jungles 
and mountains with them. The Australian Army’s official history of the Papua and New 
Guinea campaigns stressed the “fanatical and savage” nature of the Japanese, a group 
who “knows neither the decencies of civilization nor subscribes to the international code 
of warfare.”49 Two specific items helped to mold Allied images of the Japanese as sub-
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human: the conditions under which Japanese soldiers lived and reports of atrocities on the 
part of the Japanese. 
In the U.S. Army’s official history of the Papua and New Guinea campaign, 
Samuel Milner related how the Japanese had used the bodies of their fallen comrades as 
sandbags at the village of Gona and that after the Allies had seized the position the ste c  
of the unburied dead was so overpowering it led many to wonder “how human beings 
could have endured such conditions and gone on living.”50 The question of the Japanese’s 
ability to tolerate what most Westerners considered sub-human living conditions was one 
that reappears throughout the documents covering the fighting on the island. One undated 
Australian report concerning the living conditions of the average Japanese soldier in 
Papua questioned whether European soldiers would have tolerated the same conditions. 
The report goes on to maintain, “In like circumstances I am convinced that Europeans 
would have attempted to fight their way out to escape the disgusting conditions in which 
they were living.”51 It is important to note the constant referencing back to the inherent 
differences between the Japanese or Asian mindset and the European, or more implicitly, 
the white psyche.  
The Australian military, in celebration of the Allied victory in Papua and New 
Guinea, released a brief historical account of the fighting bearing the revealing title The 
Jap Was Thrashed. This document, much like its American counterpart produced after 
the war, highlighted the poor living conditions of the Japanese soldier as well as drawing 
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attention to the idea that the Japanese were unthinking and unquestioning beings. One 
description stated, “he [the Japanese soldier] couched in his post 24 hours a day – eating, 
drinking, sleeping in a dank, filthy pit only a few feet square, obeying like an automton 
his orders to stay there, to kill or be killed.”52 This was certainly a popular view of the 
Japanese as a whole during World War II. Their seemingly unquestioning obedience to 
the Emperor was taken as further evidence that the Japanese were not human in the same
manner as Americans or Australians. Historians dealing with the developmnt of 
“whiteness” have maintained that one of the central aspects of “whiteness” wa  the 
ability to participate in government and not simply be governed.53 The seeming inability 
of the Japanese to question their political leaders automatically designatd them as 
something lower than the white, or more specifically the Anglo races of the world.  
The atrocity issue was instrumental in helping to shape a racial image of the 
Japanese as inferior. A story in the Sydney Morning Herald related that the “Japanese 
committed barbaric acts against our troops which branded them as the lowest order of
savages.”54 Many of the atrocity stories dealt with the murder of prisoners of war and 
stories of cannibalism on the part of the Japanese. The Japanese certainly could not claim 
to have committed the only atrocities in the Pacific. Stories of American Marines and 
Army soldiers collecting skulls and teeth of Japanese dead have been well documented. 
The successful dehumanization campaign on both sides allowed for numerous acts that 
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violated many of the accepted norms of war. And both sides used these acts to 
demonstrate to their own people the depravity of the enemy.55 
Americans and Australians viewed their own acts of violence within the context 
of a racial viewpoint. Most Allied soldiers came to believe that the seemingly inhumane 
acts of the Japanese set a precedent for the fighting in the Pacific. The issue of 
mistreatment of prisoners was an especially sore one. During the Papua and New Guinea 
campaigns both American and Australian intelligence services received numerous r ports 
of the murder of Allied prisoners of war. One report from the Australian military related 
three authenticated reports of atrocities committed by the Japanese military against 
Australian prisoners at Milne Bay. The report detailed how Australian soldiers were 
found tied to palm trees, having been bayoneted repeatedly.56 Another report, prepared by 
Australian jurist Sir William Webb after the war, related an incident in which one 
Australian soldier attempted to escape from his Japanese captors. The Australian was cut 
down by an officer’s sword and then shot in the head. Two other members of the same 
party were bayoneted in the stomach and left to die. They managed to reach a nearby 
village but were found by another Japanese unit and burned alive in the hut they had hid 
in.57 Reports like these, coupled with earlier reports of the events like the Bataan De th 
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March, reinforced an already strong negative racial viewpoint that the Americans and 
Australians held of the Japanese. 
Reports of cannibalism further tarnished the image of Japanese soldiers, making 
them seem subhuman by western standards. Rumors of cannibalism filtered throughout 
the Allied armies and fueled racial anger towards the Japanese. Many of the reports were 
unauthenticated but there was certainly some evidence that Japanese soldiers in Papua 
and New Guinea, facing extreme shortages, did engage in acts of cannibalism. In post-
war interviews, American and Australian intelligence officials did gain some 
acknowledgement of this from Japanese prisoners of war. However, it is difficult to 
ascertain to what degree these reports can be believed. Regardless though, these reports 
seemingly substantiated the stereotype of an indifferent and inhuman Japanese soldi r. 
Eiichi Yanagizawa, a private in the Japanese 41st Division, told his Australian captors 
that, “On 21 December 1944, at Marujippu, Major Morimoto, 2 Battalion Commander, 
shared out to his troops the flesh of two Australian soldiers who had been killed in action 
and joined them in eating it.”58 Sir William Webb’s post-war report also contained 
accounts of cannibalism that Japanese prisoners of war related. One soldier admitted that 
upon running short of rations he and his comrades began to eat the bodies of their fallen 
comrades as well as bodies of fallen enemy dead.59 
These issues helped to fuel anti-Japanese sentiment on the home front as well as 
on the front lines of combat. Newspaper reports carried the horrors of the fighting into the 
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homes of average Americans and Australians, especially after 1943. A reading of the 
news stories and editorials gives voice to the vehement hatred felt towards the Japan se 
by Americans and Australians. The strong racial language in the newspapers and to 
realize this helped to shape average conceptions of the Japanese as inhuman. One 
editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald opined that the Japanese were “the nearest thing 
in human form to a bush animal.”60 Another editorial argued that, “the Japanese are not fit 
to have any place alongside civilized nations, and there is a demand, as in the Daily Mail, 
for outlawing them completely.”61 This editorial is very reminiscent of Herbert Evatt’s 
claim, cited earlier, that the fighting in the Pacific was a war to preserv  European 
civilization in the region. A separate editorial gives evidence to how deeply racial animus 
animated much of the writing about the war. “The Japanese have proved themselves a 
sub-human race,” the editorial argues, “and it is in that regard they must be treated. There 
can be no place for them after the war in the concourse of civilized nations and in the 
common relations of human beings.”62 Often the rhetoric of the civilian home front went 
far beyond the rhetoric used by those closest to the combat. However, both groups were 
bound tightly by their mutual hatred for and disgust with the Japanese. 
The Pacific War also brought Americans and Australians into closer contact wi h 
other non-white natives who lived in the Pacific region. The Australians and other frmer 
colonial holders in the Pacific viewed with some alarm the interactions of the nativ
islanders, especially with the American military forces. Much of what troubled European 
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whites in the Pacific was the unknown effect that the Americans would have on the pre-
war relationships that had marked white and non-white interactions in the region. Many 
feared that the Americans were helping to usher in social practices into an area th t was 
felt to be ill equipped to handle them.63 The economic effect was especially troubling 
since the American military often paid native workers what were considered lavish sums 
to help in transporting and unloading of material. Australian officials tried to impress 
upon the Americans the necessity of avoiding the giving of items such as tobacco, food r
clothing as this would “destroy their [native islanders] incentive to work.”64  
Australian officials found the introduction of African American servicemen into 
Papua and New Guinea especially upsetting. Historians have noted that the effect of what 
were perceived to be well-educated, well-paid and well-dressed African American 
soldiers would lead the native islanders to question their own relationship with their 
former colonial masters. Equally upsetting was the fact that the Australians, for example, 
were no longer the main distributor of goods and services in the region. They had been 
demoted to the rank of junior partner, even in dealings with the non-whites of the 
region.65 If left unchecked it was feared that the native islanders would begin to push for 
greater economic rights as well as political rights. Certainly much of the concern being 
expressed by the European colonial powers in the southwest Pacific region was 
overblown. The African Americans serving in the southwest Pacific were, in comparison 
to the natives, well-educated and well-paid. However, Australians who claimed that 
African Americans and whites were working in near equality were consiste tly 
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overstated. African American soldiers were faced with working in segregated units, often 
under the command of white officers, and many times found themselves blocked from 
certain jobs due to their race. Perhaps much of the fear that Australians and other former 
colonial powers in the Pacific had was because of the very clear anti-imperialist message 
that had been a consistent component of Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy. 
As irrational as these fears were, they still led the Australians to moveto reassert 
their dominance over their former colonial charges. Numerous American accounts detail 
the harsh measures meted out by Australian overseers on former plantations that served 
to remind the native islanders who was in charge. An American sailor near Port Moresby 
recorded one particularly brutal episode. He related that a native worker, who had been 
working to clear coconut groves on a plantation that had been overrun by the Japanese, 
was brought before the Australian overseer. The worker had stopped his work to relieve 
himself on a nearby pathway. The overseer, as the American soldier watched in s ock, 
“grabbed a stick the size of a broom handle, then thrashed the native’s bare back with all 
his might.”66 The overseer told the American sailor that the punishment had been because 
the worker had not asked permission to stop work.  
The Australian colonial government reestablished itself in Papua and New Guinea 
after the Japanese were forced back into the north of the island. Much of the harsh 
reinstatement of colonial rule was rationalized as a way to insure the compliance of a 
possibly untrustworthy population. This matter was brought to the attention of the 
Australian military in several intelligence reports which detailed Japanese efforts to turn 
native islanders against their former colonial masters. This was a tactic that had yielded 
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some successes on the southeast Asian mainland as evidenced by the formation of the 
Indian National Army under Subhas Chandra Bose.67 
There was little evidence that the Japanese actually ever made any headway with 
the island natives in Papua and New Guinea. But this did not stop the Australians from 
worrying about that possibility. One report concluded that the native islanders i central 
Papua “cannot be trusted and would be more likely to assist the Japanese than the whites 
because the Japanese gave them presents of food, tobacco, etc.”68 This suspicion of native 
sentiments was pervasive among the Australians. Another intelligence report r lated that 
natives who lived in areas that had been under Japanese control displayed uncertain 
attitudes towards the war effort. Because of this, then, they were restricted o their 
settlements or their employer’s residence and could not move about without a special 
pass issued by the colonial administration.69 The interactions with native islanders 
provided an interesting detour from the standard story of race in the Pacific War. The 
issue helped reveal that the relationship was far more complicated than simply being a 
shared hatred of a common enemy. Race helped to provide a common framework within 
which both Americans and Australian operated but also helped to complicate the 
developing relationship. 
The African American servicemen stationed in the SWPA further complicated the 
racial relationship between the Americans and Australians. The issue of rac and racial 
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awareness is intimately tied into the experience of African Americans in World War II. 
Those who served in the Pacific found themselves in a particularly peculiar situation. 
With the growing emphasis of the Double V Campaign by African Americans to combat 
fascism abroad and racism at home, African American servicemen in the Pacific found 
themselves fighting a war driven by race and in many ways to reestablish white colonial 
power in the region. The African American came to occupy a unique place in the 
American and Australian relationship. On the one hand, African Americans were 
welcomed by the Australians as saviors from Japanese invasion and celebrated for th ir 
Americanness. On the other hand, through, they were seen as potential threats to a socie y
that had maintained a social and political philosophy based on defending its whiteness.70 
The Australian government’s initial reaction to the introduction of African 
American troops was most decidedly negative. Minister of War Frank Forde publicly 
expressed no misgivings about the possibility. Privately though he and other government 
officials protested loudly to Washington about this action until they received assurances 
that all of the African American troops were good soldiers and would be closely watched 
by their American superiors.71 A separate memo from the office of Prime Minister John 
Curtin to other Australian governmental offices indicated that, “Whilst the Australian 
reaction to the dispatch of negro troops to Australia would not be favorable,” the end 
decision lay in Washington and not Canberra.72 The Australian government made sure 
that the United States was well aware of their displeasure at the possibility of having 
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African Americans stationed in their country. In a memo to the Department of Interior, 
the Australian War Cabinet reached a decision that “no colored troops from the United
States will be stationed in Australia” but that the Australian government would n t have 
any problem with convoys carrying African Americans stopping at Australian ports.73  
The realities of the war forced the Australian government to recognize the 
necessity of having African American troops stationed in Australia. The vast majority of 
the 8,025 African Americans who would be stationed in Australia served in logistic units 
helping to build new aerodromes, army camps, roads and in the unloading of vital 
material at Australian ports. These jobs were of fundamental importance to the success of 
the Allied war effort in the Pacific. As mentioned previously, Australia early in the war 
faced a manpower shortage and would have been hard pressed to meet the demands of 
transforming their nation into the main base of Allied activity in the southwest Pacific. 
The introduction of the African American troops helped to ensure that the Allies would 
be able to more quickly move material to the north of Australia and engage the Japanese 
more quickly in Papua and New Guinea. But even knowing this reality there were still 
some rumblings from among the Australian population, especially the labor unions.  
The president of the Townsville Trades and Labor Council, J.W. Clubley, penned 
a series of letters to the Ministry for Labor and National Service highlightin  Australian 
labors’ dispute with having African Americans introduced into their country.74 Here again 
one can see the economic aspect of race coming into play. Labor’s position within 
Australia was predicated on maintaining jobs such as wharf laborers solely for white 
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Australians and ensuring a certain standard of living for their white members. The 
introduction of non-white labor, especially non-white labor outside of the purview of 
government labor laws, was especially frightening to them. For Australian l bor, there 
seemed to be little difference between having their job security threatened by the 
Japanese or by African Americans.  
One can see then that African American servicemen entering into Australia faced 
a society already primed to see them as much as a threat as an ally. But what types of 
experiences did African Americans actually have in Australia? The reality of the African 
American experience in Australia can best be summed in one word: ambiguity. 
Australians both welcomed and shunned African American soldiers and sailors which 
reflected the deep dissonance their country felt towards aid from non-whites. Also, 
African Americans had to contend with the racial views of their fellow white Am ricans 
who often stood in positions of authority over them. The interplay between these three 
groups provides an interesting insight into how complex the racial relationship between 
the United States and Australia was during World War II.  
Several historians have noted that most white Americans who arrived in Australia 
had little previous knowledge of their hosts. African Americans, if equally uninformed 
about the history and institutions of Australia, were more aware of Australia’s history of 
racial dealings.75 This likely pervaded their thoughts as the first African Americans 
arrived in troop convoys in Sydney and Melbourne. However, the Australian people 
initially made no differentiation between white and black Americans. Instead they 
focused on the Americanness of their new allies. The immediate threat of invasion in 
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1942 superseded any fears about race mixing among the Australian general population 
though, as pointed out earlier, the Australian government was less than pleased with the
decision to ship African American troops to Australia.  
While the threat posed by a Japanese invasion goes a long way towards 
explaining the positive reception African Americans received upon their arrival in 
Australia, other factors must be taken into consideration as well. Even though race had 
been a central preoccupation for the white population of Australia since its founding, the 
actual numbers of non-whites that had to be dealt with were miniscule, especially in 
comparison to the American experience of white / non-white interaction. In the United 
States formalized separation of the races represented in Jim Crow laws and in practiced 
social discrimination in the north was the norm. Australia, though, lacked any sort of 
principle that mirrored the American idea of “separate but equal.” And as Edward Drea 
points out, “This meant that white men and, more especially, white women, treated whit  
and black Americans in almost the same way.”76 This led to instances of African 
American soldiers and sailors being invited into Australian homes to share meals as well 
as being accepted on a social footing in places like dance halls. Davis Lee, a 
correspondent for the Afro – American, captured an interesting example of this 
phenomenon in an April 1942 story. He wrote that a local dance involving Australian 
soldiers and women as well as African American servicemen was broken up by white 
American military police, upset over what they saw as the illicit mingling of the races. 
The military police forced all of the African Americans to leave the dance hall. In 
response the Australian soldiers sent the girls home as a protests against wht they saw as 
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unfair treatment of brothers in arms.77 Examples of incidents such as this are not 
uncommon and highlight that African Americans who served in Australia were not 
immediately subjected to various forms of discrimination. It is important to keep in mind 
that often they were first and foremost to the Australians, Americans.  
It would certainly be easy to take reports like Davis’s and use them to argue that 
Australia was always a hospitable society for African Americans. However, this is not the 
case. African Americans came to discover there were underlying doubts about their 
presence that came back to the fore. This is especially true after the threat of Japanese 
invasion had dissipated after the Battle of the Coral Sea and can be seen as closely 
mirroring the Australian’s changing views on Americans in general. Generally these 
doubts centered around one central question: what happened if those African American 
servicemen, no matter how polite and well behaved, fathered children with Australian 
women?78 Fear about the loss of Australian women to Americans was a constant source 
of friction throughout the war but the introduction of race into the equation served only to 
heighten Australian fear. The growth of the Australian white population was a centr l 
concern of Australian society both before and after the war. It was certainly an issue 
which all Australians, regardless of political affiliation, saw as a crucial aspect of their 
continued success as, to use John Curtin’s phrase, “the only white man’s country south of 
the equator.” By the end of 1942, African Americans in Australia faced a far diffe ent 
situation then they had only a few months earlier. Some towns in Australia instituted 
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limits on liquor sales to African Americans and a more rigid institution of segregation of 
services in major cities like Brisbane and Melbourne.79 
The Australian press notably covered concern over allegations of rape by African 
American servicemen in the Southwest Pacific. The Sydney Telegraph carried a story 
from New Caledonia concerning supposed reports of African American troops attacking 
the white female population of the island. The governor, Christian Laigret, informed the 
paper that, “Negro troops have attacked white women even in the company of their 
husbands and brothers,” and that the young men of the island had organized themselves 
into bands for the defense of their women.80 Coverage of events like this proved more 
often than not to be exaggerated but led to an increased wariness on the part of the 
Australians about the possibility of similar events happening within their own 
communities. The situation was also fueled by white Americans whose own racial 
sensibilities were offended by what they saw as the rather generous treatment of African 
Americans in Australia. Oftentimes, these white Americans took it upon themselves to 
teach Australians how to “handle” African Americans.81 
Australian views on race were more often aimed at excluding non-whites from 
society than from containing a sizeable non-white population. The introduction of 
African American troops into Australian cities served to upset the racial system that the 
Australians had developed over time.82 The vast majority of Australia’s own non-white 
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native population, the Aborigines, did not reside in the cities at the time. This led to a 
strong sense of uncertainty of how to best interact with the African American troops 
passing through places such as Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Some white American 
servicemen took it upon themselves to police the racial interactions taking place between 
African Americans and Australians in an effort to maintain the traditional racial hierarchy 
prevalent in American society. 
Walter Dorsey McClane, a member of the NAACP’s board of director’s, made 
note of this phenomenon in a letter to Franklin Roosevelt. He observed that when African 
American troops first arrived in England, white officers “issued orders informing the 
English people that they must not treat colored North American soldiers as equaland 
they must have no social contact with them,” and that similar reports were coming into 
his office from Australia.83 A prime target of these actions in Australia were women. 
White Americans found themselves competing against both Australian servicemen and 
African Americans for the attention of the very small population of young Australian 
women in the major cities. It is not surprising therefore that where possible, som  white 
Americans sought to tilt the field in their favor by trying to restrict African American 
interactions with the white female population of Australia.  
Several different tactics were used to control contact between the two groups. 
Claims were made that African Americans were natural carriers of syphili  and other 
venereal diseases and would infect the clean daughters of Australia. Another widely used 
tactic was to appeal to the image of the African American “as an immoral degenerate 
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creature who was undoubtedly a sex machine.”84 This was an especially potent tactic as it 
played on those deep fears in Australian society about the loss of homogeneity within 
their population. It can be argued that this tactic proved to be so successful because it 
resonated so deeply within white American culture as well. The fear of the African 
American as a sexual predator was a common thread providing yet another link in the 
racial line binding Australians and Americans together.  
By the end of the war the African American experience in Australia had run the 
gamut from tentative acceptance to outright rejection. Jane Fidcock offered the view that 
African Americans were never fully accepted into white Australian society because of 
their status as the Other. She also argued that white American’s racial views did not 
significantly alter Australian views but helped only to reinforce a commitmen  to the 
White Australia policy.85 The racial experiences shared by Australians and Americans 
provided an important linkage that helped to ameliorate many of the long-standing 
political, military and cultural differences that proved so difficult to overcome. As one 
American officer wrote from Australia, “International friendship does not exit as an 
abstraction between political entities known as nations. Rather, it consists of a multitude 
of friendships between people in all walks of life in the two countries.”86 Race proved to 
be one of those important bonds of friendship between the two nations. And while race 
greatly strengthened the American – Australian bond it did not prove to be the cure all for 
eliminating disagreements between the two. The post-war world brought many old 
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divisions back to the fore and helped to introduce new ones as well. However, the 
ideological basis for the friendship between Australia and the United States th  had been 
laid by their racial connection provided the framework for another ideological attachment 
in the post-war Pacific that would insure Australian and American cooperation for the





















Chapter 5: A Reddened Pacific: 1946 – 1949 
On October 30, 1948, Australian Ambassador to the United States Norman Makin 
attended a solemn memorial service in Norfolk, Virginia. The occasion was to 
memorialize the drowning of an Australian citizen who had died while coming to the aid 
of a young swimmer. Makin was warmly received by the mayor of Norfolk, R.D. Cooke, 
who used the opportunity to remark on the larger significance of American and 
Australian relations that had emerged from World War II. Cooke’s speech referenced the 
racial ideas that had proved so effective in bringing both nations together during the war. 
He also, importantly, made new reference to a growing world threat that was forcing both 
the United States and Australia to reevaluate their relationship in the postwar world.  
 Cooke spoke as much to Makin as to the gathered crowd in his speech. He told 
the assembly of public officials and private citizens: 
I hope in these times of stress and uncertainty, when the war clouds are rising 
over the distant horizon, that as long as we – and your people – and our other 
cousins in all parts of the world, stand together, for the things we cherish, the 
world will be safe for us and for our descendants. I hope that all members of the 
great Anglo – Saxon family, of which your family and mine are members, will 
fully realize this all-important manner and stand together for the good of the 
World.1 
 
It is not difficult to miss the prevalent use of familial language that Cooke used in his 
speech. The racial ideas that had bound the United States and Australia together during 
the war maintained a vibrancy after the fighting had concluded. But one can also detect a 
plaintive tone in the speech. In the aftermath of the war in the Pacific, the United Stat s 
and Australia found their relationship challenged by traditional conflicts of interest and 
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new problems emerging from the end of World War II. The postwar-period harkened 
back in many ways to the troubled relationship of the 1930s but also challenged both 
nations to come into closer accord in the early years of the Cold War.  
 A major issue that affected the alliance in the late 1940s was Australia’s emerging 
emphasis on its role as a primary power in the Pacific. During the war, responsibility for 
the Pacific had fallen to the United States, a prerogative that the U.S. had jealously 
guarded. Seeming American indifference, or unwillingness to recognize the key role that 
Australia had played in defeating Japan, goaded the Australians into action. The 
Australian government under Joseph Chifley, who had replaced John Curtin as Prime 
Minister upon the latter’s death in 1945, sought to clearly stake out a claim to have a 
prevalent voice in the postwar region. The idea was certainly not a new one. Australian 
policymakers had been arguing since the late 1930s that their nation was a Pacific power. 
In a 1939 speech, Prime Minister Robert Menzies declared that Australians “Are 
principals; we are not subordinate; we have no secondary interest in the Pacific; we have 
a primary interest in it.”2 This type of argument, while perhaps accepted in principle by 
Washington, could not help but lead to friction between the two powers.  
 There certainly were efforts to insure that this point of possible tension would not 
upset the bond that had emerged from the fighting in the Pacific. Even during the war, 
persons on both sides attempted to clarify the post-war relationship that should emerge
between the United States and Australia. In a January 1941 speech to the Society of the 
Sons of the American Revolution, Richard Casey, then Australian ambassador to the U.S. 
and later Australian Minister for External Affairs, told the assembled crowd that 
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Australia was determined to play a larger role in a post-war Pacific world. However, 
Casey moderated his argument somewhat by stating that Australia would have to 
cooperate with the United States even more closely than it had up to that point in time.3 
On the American side, Ambassador Nelson Johnson expressed his own thoughts on the 
subject to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in 1943. Johnson insisted that both Australia 
and New Zealand had earned the right to take part in any post-war planning for the 
Pacific. He did concede that the Australians “Need us; but it is equally true that, just as 
we needed them in 1942 and 1943, so we will need them through the future years if we 
are to fulfill the responsibilities devolving upon us.”4 Clearly some on both sides hoped 
for the emergence of a symbiotic relationship that would serve the interests of both
parties in the region. 
 The issue of Australia’s role in the post-war Pacific arguably can be linked not to
a lack of vision but rather to an uncertainty over what course to pursue. Jeffrey Grey 
identified three main suppositions of post-war Australian defense planning: first, that the 
United States would carry the primary burden of ensuring security in the Pacific; second, 
a continued role for Great Britain in southeast Asia, and third, an avoidance of the poor 
military preparedness that had seemingly imperiled Australia in 1942.5 The first point 
coincided with the hopes of men like Casey and Johnson. Australia would provide key 
support for the United States in the Pacific but would not seek to challenge the U.S.’s 
primacy in the region.  
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The second point would lead to confrontation with the U.S. since any support of a 
continued British role in Southeast Asia would give tacit support to the reestablishment 
of colonial control in regions such as Malaya. This would be a challenge to the strong 
anti-colonial element that had been prevalent in the foreign policy of Franklin Roosevelt 
and under his successor Harry Truman. Washington policymakers could also certainly 
interpret it as a threat to U.S. economic interests in the region. Economic competition had 
long been a point of contention between the United States and Great Britain. A revived 
British presence in the region would certainly offer greater economic competition to 
American goods and services, something which Washington hoped to avoid.  
Grey’s final point served to isolate Australia from both the United States and 
Great Britain. An increased emphasis on ensuring the safety of Australia from external 
threats in the Pacific region played a significant role in the tumultuous debate that erupted 
between the Americans and Australians over the post-war peace settlement with Japan. 
Canberra’s relations with London continued to deteriorate due to long standing 
Australian concerns about British capabilities to offer assistance in times of need. 
Australian defense planners still remembered what they saw as the callousway the 
British had sacrificed Australian troops in Crete, Tobruk and at Singapore. They wer  
determined to ensure that such a thing did not occur again in the future. This strain of 
thought led Australian policymakers to realize that, “Australia was unwilli g to submerge 
its growing political or military identity in the Pacific by joining a force not manifestly 
under Australian control and substantially Australian in composition.”6  
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 What one sees emerging is a somewhat fractured postwar policy being pursued 
by Australia. One the one hand, Australia sought to maintain close ties with the Uni ed
States in the Pacific but to also balance the growing power of the U.S. with a renewed 
commitment to the Imperial relationship. Both of these, however, were balanced against 
ensuring the freedom of action to pursue whatever might be the best course for Australia. 
This lack of a clear direction in Australian policy in the Pacific in the post war period was 
duly noted by observers in the U.S. and Great Britain but also by some within Australia. 
When Australia chose to support the new republic of Indonesia as a member of the 
Economic Commission for Asia & the Far East (ECAFE), an editorial in The Sydney 
Morning Herald lambasted the decision. It observed that “Australia is making a habit, 
and a dangerous one, of parting company with Britain and America on important 
international issues.”7 The attempt to balance the American relationship against the 
British one was an issue that successive Australian governments had great ifficulty in 
solving in the early Cold War and led to fractures in ties with London and Washington. 
 The relationships between Australia and Great Britain underwent a reexamination 
after the war against Japan had ended. Britain’s role in the Pacific had been greatly 
diminished due to the increased role the U.S. took in the region. This was primarily 
driven by Britain’s own economic woes in the postwar period. During the war, Australia 
had been content to break away from the influence of London in favor of a closer 
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relationship with the United States. But the end of the war changed many of these factors. 
Curtin’s successor, Joseph Chifley, was not as strident in his anti-British sentiment as 
Curtin had been. Chifley’s Labor government viewed the growing economic influence of 
the United States in Australia and the surrounding region with some trepidation and 
because of this sought a renewal of the Imperial bond as a way to balance this. As t e 
historian Tom Frame concluded, “For Australia, America was a friendly but foreign 
sovereign nation. It would never be a ‘mother country,’ not a benign imperial master or 
associate.”8  
 It is difficult to argue that even during the war Australians had completely turned 
away from their relationship with Great Britain. It is worth noting Richard Casey’s 
thoughts on the issue, especially since Casey had been one of the key architects of th  
American – Australian bond that had emerged from World War II. He argued that 
Australians were first and foremost members of the British Empire and would do their 
utmost to maintain that relationship.9 Casey maintained this stance even into the 1950s, 
writing in 1955 that, “Our intimacy with America means no weakening in our ties with 
Britain – it is in fact one aspect of Anglo – American cooperation.”10 For Casey, and 
others who shared his thinking, Australia’s true role was a bridge between their imp rial 
mother and their republican cousins. The reality of the situation throughout the late 1940s 
was that Australia often did not figure into the thinking of either the Americans or the 
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British.11 And so, Australia found itself often having to insert itself into the consciousness 
of both nations, but in the immediate postwar period especially Britain’s. 
 The major issue that developed between Great Britain and Australia was an 
economic one. The British viewed the reestablishment of a closer bond with Australia as 
a possible way to help ease the postwar economic malaise that World War II had brought 
on Great Britain. A report entitled “Some Thoughts on British – Australian Relations” 
highlighted ways in which the bond between both nations could be renewed, often at the 
expense of the American – Australian relationship. The majority of the suggestions 
contained within the report cite economic endeavors as the primary way to bring Brit sh 
and Australian interests into closer alignment. Some included having British film 
companies produce films in Australia. Another suggested that British manufacturers pay 
closer attention to Australian demands and in particular to the Australian woman’s 
market.12 These points were clearly aimed at lessening American economic influence in 
Australia. It must be remembered that Hollywood had achieved a dominant position in 
Australian markets even prior to the outbreak of Word War II and that American 
consumer goods, such as washers and dryers, were pushed heavily by U.S. corporations 
even before the fighting had ended.  
 Initially, British efforts to recapture a large share of the Australian market were 
successful. In 1948 – 49, Great Britain supplied, by value, half of Australia’s imports. 
However, that percentage declined precipitously over the next several decades. By 1959 – 
60 it had shrunk to only 36 percent; ten years later it was at 22 percent and by 1975 – 76 
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only 13.5 percent.  In looking at the other side, Australian exports to Great Britain, one 
can note an equally sharp decline in trade. In 1948 – 49 that number stood at 42 percent 
but by 1975 – 76 had declined all the way to 4.2 percent.13 Even during the war this 
questions of what sort of postwar economic relationship Australia could expect with 
Great Britain was one on the minds of many observers. Nelson Johnson, in a letter to 
American newspaper editor Roy W. Howard, pointed out that, “There is a tendency to 
question whether England after this war will ever be able to climb back to that position f 
economic stability which had characterized England as late as 1938.”14 It is clear from 
examining the patterns of trade that efforts to reestablish the imperial relationship on 
commercial interests were not wholly successful. Partly this can be explained by the 
British decision beginning in the late 1940s to draw down their commitments east of 
Suez. A 1947 memorandum from the British government to Robert Lovett in the U.S. 
State Department highlighted this point. The memo stated that due to “the grave situation 
which confronts it as regards both finance and manpower it is essential to cut down to [a] 
minimum United Kingdom defense expenditure overseas.”15 As Great Britain withdrew 
its military forces from the Pacific region, a corresponding decline in British commercial 
interest occurred. 
 While in terms of economic and military ties the British and Australian bond 
lessened after 1945, cultural connections and an uncertainty about how active the United 
States would be in the postwar world did help to ensure that Great Britain and Australia 
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never completely abandoned each other. Nelson Johnson observed, “Australians, as well 
as British, are uncertain as to what we will do when peace comes. They recall our 
intervention in the last war. That intervention saved the British Empire. They recall that 
after our intervention we withdrew into ourselves. They fear that we will withdraw once 
more into ourselves after this war.”16 Australian policymakers led by Joseph Chifley were 
hesitant about committing Australian defense interests wholly to the United States who 
possibly might repeat its actions of World War I. If the U.S. retreated back into the semi-
isolationist mindset that had marked American foreign policy of the 1920s and mid 1930s 
then, Chifley and others wondered, how safe would Australia truly be? Part of the 
problem on the Australian and British side was their misreading of American foreign 
policy during the supposedly isolationist period between the wars. They did not recognize 
that even under Presidents Harding and Coolidge the United States had been quite willing 
to engage the wider world as evidenced by events like the Washington Naval Conference 
of 1921, the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Kellogg – Briand Pact of 1928.  
 Events were also complicated by American distrust of both the British and the 
British Commonwealth nations in the immediate postwar world. Americans feared a 
resurgent Great Britain would provide fierce economic competition in the developing 
regions of the world while nations like Australia sought to have a stronger voice in 
regional affairs that might provide a challenge to the growing American hegemony. The 
British and Australians clearly recognized these facts in their dealings with the 
Americans. A report created for Australian military officials visiting the United States 
identified the root of the problem in the American educational system. American school  
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stressed that America had wrested its independence from Great Britain in armed struggle 
and this led to a distrust of the English as well as the perception of disunity amongthe 
British Commonwealth.17 This last point was sorely misread by American policymakers 
and led to a second issue that caused undue friction in the relationship between the three
nations.  
This issue was the growing American distrust of the British Commonwealth 
because of the British habit of sharing information from what the American believed to 
be secret talks between the two nations. This especially irked the United States because 
often these talks involved issues related to the other British Commonwealth nations. The 
problem was Americans still chose to see Great Britain as the dominant partner in the 
British Commonwealth, not recognizing that nations such as Australia were fighting for a 
more independent role. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made this point known on 
several occasions to his British counterparts. Acheson pointed out that the British hab t 
had the effect of “immediately revoking resentment against the United States on the part 
of the Dominion Governments, particularly in the case of Australia and Canada, 
presumably because they believed that Washington should have broached the matter with 
them in the first place.”18 This friction was not a new one. Prior to World War II, and 
even during the war, American officials had insisted on treating the British 
Commonwealth not as a collective body but rather as a monolithic entity. The British
government had certainly done little to discourage such thinking on the part of 
Washington and tried to use this to tie the British Commonwealth closer together. In the 
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postwar period, though, London was slowly beginning to recognize that such efforts were 
futile and that nations like Australia would no longer play the role of colonial dependent. 
Washington was slow to pick up on the changes occurring within the British 
Commonwealth structure. But other factors also explain why the U.S. continued to try 
and deal with British Commonwealth nations through London. Evidence certainly exists 
that shows that the United States did not fully trust Australia, especially in the matter of 
the postwar reconstruction of Japan. The American viewpoint came out of the perception 
that the Chifley government was soft on communism and that the Australian government 
itself in the postwar period had been infiltrated by Communist agents who sought to turn 
Australia away from the United States. This point will be examined further in this chapter 
but it is important to note that the United States viewed the Australian representative on 
the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), William Macmahon Ball, with uncertainty as to his 
loyalties to the democratic West.19 Ball made note of this in a letter to Herbert Evatt in 
which he also commented on the effects this had on Australian and British relations. He 
believed there was “a deliberate effort here to drive a wedge between Australia and the 
United Kingdom,” on the part of the United States which insinuated that Ball did not 
represent the views of the British Commonwealth as a whole but rather the narrow views 
of Australia only and the supposedly communist leaning Labor government.20  
These two issues, postwar Japan and communism, were the most important 
factors in determining the course of the postwar relationship between the United Sta s 
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and Australia. The postwar relationship that emerged in the five years after the end of 
World War II in the Pacific came to mirror in many ways the turbulent relationship that 
had existed between both parties during the 1930s. It certainly was an issue at the 
forefront of the minds of many leaders in Australia. In a 1941 speech Richard Casey 
asked, “Are we going to fall apart after this war? Or put in another way – if we attain a 
workable measure of cooperation in this war, as I believe it is to our mutual interest to do 
– are we going to be able maintain it in peace?”21 The war had thrust two nations together 
who previously had little contact with one another. The expansion of Australia as a 
regional power and a more expansive American involvement in Asia and the Pacific 
ensured that contact between the two powers actually increased in frequency as well as 
importance in the post war period.22 It would only be natural that misunderstandings 
would occur.  
Some of the postwar acrimony can be laid at the feet of Australian Minister for 
External Affairs Herbert Evatt. Evatt had been a lightning rod for American criticism 
during World War II and proved to be equally so in the postwar world. His blunt manner 
and unyielding belief that Australia be accorded a sizeable role in the postwar Pacific led 
him to butt heads with many in Washington. The State Department prepared a rather 
blunt assessment of Evatt for President Harry Truman prior to a personal meeting with 
Evatt in 1947. The report detailed the image many policymakers in Washington had of 
the forceful Evatt: 
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He has been accused of self-seeking, and it is not always clear whether he is 
motivated by true patriotism or simply by egotism. He has great self-confidence 
and determination, is anxious to have a finger in every pie, is slow in giving his 
confidence, and insists on receiving full credit for his achievements. Quick to 
make up his mind, although often forgetful in completing urgent manners, he is 
respected for his intellectual and political courage.23 
 
It is clear that Evatt had few admirers in Washington. And it is clear that the personal 
feelings many in Washington held towards Evatt tended to cross over and affect 
American – Australian relations as a whole. 
One problem was the American view of Evatt’s conduct as President of the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1948 – 49.24 Evatt used this position to try to gain a 
greater voice for middle and small powers in a world quickly being polarized between the 
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Evatt hoped to ease the 
growing tensions between the West and East because he, like many leaders in middle 
sized powers, feared being dragged into a conflict between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. From 
the American perspective, however, it appeared more often that Evatt sought to 
undermine American influence with neutral powers. His calls for mediation and restraint 
went against the growing sentiment of American foreign policy makers that communism 
had to be met with force. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal remarked in his iary 
upon this point and referred to Evatt as “an active source of both irritation and 
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uncertainty.”25 American concerns over the extent to which Australian actions seemingly 
helped to advance Soviet or communistic aims in the Pacific became tied not so much to 
Australia as a nation but rather to individual actors like Evatt. His efforts to act as an 
intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union, while motivated by an 
altruistic view of the role of the United Nations, were seen by Washington as 
unabashedly naïve and often to the benefit of the Soviets.26 These feelings of animosity 
towards Evatt and other members of the Chifley government led the State Department by 
late 1949 to be “not merely indifferent as to the wishes of the Australian Labor 
Government,” but to work towards the ouster of Labor, “as apparently the only way of 
getting rid of Evatt.”27 
Evatt was at the center of another postwar disagreement between Australia and 
the United States. In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff identi ied several 
key island groups in the Pacific region that were desired for use as naval bases. One of 
these was Manus Island in the Admiralty Islands which was within the Australian sphere 
of influence due to its U.N. mandate over New Guinea. The Americans did not press for 
full-time use of Manus as a permanent military installation but rather for the rig ts to use 
the facilities on the island in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific. This 
claim was thought to be reasonable, especially since the U.S. military had been 
responsible for the construction of the majority of facilities that existed on the island.  
The main point of contention that arose was Evatt’s insistence on discussing 
basing rights at Manus only in the larger context of a joint Australian – American defense 
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plan on a scale similar to the U.S. – Canadian defense planning that took place 
immediately after World War II.28 This approach went against the proposed American 
approach to its postwar relationship with Australia. In the late 1940s, American foreign 
policy towards Australia had three central aims: educational exchanges und r the new 
Fulbright program, discussion of taxation issues on American imports and a general 
treaty of commerce and navigation rights in the southwest Pacific.29 These limited aims 
reflected what Washington wanted from its relations with Canberra in the imm diate 
postwar period. The creation of a general defense entity in the Pacific region was 
certainly not an issue that the United States wanted to pursue at the time.  
The United States had several arguments against the creation of any regional 
defense entity. President Truman, prior to a meeting with Prime Minister Chifley, 
received a memorandum on the subject that outlined the American arguments. The 
memorandum stated the key point that, “The U.S. should oppose a general conference 
and an overall defense arrangement for the Southwest Pacific as premature, in dvisable, 
and likely to encourage the U.S.S.R. to advocate similar arrangements elsewhere not to 
the advantage of the U.N or the U.S.”30 The American military found it especially galling 
that the facilities they had built were being denied to them. In the end the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the State Department counseled Truman to forget Manus in favor of other bases 
in the Pacific region. In Australia, conservative critics of the Chifley government 
hammered away at the seeming indifference of the Chifley government to American 
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overtures of friendship. An editorial in the Melbourne Herald cautioned its readers that, 
“There is a danger that if these continue to be received with indiffernce, the 
impression may be created in Washington that Australia is not interested in having 
relations of any cordial kind with her powerful and patient neighbor.”31 This was 
indeed one of the outcomes of the Manus Island disagreement. A growing sense of 
distrust of Chifley’s Labor government began to pervade American foreign policy and 
military policy maker’s thinking. 
One area where this sense of distrust can be seen was in the sharing of military 
secrets related to the nascent American guided rocket program. Both Great Britain and 
Australia were keen to be informed about the details of the American program but fears 
about communist infiltrators inside of the Australian government led the United States 
government to reduce the flow of information to Canberra. Often, what information the 
Australian government did receive was filtered through the British government. In a 
meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Australian Ambassador Norman Makin 
commented on this issue. The filtering of information through a third party, Makin 
stressed, “was unfortunate, and it was the hope of his government that the mutually 
beneficial cooperation between the two governments which had been obtained during the 
recent war might be continued.”32 Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of Defense for 
Australia, in a separate meeting with Acheson, lamented that the lack of information from 
Washington hampered not only Australia and Great Britain’s own rocket program but 
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also hampered Australian efforts to create a coherent policy for what role to p ay in the 
defense of the Pacific.33 However, none of these arguments swayed the United States. It 
would only be after the fall of Chifley’s Labor government to the conservative 
government led by Sir Robert Menzies in December of 1949 and the creation of a new 
internal security service in Australia that the U.S. would restart the flow of information 
related to high level military secrets. 
 While relations between both countries did deteriorate in the immediate postwar 
period it should be noted that efforts were made to continue the successful alliance that 
World War II had built. In 1948, Rear Admiral John Collins, Chief of Naval Services of 
the Royal Australian Navy (CNSRAN), met with Admiral Dewitt Ramsey, Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINPAC), at Pearl Harbor Naval Base. The two men carried 
out top-level strategic talks that dealt with regulating control of shipping between both 
nations’ regional waters as well as determining a boundary between the Australian 
command and American command regions in the Pacific. These talks were the first in a 
series of naval talks between the two nations in the late 1940s that helped to ensure that 
the bond between Australia and the United States was not severed.34  
Another area in which the United States sought to ease growing tensions with 
Canberra was through the selection of its ambassadors to Australia. The appointment of 
Robert Butler, a Minneapolis shipbuilder, in 1946 and Myron Cowen, a New Yorker who 
had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, in 1948 were ell 
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received by the Australian government and people.35 A 1946 editorial lauded President 
Truman for the selection of Butler to fill the ambassadorship to Australia. “A change of 
our diplomatic relations,” the editorial informed readers, “is due to the increased 
importance of the political and economic affairs of the Southwest Pacific for the United 
States. American interests in Australia – political, military and economic – are 
expanding.”36 But even the role of the American ambassador came to cause friction 
between Australia and the United States. The problem stemmed from the fact that both 
Butler and Cowen saw the Australian position as devoid of the possibility of career
advancement and because of this only stayed in the position for brief periods of time. A 
report from the Australian Embassy in Washington D.C. to Canberra made note of this 
issue stating that, “Butler’s real trouble is that he is a man of great energy, side-tracked 
into a country with which the U.S.A. has best possible relations and where he has 
relatively little to do.”37 After Myron Cowen, who had gained great popularity in 
Australia, the United States did not immediately fill the ambassador’s position. The need 
to fill such a position quickly was deemed of great importance by the Australian 
government as Australian Ambassador Norman Makin stressed to Dean Acheson. Any 
delay, Makin insisted, “Might be misunderstood and might occasion undesirable 
speculation and comment.”38 Between 1945 and 1953, the United States had four 
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different ambassadors to Australia. Conversely, in that same time period, Australia had 
only two men serve as ambassadors to the United States. It is apparent that the Australian 
government had reason to worry that American opinion of the worth of the Australian 
rapport was falling in the postwar world.  
The political and military considerations of the United States in the years 
following World War II were often at cross-purposes with Australia’s. These factors 
conspired to ensure that both nations would not, as Richard Casey expressed hope for, 
“work together as closely as one blade of a pair of scissors with the other.”39 The 
American – Australian bond found itself complicated further by the reintroduction of 
economic issues that resurrected memories of the trade wars of the 1930s. The difference 
though was that unlike in the interwar years, trade between both countries had expanded 
significantly. An examination of reciprocal trade figures from the period immediately 
following the end of the war demonstrates how much trade patterns between the two 
powers had changed. In the twelve-month period beginning August 1945, the average 
American monthly exports to Australia were valued at $7.321 million per month; 
Australia exports to the United States were valued at $11.587 million per month. In 
period between 1936 and 1939 those numbers had only been $5.583 million and $2.09 
million per month.40  
The United States had replaced Great Britain as the primary economic 
relationship for Australia. Much of the new trade came out of the American Lend – Lease 
program of World War II. Australia received a significant amount of Lend – Lease 
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material during the war. This helped not only to fuel its war industries but also o position 
Australian secondary industries to take advantage of the economic opportunities coming
out of the war. This had been a concern for the United States during the war and had 
caused some problems in the wartime relationship. The larger issue, however, occurred in 
the fall of 1945 when President Truman abruptly decided to end the Lend – Lease 
program. This was a particularly harsh blow to Great Britain whose economy was in
shambles after the war and relied heavily on Lend – Lease materials to crry n. 
Australia, while not in as dire a position as Great Britain, also viewed the sudden ending
of Lend – Lease with surprise and even anger.41  
Truman’s decision was motivated by domestic politics as much as international 
events. The conservative resurgence in the United States that had begun with the mid-
term congressional elections of 1944 sent a signal to Truman and the Democratic Party. 
Many conservatives inside the United States demanded repayment of Lend – Lease 
materials fearing a repeat of the events after the end of World War I when sev ral nations 
who had been major debtors to the U.S. had failed to repay their war debts. These 
domestic concerns, though, proved less persuasive abroad. Members of the British 
Commonwealth rallied to the side of Great Britain in expressing their dismay at the
treatment that the U.S. extended to its primary wartime ally. An editorial in The Argus 
(Melbourne) reported that, “Australian suspicion that the U.S.A.’s decision to end Lend – 
Lease smacked of dollar diplomacy,” because of conversations held with prominent 
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Americans in the city who asked not to be quoted.42 It is difficult to prove that the 
American decision to end Lend – Lease was wholly motivated by a hope to have a greater 
stake in the postwar economic world. This, however, was exactly the impression that 
Australia came away with. 
A major point of contention between the two powers was the issue of the postwar 
settlement of Lend – Lease materials to Australia. The United States argued that Australia 
had received far more in aid than it had supplied in reverse Lend – Lease materials during 
the war. The Australian government stridently denied this and maintained that Australia 
had emerged from the war with no material debt to the United States. This issue was a 
central point of conversation between President Truman and Prime Minister Chifley 
during the latter’s visit to Washington in 1946. Truman was well prepared for the 
meeting on this point. Several reports and memos prepared by the State Department 
alerted the President to the Australian position and the American evaluation of the 
situation. One report highlighted the three main Australian counter-arguments: the parity 
of Lend – Lease and reverse Lend – Lease materials between the two nations, the 
undervalued Australian pound and the low price levels that characterized the Australian 
economy. The U.S., Truman was informed, had supplied Lend – Lease materials valued 
at near $1.4 billion and had received reverse Lend – Lease materials estimated at $900 
million. The report maintained that the United States was confident that a settlement 
could be reached between the $100 million the U.S. asked for and the $15.2 million 
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Australia was willing to offer.43 Eventually the issue was settled along the lines outlined 
here. The settlement of Lend – Lease though was only one economic issue that clouded 
the alliance between Australia and the United States in the postwar period. 
A second, and even more contentious issue was a renewed fear by Australia about 
the revival of American protectionist trade policies and the impact on critical wool 
exports. Wool was still one of the most important exports for Australia at the time and 
because of this the Australian government tended to act aggressively towards wh t they 
saw as American moves to limit or exclude Australian wool from the markets of the 
United States. In 1947 the United States Congress had passed an amendment to the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act that would have allowed for the imposition of import fees or 
quantitative limitations on wool coming into the United States. This act, the Wool Bill f
1947, became the centerpiece of American – Australian disagreement at a 1947 
international conference on world economic issues held in Geneva, Switzerland. The 
Australian delegation accused the Americans that the passage of the amendment violat d 
the principles of free trade that the United States had espoused during the war. The 
Australians informed the Americans that, “It must therefore cause us to doubt the 
capacity of the U.S. government to make effective the policy relating to international 
trade which its delegation has outlined at this conference.”44  
The action taken by the Americans provided a rare instance of Labor and its 
conservative opponents joining forces against American protectionism. An articlein the 
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Sydney Morning Herald outlined both Joseph Chifley’s and Robert Menzies’ anger over 
the American actions. It related that the American decision to raise the import duty on 
Australian wool “would be to show complete contempt for the Geneva negotiations.”45 
Ambassador Myron Cowen received several letters from prominent Australians det iling 
their anger over the American action. E.H. Cox, a prominent newspaperman, wrote to 
Cowen expressing his shock over Congress’s decision to raise the duties. “You people 
[Americans],” the letter declared, “have not helped the situation much by kittenish 
reluctance to buy wool just when we most need the market.” Cox further pointed out that 
a decline in Australia wool sales was particularly hard on his nation due to the growin  
dollar gap between Australia and the United States, which Cox expected to widen by at 
least an additional $30 million due to the proposed wool act.46 
A combination of factors helped ensure that the situation never reached a 
potentially damaging climax. Domestic pressure on Truman led him to veto the wool bill 
when it came before him. The National Association of Wool Manufacturers opposed the 
passage of the wool bill due to the fears of retaliatory actions on the part of the Australian 
and British governments.47 This was not an unfounded fear. Great Britain, along with 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, formed a large joint venture to pool the wool 
resources from the four nations. The organization effectively controlled as much as 85 
percent of the world’s wool supply at this time. This step was seen by the British and 
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Australians as the only effective way to insure that their woolen products garnered what 
they believed to be a fair price on world markets.  
Senator Joseph O’Mahoney of Wyoming wrote to President Truman expressing 
his fears about the British Commonwealth wool scheme. O’Mahoney chided Truman that 
“Failure upon the part of the Government of the United States to meet the world situation 
created by the world surplus and the British monopoly plan means disaster to so large a 
segment of our domestic economy that it is imperative for the United States to adop  a 
long-term policy.”48 This stance is not surprising considering that wool was a central 
export of O’Mahoney’s state. The British efforts to dictate the market throug  what some 
American policymakers saw as economic extortion proved to be effective. It forced 
important business and political interests in the United States to throw their support 
against the wool bill and contributed directly to Truman’s decision to veto the bill.  
It should also be noted that the Australian government did not emerge from the 
fight with the Americans unscathed. Unlike the 1930s, when the majority of Australian 
citizens had looked upon American economic policies towards their country with a 
jaundiced eye, by the late 1940s many Australians blamed their own government as much 
for the economic fight as they did the Americans. Editorials in newspapers around 
Australia castigated the Chifley government for what seemed to be its stubborn refusal to 
meet the United States halfway. The M lbourne Herald called on the opposition parties 
in the Australian Parliament to “dispel by positive action the unhappy impression of an 
almost hostile coolness which has been created by many of Canberra’s official contacts 
with America.” The editorial went on to point out the Australian tardiness in accepting 
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the American offer to fund cultural exchanges under the Fulbright Act of 1946 as well as 
its procrastination on an agreement concerning the double taxation on profits passing
between the two countries. “Such inexplicable instances of grudging, parochial outlook,” 
the editorial concluded, “must seem to Washington that we have dropped our wartime 
desire for Australian – American cooperation. In giving this view the government grossly 
misrepresents the views of the great majority of Australians.”49 The economics of the 
U.S. – Australian relationship continued to be a point of dispute between the two powers 
and while economic disagreements never approached the level of the 1930s they are key 
to understanding that even in the postwar period the bond between the U.S. and Australia 
was not without divisions. 
Arguably the most contentious issue was Japan and the postwar settlement with 
that nation. The United States and Australia came to widely divergent views on the issue 
of how to treat their defeated enemy and proceed with the reconstruction of Japan. The 
United States wanted to ensure that no other allied power had a say in the postwar 
reconstruction of Japan.50 This was partly motivated by the belief that the Pacific war had 
been an American one but also by a strong conviction that it was necessary to exclude the 
Soviet Union and avoid allowing communism to gain a foothold in Japan. Australia, for 
its part, refused to believe that the spirit of militarism that had animated the Japanese 
during the war had been easily broken. As T.B. Millar noted, “Australia did not lose her 
sense of vulnerability with the defeat of Japan. On the contrary, the war seemed to justify 
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generations of fears, and to prove that only American power could protect Australia in 
the Pacific.”51 It was this contradiction that served to cause friction between the two 
allies. On the one hand, Australia feared a resurgent Japan, reindustrialized with 
American aid. This fear led them to adopt a harsher stance towards Japan than had the 
Americans. This harshness often contradicted American wishes for Japan’s development 
and led to incidents of strong disagreement between the two. 
It is clear from examining postwar Australian attitudes that the racial n mus of 
the war had not disappeared with the end of the fighting. Some historians have identified 
Australian postwar policies towards Japan as being revanchist. It is somewhat simplistic 
to do so but one must recognize that the attitude of many ordinary Australian towards 
Japan did contain a strong element of hatred and a thirst for some form of retribution.52 In 
a meeting with Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in Japan 
(SCAP), Australian representatives reminded MacArthur that militarism was central to 
the Japanese character and that they had been taught to worship military strength and to 
believe only in that. The defeat at the hands of the Allied powers, the Australians argued, 
was only a minor setback in the two thousand year history of the Japanese people and 
would in no way erase the aggression ingrained into the Japanese character.53  
The United States, and especially Douglas MacArthur in Japan, proved reluctant 
to buy into the harsh viewpoint of the Australians. Because of this, the Australian 
government often found that MacArthur and the American policymakers actively ignored 
its arguments. The Australians expressed their displeasure in areas where they had more 
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direct control, primarily over immigration into Australia. The Labor governme t in 
Australia adopted an even stronger adherence to the White Australia policy in the 
aftermath of the war. This was motivated by fears over the large numbers of dislocated 
Asians brought about by the war. White workers inside Australia feared that the 
expansion of the Australian economy would lead to a decline in support for the White 
Australia policy.54  
Their fears were unfounded. Australian racial attitudes towards Japan and Asi s
had been hardened by the war. “Japan was not the whole of Asia,” wrote T.B. Millar, 
“but it was Asian, and there was in some ways a transfer to ‘Asia’ of the apprehension 
and animosity felt towards Japan.”55 Immigrants from any Asian nation, then, found it 
next to impossible to work inside Australia. The Japanese, though, were especially 
targeted. Arthur Calwell, who served as Minister of Immigration in the Chifley 
government, made the position of the Australian government on this question very clear 
in a press conference. He stated, “We don’t want to see any Japanese on Australian 
shores in any circumstances or in any capacity.” When asked what negative effects this 
policy might have on Australian business, Calwell retorted, “I think the feelings of those 
relatives of the men who were fiendishly butchered are more worthy of consideration by 
a Minister of State than profits to be made from trade and laurels to be won in sports.”56 
 This unyielding stance also extended to the immigration of Japanese wives of 
Australian citizens. While not the norm, there were a number of Australians who had 
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lived abroad prior to the war or who were taking part in the occupation of Japan and who 
had taken on Japanese wives. Many of these citizens hoped to move back to Australia and 
enjoy the postwar prosperity brought on by the expanding economy. Their plans to 
maintain their families were disrupted by the Chifley government’s unwilli gness to 
allow Asians, and Japanese in particular, to enter into Australia. The Australian Political 
Liaison office in Tokyo was inundated with requests for immigration visas for wives of 
Japanese descent. When the Tokyo office questioned the Department of External Affairs 
as to what the official policy was, they received a tersely worded telegram that stated, 
“Japanese wives of Australian citizens are not eligible for permanent admission to 
Australia under existing policy.”57 Concessions could be made if the wife were partly of 
European descent but then only if she were in sound health, a term that could be 
variously interpreted from the position of the government.58 
This behavior on the part of the Australian government is indicative of a larger 
attitude concerning all things related to Japan. It might be argued that, for Australia, the 
war had not really ended in August 1945. Deep seated fears about Japan and a misreading 
of how fundamentally the defeat in World War II had shaken Japanese society led 
Australia to adopt a of position of obstinate refusal to comply with American plans for a 
postwar Japan. This would cause a definite breach in the relationship between both 
nations. This can be most clearly seen in dealing with the issue of the official peace treaty 
with Japan.  
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The United States pressed for a quick, formal peace treaty with Japan. This stance 
gained greater urgency for the Americans after the fall of mainland China to the 
communist forces of Mao Zedong in 1949. The Truman administration, supported by 
Republicans such as John Foster Dulles, realized that Japan would have to provide the 
nucleus of a pro-western and anti-communistic sphere in Asia. Because of this, a formal 
peace treaty that would end the occupation and bring Japan back into the industrial world 
order as soon as possible was highly desired by the United States. Militarily, J pan was 
coveted by the U.S. due to its “key strategic position in East Asia” for permanent 
American military installations.59 Convincing Australia of this necessity would prove to 
be far more difficult, however. The memories of the war lingered in the minds of many
Australians, both policymakers and average Australians, as has been demonstrated by the 
continued anti -Asian and anti-Japanese bias in Australian immigration policies.  
Australian recalcitrance to accept a formal peace treaty with Japan was also 
reinforced by American behavior towards the role the other Allied powers were to play in 
the occupation. Publicly, “participation forces of other nations that have taken a leading 
part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected.”60 Privately, American 
policymakers wanted to restrict the interference of the other Allied powers in Japan as 
much as possible. This viewpoint was greatly influenced by American desires to s verely 
limit Soviet influence in the Far East. Due to this then, the United States adopted a olicy 
of active resistance against all encroachments on what was seen as an American 
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prerogative.61 This stance played into traditional Australian fears of being ignored as a 
regional power.  
An examination of records reveals that the Australian government outlined clearly 
what they believed their role in the peace process should be. In a speech before the 
Australian Parliament in January of 1945, Herbert Evatt stated, “The Australian and New 
Zealand Governments will have a full share in all the arrangements to be made at all 
stages of planning for the armistice and post-armistice period in the war against Japan. 
There is every reason to believe that this claim will be recognized both by theUnited 
Kingdom and the United States Governments.”62 A Department of External Affairs cable 
to the Australian Embassy in Washington revealed that even by 1947, Australia clung to 
the argument that its role in the war entitled it to a seat at the negotiating table. The cable 
instructed the Australian officials in Washington to make it clear to their counterparts in 
the American State Department that, “Because of her outstanding war effort Australia is 
clearly entitled to be a party principal to the settlement and that is now universally 
recognized.”63 American policymakers, for their part, recognized the principle of the 
Australian argument but felt that the strategic and political realitis of the situation 
outweighed any such considerations. The topic was discussed in a conversation betwee
Truman’s first Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and James Forrestal. When queried by 
Forrestal if the exclusion of Soviet occupation troops would also mean the exclusion of 
British and Australian troops, Byrnes replied that the British would not care but that the 
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Australians, in particular Herbert Evatt, would. Evatt, Byrnes concluded, “wants to rule 
the world.”64  
The quandary of how to best reach a compromise was settled by American 
concessions to allow a mixed British and British Commonwealth occupation force to tak 
up a post in Japan. The British government was not keen on the idea since it represented 
another drain on an already taxed manpower base and economy. Because of this, the 
British passed most of the responsibility for the furnishing of men and maintenance of the 
British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) to Australia. Paragraph 8 of the 
operational plans for the BCOF outlined this arrangement and also declared Australia 
would be the party responsible for “providing a channel of communication on 
governmental matters concerning BCOF between the British Commonwealth 
Governments concerned and the United States Government, and through the Government 
with SCAP.”65 The British recognized the potential difficulties that could come out of the 
arrangement and chose to take a secondary role to Australia in order not to jeopardize a 
close postwar relationship with the United States. The Australians, for their part, seemed 
to have little initial concern over how their actions would be interpreted by Washington.  
The American response was, in fact, mixed on the BCOF. On the one hand, the 
BCOF helped to ease the tension over the issue of whether or not Australia would have a 
hand in the occupation. On the other, SCAP and the American government saw the value 
of the BCOF, which was a small force and relied heavily on American material, as minor 
at best. The American military considered the quality of the troops in the BCOF to be 
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substandard and reflected some of the prejudices that the U.S. military command 
structure had developed towards Australian troops during World War II. In a letter to his 
wife, General Robert Eichelberger gave his impression of the Australian troops taking 
part in the occupation. He wrote the Australians thought their camp at Kure to be “nice 
and well fixed up but from an American viewpoint I didn’t think so. The Aussies even at 
their best do not look after themselves as well as Americans. Their food is not as good 
and their camps are not nearly as clean.”66 It would be easy to dismiss Eichlberger’s 
comments out of hand as those of a man unfamiliar with the more lax attitudes that the 
Australian military had in terms of appearance. However, Eichelberger had been on  of 
the few American commanders who had served under MacArthur and with the 
Australians in the southwest Pacific who had emerged from the campaign with a 
generally positive view of the Australian fighting man. Such an impression from a man 
like Eichleberger certainly reveals how the level of regard in which Australian troops 
were held by their American counterparts had declined. 
Another point over which the two powers clashed was the role of the Allied 
Council for Japan (ACJ). This was an advisory panel made up of the four major Allied 
powers that had fought in the Pacific: the United States, British Commonwealth, Soviet
Union and Nationalist China. The ACJ was established to calm fears that the United 
States, and more specifically Douglas MacArthur, would singlehandedly determine the 
postwar direction of Japan. While the United States did plan to have the largest role in 
reshaping Japan, it was decided that the establishment of a body like the ACJ was a 
                                                          
66 Robert Eichelberger to Emmaline Eichelberger, February 21, 1946, Robert L. Eichelberger Papers, Box 
11, Folder 2, Perkins Library, Duke University. 
181 
 
necessary concession. MacArthur for his part never saw the ACJ as anything more than 
an annoyance and often chose to ignore it completely.  
The British Commonwealth representative was an Australian named William 
Macmahon Ball, who like his immediate superior Herbert Evatt, attracted criticism from 
the Americans. Ball saw the role of the ACJ, and its larger body the Far Easte n 
Commission (FEC) as being more than advisory.67 Ball hoped to use the ACJ to insure 
that Australian fears concerning a revived Japan were dispelled. The Americans viewed 
this push for great Australian inclusion as a violation of the principles that had been 
established in the occupation by one major Allied power of other former Axis powers, 
such as Romania and Hungary, by the Soviet Union. A prime example of this clash of 
wills occurred during a meeting of the ACJ in which Brigadier General Courtney 
Whitney, chief of the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) government section 
briefed the ACJ on recent policies enacted by SCAP. Ball questioned whether it was 
necessary for Whitney to give a full report, which he saw as an American delaying t ctic 
to keep the Council form more important work. Whitney replied he had come as a 
representative of SCAP and Douglas MacArthur and intended to give his full report. Ball 
fired back at Whitney to answer, “Who was running the Council – the Council or the 
Supreme Commander?”68  
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Actions such as this coupled with Ball’s seeming penchant for supporting the 
Soviet delegation on procedural matters led MacArthur and other American officials to 
question Ball’s loyalty and trustworthiness. In a letter to William Hassett, ecretary to the 
President, George Atcheson, Jr., American representative on the ACJ, confirmed that 
Ball, acting in concert with the Soviet representative, seemed to give “… the clear 
impression that their principal purpose is to bring into public view any criticism they can 
manage to find in regard to what the American authorities have done and are doing.”69 
The discord between the two parties was not hidden behind closed doors either. American 
antipathy towards Ball was well known as was Ball’s own dislike for what he saw a  the 
imperious behavior of SCAP and the American command structure. An editorial in The 
Argus (Melbourne) summarized what the Australians saw as the core of the clash. The 
Americans, the editorial concluded, viewed the conversion of the Japanese to a peaceful
society in terms of “… paper plans and pious expressions of good will on the part of the 
Japanese.” The Australians, for their part, were skeptical of “… an ‘overnight’ 
conversion of the Japanese to ways of peace.”70 
One matter that the Australian interpretation does not take into account is how 
deep American fears about the growth of communism in Asia had become by 1946 – 
1947. This fear was a primary factor in motivating the United States to push for a quick 
peace treaty with Japan after the war. The Australian government resisted a hasty peace 
until several issues had been settled to their satisfaction. Key among these issues were the 
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questions of reparations and Australian safety. The Australian government outlied its 
demands for Japanese reparations to the United States on several occasions. Two primary 
ways Australia hoped to be compensated were through the allocation of Japanese 
property in territories outside of lands to be retained by Japan. Another was through the 
allocation of goods and industrial equipment and facilities that were not considered 
necessary for a peaceful Japan’s economic survival or for the supplying of the Allied 
occupation forces.71  
The primary goal of the Australian government was to secure reparations for 
Australian citizens and soldiers who had been held as prisoners of war by the Japanese. 
This point was pushed especially hard by veterans’ organizations in Australia. In  letter 
to Prime Minister Joseph Chifley, E.V. Britnell, the secretary of the Australian Prisoners 
of War Relatives’ Association, informed Chifley that, “We submit that it is beyond 
argument that you should place human reparations as No. 1 priority in the list of 
reparations. We desire you to know that this question will not be allowed to recede to the 
back of our minds and be forgotten, and we expect you to push our demands to the 
utmost of your ability and power.”72 The Australian’s did follow through and pressed the 
American’s for some accommodation on this question. Chifley’s government reminded 
the Truman administration that Australia had modified its claims against Germany in 
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favor of those countries more directly affected by Nazi aggression. It washoped that, in 
return, the same consideration would be extended to Australian claims.73  
The Americans, for their part, refused to grant any concessions to the Australian , 
fearing that any sort of reparations payments would retard the industrial recove y of 
Japan, something that the Americans considered key to fighting the spread of 
communism in Asia. Also, the Australian calls for reparations did not take into account 
how devastated the Japanese economy had been by the war. For the first few years 
immediately following the end of hostilities the American government took on the 
primary responsibility for feeding the Japanese populace and rebuilding the infrastructure 
and economic base of the country.74 As Richard Casey reminisced later, “… we came up 
against the hard fact that the Japanese economy was being supported by the United States 
and we clearly could not expect the American taxpayer, in effect, to provide us with 
reparations on behalf of Japan.”75 
While the Australians allowed the issue of reparations to fade into the 
background, concerns over a revived Japan and the potential threat that it posed to 
Australian security did not. In a speech before the United Nations, Herbert Evatt outlined 
Australian worries about a premature peace treaty with Japan. The first and foremost 
principle of Australian opposition rested on the complete disarmament and 
demilitarization of Japan, an ending of the Japanese capacity to produce war materials 
and close supervision of Japan to prevent the reintroduction of war industries after the 
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signing of the peace treaty.76 Evatt echoed this sentiment before the Australian House of 
Representatives. He told the assembled lawmakers that, “… the greatest care must be 
taken lest Japan should be given a war potential which might be of significance to the 
future of the Far East and the Pacific. If we permit the building up of the war potential of 
Japan to this we shall suffer for it.”77 This message was echoed repeatedly by members of 
the Australian government and also by the general population. This perception was not 
prevalent just in Australia. Both the newly independent Filipino government and the 
government of New Zealand expressed concerns over the possibility of a resurgent 
militarism in Japan. 
A full conference of the British Commonwealth nations was called to meet in 
Canberra to discuss the possibility of what was seen as a piecemeal American approach 
to peace with Japan. The Canberra Conference was held between August 26 and 
September 2, 1947 to secure a general agreement among the British Commonwealth 
nations about their views towards a Japanese peace treaty. Several conclusions were 
reached by the representatives: retention of the territorial changes that occurred at the end 
of the war, complete disarmament of Japan, guarantees of a democratic constitution in 
Japan, limited reparations and supervision of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) to 
ensure the treaty clauses were being met.78  
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The United States’ response to the Canberra Conference was decidedly negative. 
The Americans intimated that any attempt to force reparations or any restrictive 
limitations on the Japanese peace treaty would be met with strong disapproval and an 
almost certain veto by the United States’ representatives on the FEC or ACJ.79 The 
Canberra Conference proved to be more than the American government could take. In 
public officials lashed out at their Australian counterparts. “State Department officials do 
not contest Australia’s right to have a full say in the Japanese peace settlement,” an 
editorial in the Melbourne Herald stated, “but will not stand for ‘bullying.’ They are 
somewhat suspicious at what they regard as the Australian Government’s tendency to use 
international conferences as election platforms.”80 The forcefulness of the American 
response took the Australian government aback but did not encourage a significant 
change in the Australian stance. The issue of a quick peace treaty with Japan proved to be 
a substantial division between the two allies.  
In an effort to quell these fears, the Truman administration sent leading 
Republican foreign policy expert John Foster Dulles on a tour of East Asia and the 
Pacific (February 1951) to garner support for a speedy peace with Japan. The Truman 
administration had first broached the topic of the peace treaty with Japan starting in early 
1947 but had received little positive feedback from Canberra. Dulles’s tour in 1951 was a 
second attempt to get the Australians on board with the American proposals. In Australia, 
Dulles encountered continued opposition to a liberal peace treaty with Japan and the new 
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demand that any peace treaty with Japan be tied to the creation of a formal defensive 
alliance between the U.S. and Australia along the lines of NATO.81 Sir Percy Spender 
recalled that the negotiations between Dulles and the Australians foundered on this issue. 
He recounted that for the Australians, “The treaty should contain provisions which would 
prevent the reemergence of Japanese militarism. And that, of course, involved restrictive 
conditions being imposed in the Treaty, whereas Mr. Dulles’ view was, very definitely, 
that any treaty which sought to impose upon a defeated conditions were unduly 
restrictive.”82 Foster responded to these arguments by assuring the Australian government 
that the war had effectively broken the spirit of militarism that had animated J pan prior 
to the conflict. In fact, Dulles described the mood of the Japanese as one of “extreme 
pacifism” and tried to discount Australian fears as alarmist.83 
Dulles’s tour resulted in little change in the Australian attitude. This led some in 
Washington to mull the possibility of reaching a unilateral peace with Japan. It is clear 
then that the postwar period in American – Australian relations was not a simple or easy 
one. In many ways the period between 1946 and 1949 brought back old grievances that 
had never been fully addressed during the war. Economic issues, the role of Great Britain 
in the postwar Pacific and Japan served to strain a relationship, which strengthen d by the 
experiences of World War II, was not unshakeable. Australia sought to walk a line 
between establishing itself as an independent power in the Pacific and aligning itself 
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closely with the United States. This middle road approach served more often than not to 
sow discord between Canberra and Washington. The alliance had become frayed but 
never completely unraveled. The reason for this was the emergence of a new threat in e 
Pacific region that both the United States and Australia saw as a primary menace to their 
respective nations: the growth of communism in Asia.  
By 1947, American policymakers and the general public had become convinced 
that world communism, a monolithic entity directed from Moscow, was intent on 
dominating the world. The blockade of Berlin and the communist insurgency in Greece 
led to fears of a Soviet takeover in Europe. Communist Chinese victory over Nationalist 
forces in 1949 only served to strengthen American fears as now Asia became a possible
breeding ground for the perceived communist peril. The ideological union of anti-
communism served to revive the American – Australian alliance in the early Cold War 
period and provide an anchor for what would become one of the closest foreign 
relationships that the United States developed in the twentieth century. Coral Bell 
concluded that the American international anti-communist crusade was the decisive 
factor in the American – Australian alliance.84 The Chifley government saw East Asia as 
key to its own strategic interests and the growing threat of communism among the Asian 
people revived fears of Australia being overrun by vast numbers of non-whites to the 
north.  
Australian concerns were further fueled by the information being distributed from 
Washington. The outbreak of communist led or inspired rebellions in Indonesia, Burma 
                                                          
84 Bell, Dependent Ally, 46. America’s anti-communist stance was established in NSC 20/4 (1948) and 
NSC 68 (1950). 
189 
 
and Malaya as well as Ho Chi Minh’s continued fight against the French only served, in 
the opinion of the United States, to help the Soviet Union by creating firestorms which 
the Western powers had to contend with.85 The American decision to see these 
movements, which were often nationalist in nature more than international, as being 
controlled by Moscow became a flaw of American foreign policy during the Cold War 
and would lead the United States to take actions in some instance which otherwise could 
have been avoided. It must be recognized, though, that this was not solely an American 
shortcoming. Australia itself took a similar view as, “Australian alarm about 
‘communism’ was directed mainly at the Soviet Union, the mainspring of international 
communist activities.”86  
Australian policymakers adopted the attitude of their American counterparts in 
interpreting world events between 1945 and 1950. Richard Casey wrote, “No sooner was 
the last shot fired in the war of 1939 – 1945 than Russia started on her attempt to capture 
the world for communism … the Iron Curtain has come down across half of Europe. 
Russian emissaries are burrowing like moles in every country.”87  Sir Percy Spender, 
Minister for External Affairs (1949 – 51) and Australian Ambassador to the U.S. (1951 – 
58), echoed Casey’s views in his own writings. “Western influence has almost been 
removed from this part of the world,” Spender wrote, “leaving the field wide open to the 
machinations of the Kremlin. This communist infiltration is in its strategy not unlike the 
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Japanese infiltration of 41 – 42.”88 Spender’s analogy to the Japanese offensive of World 
War II is revealing because it shows an important element of the American – Australian 
anti-communist crusade. The racial attitudes that had animated the bond from the 
previous war allowed both nations to make transition easily into an anti-communist 
attitude. Put another way, fear of the “Yellow Horde” had been replaced by fears o the 
Red Menace. The occupation of Japan demonstrated how quickly perceptions about non-
whites in Asia could change, especially among Americans. The Japanese went from hated 
enemy to needed ally in an exceptionally short period of time. The success of the 
communists in China in 1949 allowed both the U.S. and Australia to transfer their hatred 
and fears of the Japanese to a new Asian group. The foreignness of communism certanly
also contributed to this phenomenon since it was seen as being antithetical to Western, or 
white, standards. 
Perceptions of the communist threat had an interesting effect on that American – 
Australian alliance in that it directly affected Australian domestic politics. American 
military and national security organizations, as mentioned earlier, came to view the 
Chifley Labor government with some suspicion. A confidential Central Intelligence 
Agency report stated, “Nevertheless, it is believed that militant influences within the 
Labor Party will continue to be a deterrent to a strong Government anti-communist 
campaign and that the ACP (Australian Communist Party) is still capable of temporarily 
crippling Australian production.” The same report identified Australian trade unions as 
the principal source of communist agitation inside Australia and worried that the trade 
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unions, as the principal source of the Labor party’s political strength, could “apply 
indirect pressure upon the Australian government.”89 These concerns over the 
trustworthiness of the Labor government led to the American decision to severely restrict 
intelligence and defense information that was outlined previously in the chapter.  
The fears of the American government about communist influence over or 
infiltration of the Chifley government did not appear suddenly. They had been building 
over the entirety of the four years that Chifley held the office of Prime Minister. Long 
standing American antipathy towards Australian labor unions made them easy targets fo  
accusations of harboring communist sympathies. In a letter to General Robert 
Eichelberger in October of 1945, Lieutenant General L.H. van Oyen expressed his 
frustration in dealing with Australian dockworkers. He wrote that American vessels were 
often held up by Australian dockworkers “under communistic influence” and that the 
Chifley government was not only powerless to help but in fact displayed an attitude 
“hardly sympathetic” towards American concerns.90 The Central Intelligence Agency 
found reason to cast suspicion on high ranking members of the Labor government 
including Herbert Evatt, who was singled out because his brother had served as president 
of a communist front organization in New South Wales.91 
The Australian general election of 1949 was of particular interest to the Unitd 
States. Chifley and the Labor Party found themselves hammered on the issue of 
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communism by Robert Menzies and his conservative brethren. Chifley’s announced 
intention to nationalize Australian banks and a general strike in the coal industry in 
Australia in 1949 did not help Labor’s position. Officially, Washington maintained a 
stance of neutrality, but privately American policymakers could not help but hope for 
Menzies’s victory. It was generally acknowledged inside Australia that a L bor defeat 
would go a long way towards renewing U.S. confidence in Australia as a partner against 
the communist threat. The United States let it be known that any decision on whether or 
not to restart the flow of defense information to Australia would be held off until after the 
election was concluded. Most interpreted this as a sign that if Labor were to survive the 
challenge, the U.S. would continue to withhold secret information.92 
The attacks of Menzies and others such as Percy Spender proved effective in what 
could be seen as an analogous development to the changing nature of American domestic
politics. In a published address, Spender warned his fellow countrymen against the 
insidious influences of communists. He wrote: 
Communistic influences have penetrated deeply – more deeply than the average 
citizen knows. You will find them if you look for them in many strange places 
and within many apparently harmless organizations, playing a special role, but 
always extending the influence of the alien creed they serve. You will find them 
in societies for improved cultural relations with other nations, particularly Russia, 
in new theatre movements, in groups for scientific workers, in youth movements, 
as well as in the industrial labor movement. Indeed you will find them in some of 
our newspapers, giving a communistic twist and bias to news paragraphs.93 
 
Spender’s language bore an uncanny resemblance to the language being used by the 
growing number of conservative critics of the Truman administration’s foreign policy. 
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Menzies’s victory in 1949 went a long way towards demonstrating to the United Stats
that Australia was a solid ally that could be relied on in the struggle against world 
communism. 
 A second important factor that reinforced this belief after 1949 was the issue of 
the recognition of Communist China. The United States still recognized Chiang Kai – 
Shek’s government on the island of Formosa (modern day Taiwan) as the legitimat  
government of China. The Americans made it known that they expected their allies to 
follow suit and to withhold formal recognition from Beijing. Great Britain, for its part, 
found itself in a much more tenuous position than its American counterparts. The British 
were concerned over possible Chinese action aimed at Hong Kong as well as the sizeable 
trade that the British had on the mainland of China. These factors contributed to a far less
rigid stance on the part of the British, to the disappointment of the Americans.  
 Australia proved to be different. There was some thinking that the Australians 
would follow the British lead but surprisingly they instead chose to closely identify their 
own recognition policy with that of the United States. Several factors contributed to this 
decision on the part of Canberra. Perhaps key was the continued issue of race. As 
Australian historian T.B. Millar revealed, Chinese immigration in the ninetee th century 
aroused the racial antagonism of white Australians but that these had subsided due to the 
growing threat of Japan and China’s own internal divisions.94 However, the victory of 
Mao Zedong reawakened Australian fears about China. China became a central concen 
of Australian foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War. It was decided that all 
action had to be taken to limit communist China’s influence on its neighbors that might 
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prove detrimental to Australian security concerns.95 Because of this then, Australia 
decided to align itself closely with the United States. Australian policymakers recognized 
that only the United States would have the military might to resist communist incursions 
in the Pacific. It was, in many ways from the Australian perspective, similar to the 
situation that had arisen in December of 1941. 
 Sir Keith Officer, the Australian ambassador to China at the time of the fall of the 
Nationalist government, was instructed by the Department of External Affairs to offer all 
assurances to the United States of Australian solidarity on the question of recognizing the 
new communist regime in China. “You may assure the American Ambassador,” the cable 
informed Officer, “that we are not contemplating any step towards recognition of 
Communists and will consult U.S. and other Governments before doing anything in that 
direction.”96 Assurances of this nature were met in Washington with approval. Both 
countries were rapidly beginning to see the growth of communism in Asia as a 
continuation of the racial threat that Japan had posed just a few years prior.  
Richard Casey commented that communism had a happy hunting ground 
“wherever there are racial minorities which are dissatisfied,” a message of caution for 
Australians about the small Chinese population residing inside of Australia.97 The CIA 
identified several ethnic minorities as a possible internal threat to the Australian 
government, among them Czechs, Jews, Russians, Italians and Yugoslavs. The 
identification of these groups is particularly interesting since none of these groups were 
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still fully considered as part of the white mainstream culture of either country.98An 
editorial in The Washington Post attributed some of the childlike qualities that had been 
ascribed to the Japanese during World War II to the Chinese after the communist victory.
“The Chinese,” the editorial lamented, “intoxicated with their ability to ‘get away with 
it’, are giving vent to their pathological and traditional anti – foreignism with childish 
irresponsibility.”99  
The portrayal of the Chinese as children given to fits of anger fit easily into the 
traditional paternalistic viewpoint that the United States and Australia had towards their 
Asian counterparts. The racial ideology in both nations that World War II had helped 
both to see a bifurcated world of white against yellow allowed them to easily transition 
into a similar worldview in the early Cold War period: white against red. The perceiv d 
threat of a red Asia propelled both nations into closer alignment and would lead them to 
once again join forces in war against an Asian foe.100 
                                                          
98 “Communist Influence in Australia,” CIA ORE 9 – 49, April 11, 1949, President’s Secretary’s File: 
Intelligence Files 1946 – 1953, Box 215, Truman Library. 
99 “Issues in China,” The Washington Post, November 19, 1949, Series # A1838, Control # 494/31/7/2, 
NAA. 
100 Darian – Smith, On the Home Front, 226. 
196 
 
Chapter 6: The Pendulum of War: 1950 – 1953 
In the early morning hours of June 25, 1950, the 38th parallel that separated 
Communist controlled North Korea from the pro-western south erupted with a barrage of 
heavy artillery from the northern side of the line of demarcation. The North Korean 
People’s Army (NKPA) used the artillery as cover for launching a full-sca e invasion of 
the south with the intent of reunifying the peninsula under the control of Kim Il Sung, the 
leader of North Korea. Their northern counterparts quickly overran South Korean forces
since the southern forces lacked any heavy artillery or armor of their own. The 
Communist invasion of South Korea sent shockwaves through the capitals of the major 
Western Powers, most especially the United States, which found itself ill prepared to 
blunt the North Korean advance. 
The years between 1945 and 1949 had seen a massive demobilization program 
undertaken by the United States. A virtual monopoly on atomic weapons had given the 
nation a sense of security that allowed for a substantial scale back of all branches of the 
military with the exception of the newly independent United States Air Force. Many
military and political thinkers espoused the idea that atomic weapons had made large 
conventional forces an unnecessary expense. By 1949, almost the whole of American 
conventional forces were directed towards defending Western Europe. In the Far East, the 
loss of China had provided a deep shock to the American command structure but had 
done little to encourage the U.S. to buttress its military forces in the region. On the 
contrary, “in 1949, despite knowledge of a North Korean military buildup, the United 
States withdrew its two Army divisions stationed in South Korea because the Korean 
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peninsula was outside the United States’ strategic interest in the Far East.”1 Aside from a 
skeletal occupation force in Japan, the U.S. found itself in a position of great weakness in 
dealing with the newly begun Korean War which would subsequently affect American 
diplomacy in the Pacific region. 
The war itself became a new conduit for the development of Australian and 
American relations. World War II has often overshadowed the importance of the Korean 
War period in helping to spur a renewed commitment to the alliance from both the 
Americans and Australians. An examination of the period, though, reveals that in many 
ways it was the years between 1950 and 1953 that truly bound both parties together in the 
alliance that has been a cornerstone of both nations’ foreign policies to this day.  
The three-year period between 1950 and 1953 wrought great changes in the 
American and Australian relationship. The war itself, as well as issues that became 
intimately tied with the war, would help to reverse the downward trend that had 
characterized relations between the two powers in the period between 1946 and 1949. 
These issues would securely bind Australia to the United States and help to ensure that 
the American – Australian alliance would become a cornerstone of American foreign 
policy in the Pacific for the remainder of the Cold War and the twentieth century. 
Relations between both powers had begun to improve in late 1949 with the 
ousting of the Labor Party and the election of Robert Menzies and the Liberal – Country 
Party coalition. Menzies was no stranger to the position of prime minister. He had served 
in the same position between 1939 and 1941 and his administration had been marked by a 
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strong commitment to Great Britain and the imperial relationship. But the Menzies of 
1949 was not the same man who had left power in 1941. He had come to recognize that 
the security of the Pacific region and Australian interests in the region rested squarely 
with the United States.2 This point was certainly recognized even in Washington. Prior to 
a meeting with Menzies, President Truman received a background memorandum 
prepared by the State Department to brief him on the major issues affecting the U.S. – 
Australian relationship. “The government of Prime Minister Menzies,” the memo 
highlighted, “has made the achievement of close relations with the United States a 
cardinal point of Australian foreign policy. Leading members of the government have 
repeatedly stated it was essential for Australia to maintain the best possible relations with 
the United States and, in so far as possible, to initiate and carry out Pacific policies in 
cooperation with this country.”3  
For Australia, a closer relationship with the United States offered not only 
security but also a new avenue to increase Australian industrial output, a key program in 
the postwar period. Sir Richard Casey, who succeeded Sir Percy Spender as Australian 
Foreign Minister upon the latter’s dispatch to Washington as ambassador, continued his 
long push for a strong American – Australian alliance. In a meeting with Liberal Party 
leadership, Casey outlined the important role that the U.S. had to play if Australia was to
expand its industrial base. For Casey, it “was essential to get the United Stats interested 
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in our development and expansion and get substantial American money invested in 
Australia.”4 
American officials went out of their way to cultivate this newfound goodwill 
towards the U.S. on the part of the Australian government. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson stated in a nationwide broadcast on the BBC – Australia that among the many 
friends the U.S. had in the world, Australia maintained a special place because “yo  can 
count on them sticking with you when the going is tough.”5 Even John Foster Dulles, 
who had encountered strong resistance from the Australian government for an early peace 
treaty with Japan, came to see Australia as one of the few countries in the Pacific region 
that the U.S. could fully count on in facing down the growing threat of communism.6 
American ambassador Pete Jarman noted in a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley that even 
though Australia was a small nation in terms of manpower and industry, it had grown 
ever more important “because of this threat we have from the Far East.”7 These views 
represent a drastic departure from the previous three years when the United States 
government had looked on the Australian government with suspicion and sometimes 
even outright dislike. The new attitude towards the relationship from both sides was 
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certainly a change but it hid the fact that certain fundamental differences between the two 
sides remained. 
The temptation exists to argue that Australia, in its continuing search for security, 
simply bound itself to the U.S. forfeiting its independence of action in the international 
arena. Many would agree with Pete Jarman’s estimation that “it is natural for a long 
friendship to have existed between us, even if no war had occurred.”8 This is a highly 
oversimplified reading of U.S. and Australian relations and discounts the continued 
struggles that arose between the two nations as Australia struggled to find its own voice 
in its relationship with the United States. It became easy for Americans to be seduced by 
the speeches of men such as John Bostock, the president of the Australian – American 
Association, who identified Americans as “kith and kin, our cousins in blood and natural 
affinity and in usage of the fruits of the good earth,” or in the writings of Australian 
newspaperman Sir Lloyd Dumas who informed Sir Percy Spender that he had “never 
come across any signs of anti-Australian feeling” in the United States.9  
Points of disagreement still existed between the two parties, a number of which 
were based on continued Australian anxiety over exactly how much say the United States 
had in Pacific affairs as well as concern over the loss of market revenue to American 
businesses. Australians wanted the U.S. to realize that they were “not content t b  hair 
on the tail of the dog. They felt they, at least, should be part of the hide of the dog 
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itself.”10 From the United States’ perspective, Australia was certainly growing in 
importance but there was still a tendency to not recognize the growing rift between the 
Australian and British governments.  
A major problem of the post war period was the planning of major policy issues 
with Great Britain, who then filtered the information to the other British Commonwealth 
nations. This continued to cause headaches for Washington during the Korean War. 
American officials often found themselves in a conundrum where they initiated talks with 
the British on a confidential matter only to discover that the British passed the 
information along to other countries like Australia. Two possible explanations exist for 
this phenomenon. First, it is possible that the Americans did not fully understand the 
workings of British Commonwealth relations, especially in defense planning. What the 
Americans thought to be information of value only to the British, the British thought to 
be of value to the whole of the British Commonwealth and hence would pass it along. 
The second possible explanation is that the British simply did not understand that the 
United States wanted to deal directly with the British Commonwealth countries only on 
issues that pertained directly to them. Dean Acheson made this point very clear to Lord
Hastings Ismay, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Reations. Acheson 
chided Ismay for passing along information the U.S. believed to be confidential and 
pointed out that “we had enough difficult points without adding the wholly unnecessary 
one of prestige. They [the British Commonwealth governments] resented deeply having 
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to deal with us through London.”11 This problem had been a longstanding one in U.S. – 
Australian relations and would not be fully solved until 1967 with the British withdrawal 
of forces from east of the Suez. 
Continuing economic difficulties between the United States and Australia 
hounded the relationship during the period as well. Much of the rancor centered on the 
debate in Australia over how much reliance should be placed on U.S. investment to help 
expand Australian industry. Proponents argued that Australia lacked the resources t  fund 
any major expansion of the Australian economy and thus foreign investment was 
necessary, particularly American investment. Opponents maintained that allowing 
American capital into Australia would give the U.S. too much leverage over the 
Australian economy and government. The pro-labor newspaper Queensland Guardian 
remarked that the Menzies government had become so beholden to American economic 
interests that “it doesn’t see how it can do anything but agree.”12  
Another point of contention was over the effect of American military purchases 
on the international wool market. At the onset of the Korean War the American 
government made it known that it would seek to purchase large amounts of both raw and 
refined wool in order to meet the clothing needs for the rapidly expanding forces called 
up to meet the threat on the Korean Peninsula. This pushed wool prices to twice their pre-
war levels and touched off a speculative frenzy in Australia, where wool still maintained 
its place as the prime export of the nation. Australian framers began to turn croplands into 
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grazing lands for sheep in order to meet the perceived demands. However, by March 
1951 it was apparent that American needs were far below the high levels that had been 
announced in the summer of 1950. This caused the price of wool to collapse and 
Australian farmers were left with an oversupply of wool that would depress prices for 
several seasons.13 The Australian populace quickly blamed the United States for the 
collapse of the wool market.14 
Events like these helped make it more difficult for Menzies and his government to 
make a strong argument for increased American investment. The reality of the situation 
was that Australia badly needed American capital investment inside of their nation. The 
postwar dollar gap between the two countries had been widening at an alarming rate and 
the Menzies government came to see this as one of the most pressing economic problems 
facing Australia. The topic of increased American capital flow to Australia was an 
important issue for Menzies during his first visit to the United States in July 1950. He 
met with Dean Acheson to discuss American support for Australia’s efforts to secure a 
loan from the International Bank to fund internal improvement projects.15 The Truman 
administration was certainly sympathetic to the Menzies government’s plight. President 
Truman concluded that American policy towards countries like Australia should be to 
help them “achieve sound economic growth without the necessity for special financial 
aid.”16 The reality was, however, that continued resistance from some corners of 
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Australian society and politics as well the American government’s inability to regulate 
overseas investment by American companies led to a continued dollar gap throughout the 
period of the Korean War. 
American – Australian relations were also troubled by an increased awareness of 
racial issues. The Truman administration showed itself more amenable to openly 
confronting issues of race in the US than had been the Roosevelt administration. 
Particularly, the Truman administration and some portions of the American public 
became more critical of the treatment of non-whites in South Africa. These points should 
not imply that issues of race no longer resided at the center of American life. The late 
1940s and early 1950s brought about openly aggressive claims from certain segments of 
American society concerning the superiority of whites over non-whites. In fact, 
Australian leaders noted that if the issue of white and black relations in the U.S. was 
brought up, Americans tended to change the topic of conversation.17 Even so, these 
debates greatly heightened Australian fears about the future of the White Australia 
policy.  
Australian leaders were particularly concerned that the White Australia policy 
would be brought before the United Nations where Australia would be castigated by the 
numerous non-white countries of the world. Sir Richard Casey, serving as the Australian 
Minister for External Affairs, revealed in his personal diary that this issue was almost 
constantly at the forefront of his mind. Casey believed that the apartheid program f 
South Africa revealed not the evils of racial discrimination but rather “an argument in 
itself against two or more races of different origins trying to live together in the same 
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country – but this argument is likely, in this congregation of nationalities and races, to b 
swamped by the racial discrimination argument.”18 Australian support for American 
policies in the Pacific and Asia as well as prompt help in stemming the tide of th North 
Korean advance in 1950 helped to ensure that Australia’s immigration policy did not 
receive the same scrutiny as did apartheid. The Australian government recogniz d that 
playing the role of the loyal partner in the American anti-communist crusade assured that 
the White Australia policy remained inviolate.  
The American – Australian alliance benefited from the rising fears of communism 
that engulfed the Western nations starting in the late 1940s. Communism, tinged by a 
continued insistence on seeing the world in racial terms, proved to be the key ideological 
idea that finally securely bound both parties together in both a formal and informal 
alliance. During the years of the Korean War, American and Australian reltions became 
dominated by a general fear of the growth of communism, specific concerns over Red 
China and the Korean War itself, which produced two subsidiary issues: ANZUS 
(Australia – New Zealand – United States Tripartite Agreement) and the Treaty of San 
Francisco which established a formal peace treaty with Japan and its opponents in World 
War II. 
General American fears concerning communism simply did not appear in 1945. 
An examination of American history back to the 1880s and 1890s reveals a longstanding 
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American distaste for what was considered the radical or anarchist principles of 
communism and socialism. The first Red Scare of 1919 – 1920 established a model for 
what would become the communist hysteria of the late 1940s and 1950s.19 In a radio 
address to the nation on April 11, 1950, President Truman warned his fellow countrymen 
that “the communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out 
freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered 
among their principal victims.”20 Because of this finding reliable allies abroad to blunt 
the growth of communism became a key preoccupation for the United States. American 
foreign policy in the late 1940s established a general litmus test by which allied nations 
were judged. Very simply, the more anti-communistic a nation was, the great r the level 
of support it received from the United States. An example of this approach can be found 
in the American relationship with Iran in the 1950s. In speaking before the Unitd States 
Senate, Prime Minister Robert Menzies signaled Australian acceptance of this litmus test 
by telling the assembled senators that “it is concerted defense that is needed against 
concerted aggression; that we must think together, we must work together, we must so far 
as possible plan together.”21 
Australia also was deeply troubled by the spread of communism into Southeast 
Asia. As British and British Commonwealth forces fought against communist rebels in 
Malay starting in 1948, Australian officials began to note the possible direct threa
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communism posed to Australia. In fact the use of Australian forces against communist 
insurgencies in Southeast Asia became one of the five major ways in which Australia 
sought to enhance its security in the Cold War period.22 The Australian government made 
its views on the spread of communism well known, especially to Washington. In a set of 
background notes to U.S. journalists, the Australian Department of External Affairs noted 
if Southeast Asia fell then Indonesia and possibly even New Guinea might fall as well. 
This would place Australia “under a rather hostile umbrella.”23 Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies expressed a similar line of thinking in a personal meeting with Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson in 1952. Menzies pointed out that for Australia, holding Southeast Asia 
was key. If the Western powers failed then this would bring “Asian Communist forces to 
the very doorsteps of Australia.”24  
It is worth noting here Menzies’s qualification of the communists as Asian. This 
is revealing in that it demonstrates that a strong racial element persisted in the Australian 
mindset. Traditional Australian fears about Japan after the end of the war in the Pacific 
were easily transferred to the whole of Asia after 1950. The same fears that Menzies 
articulated to Acheson bear a striking resemblance to the fearful language used by Prime 
Minister John Curtin and others during 1941 – 1942. This phenomenon was certainly not 
restricted to Australia alone. American policymakers and the American public also saw in 
the rise of communism in Asia the renewed threat of the “Yellow Horde.” An 
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examination of the personal papers of General George Patton reveals how, in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, Soviet forces, and hence communism, became connected 
with race. In a letter to his wife Beatrice on May 13, 1945, Patton wrote that the Soviets 
“are a scurvy race and simply savages.”25 In a later letter dated July 21, 1945, Patton 
lamented that “We have destroyed what could have been a good race [the Germans] and 
we [are] about to replace them with Mongolian savages. And all of Europe will be 
communist.”26 Secretary of Defense George Marshall received a letter from a private 
citizen named Kernan Robinson that touched on this subject. Robinson’s letter 
highlighted the racial aspect that communism in Asia had brought back into focus for 
Americans. He stated: 
Personally, as a long time resident of the Pacific Coast, I am strongly f the 
opinion that the old talk of the “Yellow Peril” is as new and pressing a subject as 
it has ever been. Viewing these matters in their deeper light, to-wit: As problems 
of almost physical nature, there can be little question that the loss of China to 
Russia, complete or not complete as it may be, turns the faces of the hordes of that 
vast Asiatic nation to the Western Hemisphere.27 
 
The reoccurring use of the phrase “Asiatic” to describe communists in Asia reve ls that 
both parties believed that some racial characteristic or trait made the peopl  of nations 
such as China or Malaya or Indonesia more susceptible to the encroachments of 
communism. 
 Discourse on the connection between race and communism also appeared in the 
public forums of newspapers. A prime example of this is found in an article from The 
Washington Post that ran just after the start of the Korean War. The article makes explicit 
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use of racial terminology and seeks to place the Soviet Union on the same level as the 
nations of Asia, an implicit denigration of the U.S.S.R. “Most Asiatics are woefully 
ignorant of political consciousness,” the article stated, “Soviet Russia is pictured as a half 
– Asiatic nation whose sole interest in the struggles of Koreans and Chinese is to see that 
they are given a fair opportunity for political advancement. Stalin, say the Red 
propagandists, wants Asia for the Asiatics. What they fail to add is that Stalin has often 
stated that he, too, is an Asiatic.”28 The article certainly is intended to point out that the 
altruism of Soviet involvement in Asia had a self-serving end. But even this point is 
reminiscent of American perceptions of Asian races as untrustworthy or sneaky. The end 
effect is to tie the Soviet Union, and hence communism as a whole, to the racial parodies 
of Asians that proved both understandable and comforting to Americans and Australians. 
 Another point that must be raised when discussing American and Australian 
reactions to the general growth of communism in Asia was how poorly both nations 
managed to read communist movements in the region. Neither the U.S. nor Australia 
appeared willing to view movements such as Ho Chi Minh’s fight against the French in 
Vietnam as being truly nationalist movements. Communism became, for the West rn 
world, a monolithic structure without variation and controlled directly by the Soviet 
Union. This view would blind the U.S. and Australia to the subtle nuances of 
communism in Asia and certainly contributed greatly to the outbreak of conflict between 
the West and pro-communist forces in the region.29 
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 Secretary of State Dean Acheson voiced this opinion in a letter to Clarence 
Moulette, whose son was serving with the Marines in Korea. Acheson maintained that it 
was the Kremlin who directly controlled events in Korea and that this had contributed to 
the denial of the Korean people’s natural right to self-development.30 It is difficult to 
judge if Australian perceptions on the solidarity of the communist movement were 
influenced by estimations coming out of Washington or were those ideas truly believed in 
Canberra. It is certainly clear from an examination of the writings of overnment leaders 
that the communist threat to Southeast Asia was under the guidance of the Soviet Union. 
In a speech before the Australian Senate, Prime Minister Menzies concluded that the 
current Cold War mentality that gripped the globe had been perfected in Moscow as an 
effort to “prevent or impair defense preparations in the democracies.”31 In an undated 
essay concerning the fight to dissolve the Communist Party of Australia, Menzies 
maintained this view. He wrote that communism the world over was the same and its 
primary means of growth was through the “fifth column, small in numbers, but led and 
directed by men many of whom have actually been highly trained in the Soviet Union 
itself.”32 Menzies’s point does have some validity. Men such as Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il 
Sung had indeed spent time in the Soviet Union and had certainly received ideological 
training there. However, by simply seeing these men as stooges of Stalin, Menzies a d 
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others like him in both Australia and the United States unknowingly blinded themselves 
to the varied nuances of the international communist system that they faced. 
 For the average American or Australian events such as the Korean War actually 
had little effect on their day to day to day lives, especially since the governments of both 
nations worked hard to insulate their respective publics from the war as much as 
possible.33 This, however, did not stop communism from being a public worry. Fears of 
communist infiltrations in high government offices as well as fears about fifth columnists 
within communities were reflected in the Red hysteria of the late 1940s and 1950s. 
American fears were heightened by events such as the Alger Hiss trial in 1948, the trial 
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1951 and the supposed discovery of communist agents 
within the State Department by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1950. Similar fears were 
present in Australia and had been used as a powerful political tool by Robert Menzies 
during the general election of 1949 that saw the ouster of the Labor Party. The issue of
communism within Australia was of particular concern for both Menzies and the 
American government because American concerns over the trustworthiness of the 
Australian government had led to the decision to restrict the flow of sensitive mil tary 
information to Canberra. 
 Menzies made the issue of communism a centerpiece of his electoral platform in 
1949. The Communist Part of Australia (CPA) had long been a target of the Australian 
government. Even during World War II with a more sympathetic Labor government in 
control, the CPA had been declared illegal due to its unwillingness to support the British 
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Commonwealth war effort between 1939 and August 1941 on orders from the Soviet 
Union.34 American officials feared that the potential threat of communism was not fully 
appreciated by the Australians or that they simply turned a blind eye to it. In a letter to 
American Senator Alexander Wiley, Ambassador Pete Jarman confided that “the verage 
man in Australia has not awakened to the danger which confronts the world and 
particularly this part of it.”35 American journalist Esther Van Wagoner Tuffy commented 
on the same issue in a radio interview broadcast in Australia and New Zealand. When 
asked about what Australians saw as an American overreaction to the issue of 
communism, Van Wagoner Tuffy replied: 
In the kindest and most gentle criticism I have been told we [Americans] are 
hysterical about communism. McCarthyism is being cited to prove it. I am willing 
to agree that we are a little hysterical about communism in the United Stats … 
but let me add I think this part of the world is a little too sanguine … Se we can 
learn from each other. We can become less emotional in our fears and do better in 
the U.S. and perhaps you can become more alert.36 
 
The Menzies government interpreted statements such as these that the U.S. still was not 
completely convinced that internal communism did not pose a threat to Australian 
security. In order to demonstrate that Australia was worthy of being a trusted partner in 
the fight against world communism, Menzies and the Liberal Party took the fight against 
internal communists to a new level. 
 In 1951, Menzies introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Bill that said the 
CPA was to be declared an unlawful organization and that the party's property could be 
seized and disposed of. Any other organizations that were suspected of being affiliated 
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with the CPA would also be dissolved. Anyone who carried on the work of the party after 
it was declared illegal was to be jailed for five years. In addition, as soon as smeone was 
declared to be a communist, they were to be suspended from their job if it were in the 
federal government, the defense forces, or in the unions. In the words of the bill, a 
communist was a person who supports or advocates the objectives, policies, teachings, 
principles or practices of communism, as expounded by Marx and Lenin.37 
 The introduction of the dissolution bill had been a major campaign pledge of 
Menzies in 1949 but he moved slowly in introducing it due to fears that it would cost the 
Liberal Party support among the unions and possibly cause disorganization in Australian 
industry. Menzies, in a speech designed to garner support for the Communist Dissolution 
Bill, chided listeners that internal communism was not simply something that could be 
ignored. He argued that “to deal with the Australian Communist as if he were an 
offending motor-car driver, and with exactly the same legal procedures, would n t only 
be unreal, but suicidal.”38 Menzies received strong support from the Australian public, 
especially from rural areas and smaller towns. He was flooded with lettersin support of 
the dissolution bill from across Australia. One citizen thanked Menzies for his actions 
because she “wondered what kind of society our children would inherit; if they would 
ever know freedom.”39 Another letter pointed out that for most Australians communism 
was something they only heard about but rarely saw but that every time the writer visited 
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Melbourne she could see it in the “coal and tram strikes and everything decent throw in 
to confusion.”40 
Menzies also had a personal political objective in mind with the dissolution bill. 
The Labor Party had maintained control of the upper house of the Australian Parliament 
in the 1949 election. Menzies hoped that the Labor Party would defeat the dissolution bill 
that would have allowed him to call for a new general election in which he was confident 
his Liberal Party would seize control of the Australian Senate. The Labor Party refused to 
cooperate though and allowed the bill to pass through the Senate. Eventually it was 
brought before the Australian High Court where it was ruled unconstitutional. However, 
Menzies’s fight for the bill as well as the introduction of a new governmental security 
service designed to eliminate potential leaks of secret information assured Washington 
that Australia, under Menzies, was a trustworthy partner in the fight against international 
communism.  
Towering above these general issues related to communism was the issue of 
China. The victory of communist forces in 1949 provided a sobering wakeup call not 
only for officials in Washington but in Canberra as well. Both nations came to be fixated 
with Communist China. At the root of this fixation were two very different ration les. For 
the Americans, China had long held a special place in the minds of American foreign 
policy makers dating back to the mid nineteenth century. This perceived special 
relationship between China and the U.S. had convinced Americans that China was key to 
American interests in East Asia. There was also a strong cultural attraction to China. 
                                                          




American missionary work stretched back to the early nineteenth century and many 
Americans of the late 1940s and early 1950s were familiar with the works of authors such 
as Pearl S. Buck that portrayed China in an exceptionally positive light.41 For Australians, 
China loomed in the imagination as home to an enormous group of non-whites who, after 
the defeat of Japan, represented the greatest threat to the racial homogeneity of th ir 
island nation. Even though both nations came at the issue of China’s loss to the 
communist camp from differing viewpoints, both countries found common ground in 
dealing with the new China that would help to again bind both the United States and 
Australia together. 
The first issue that faced the Western powers was the question of recognition. The 
United States, despite internal debate, adopted a course of non-recognition of the new 
communist regime in Beijing, instead continuing to recognize the defeated Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-Shek on the island of Formosa (modern day Taiwan) as the legitimate leader 
of the whole of China. Washington hoped that their western allies, especially Great 
Britain and the other British Commonwealth nations, would adopt a similar posture. The 
American decision was certainly driven by an ideological conviction stemming from a 
longstanding antipathy towards communist nations. Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
the American government had chosen non-recognition of communist regimes as a 
standard response, arguing, as Woodrow Wilson did in 1918, that the communist 
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governments that came to power through violent revolution were illegitimate, and they 
did not represent the will of the whole of the people. Because of this, then, they could not 
be considered legitimate governments.42 
The United States did not recognize that the decision facing the British 
government was not as black and white. While the British certainly did not wish to 
antagonize their American allies and jeopardize the crucial economic lifeline that the U.S. 
had extended to Britain and Western Europe in 1947 with the Marshall Plan, they had to 
balance the fact that antagonizing the new communist Chinese government could have 
dire consequences for British holdings in the Far East, especially Hong Kong. Also 
British merchants still had lucrative trade interests in Chinese markets and London feared 
that China would block access to those markets. The British finally decided that 
recognition of the government of Mao Zedong represented the only way to ensure the 
safety of their interests in China and East Asia and accordingly established diplomatic 
relations in January 1950. 
Canberra thus found itself between two divergent views on the issue of 
recognition. Great Britain had laid down the British Commonwealth policy favoring 
recognition but the Americans made their displeasure clear over what was vieed a 
breach of Western solidarity against the communist threat. The Australians certainly 
thought that the stark choice that the Americans had presented their allies did not 
recognize the potential power of China in Asian affairs or the potential threat China 
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represented to nations in the region.43 Despite these reservations, Menzies’s government, 
with its emphasis on a strong security relationship with Washington, chose to follow the 
American lead and adopt a position of non-recognition. A State Department report 
prepared for President Truman upon his first meeting with Prime Minister Menzies 
highlighted that “both the anti-communist attitude of the Menzies government and the 
desire to achieve a closer cooperation with the United States in the Far East expl ins this 
stand.”44 
The Australian decision was not without its critics. British authorities viewed th  
Australian decision as further proof of the tightening bond between the Americans and 
Australians and this helped to place a further strain on inter-British Commonwealth 
relations. Menzies’s decision was viewed by domestic opponents as yet another sacrifice 
of Australian sovereignty to American interests in the hopes of fetching some consolation 
in the form of a formal security arrangement between the two powers. Herbert Evatt, the 
former Minister for External Affairs and leader of the Labor opposition, pointed out that 
Australia’s decision to not recognize Communist China ran counter to almost the whole 
of the British Commonwealth. He went on to argue, “I think that it will be found in the 
long run, that the view taken by the governments of British Commonwealth countries, 
other than the Australian Government and the New Zealand Government, is the wiser.”45 
These reactions appear to be without consideration of the question of why Australia 
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chose to follow the American position and ignore the British one. The primary underlying 
rationale for Menzies and his government was the security that a close relationship with 
the U.S. offered. This was something which the old imperial relationship with Great 
Britain could no longer present. They also dismissed very real fears the Australian 
government held about a communist China expanding in the Pacific region.  
Many of these Australian fears, according to T.B. Millar, had been based 
primarily on fears of what Communist China might do rather than on what they actually 
had done by 1949. This changed with the Chinese entrance into the Korean War in 
October 1950. For Australia, this action provided a justification for their fears. The 
Australian government was shocked by reports of mistreatment of Australian priso ers of 
war as well as an orchestrated campaign to galvanize support of Australian communists 
against the Menzies government.46 In a letter to the Department of External Affairs, 
Walter Crocker, the Australian High Commissioner in India, had attempted to forewarn 
Canberra about the new regime in Beijing. He stated, “I myself believe that Mao Tse-
Tung’s [sic] China will in the outcome subordinate its communism to its nationalist, one 
might also say racial, expansionism.”47 It was, according to Crocker, only natural for 
people like the Chinese, just as it had been for the Japanese, to seek to expand their 
power and holdings in the region. This fear drove Australia to align itself so closely with 
American policy. Memories of 1941 certainly were in the minds of leaders in Canberr in 
October 1950. The potential threat of a new Asian power sweeping down from the north 
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to overthrow White Australia would have overshadowed almost all other concerns for 
Australian officials as well as the public. Because of this, Australia turned again to the 
United States, just as it had done in 1941, believing that only the U.S. could provide 
adequate security from the new racial threat to the north. 
During World War II, American officials had not considered the Korean 
peninsula to be of any great significant strategic or tactical importance o the defeat of 
Japan. Soviet entrance into the Pacific theatre, as had been promised at Yalta, served to 
change this thinking. The new Truman administration proved to be less inclined to allow 
the Soviet Union to spread its sphere of influence any further into East Asia. This was 
driven mostly by American concerns over the future of the Japanese occupation. The U.S. 
hoped to prevent communist influences from spreading to Japan because of the American 
hope to reintegrate Japan into the world system as a pro-western democratic nation. In 
September of 1945, American forces were hastily dispatched to the peninsula south of the 
38th parallel in order to receive the surrender of Japanese forces there.48  
At the Potsdam Conference, the Big Three reached a decision to unilaterally 
divide Korea along the line of the 38th parallel, in direct contradiction to the decision that 
had been reached at the Cairo Conference in 1943 where it had been decided that Korean 
independence would be restored after the war. Growing tension over the division of 
Europe led many within the American political and military structure to believ  that the 
Soviets had little intention of meeting the pledges made at Potsdam. The situation in 
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Korea was hardened further by the imposition of an artificial deadline, March 31, 1948, 
imposed by the United Nations to hold national elections. The U.S. used this as an 
opportunity to convene elections that were boycotted by the Soviet Union. This resulted 
in the election of a conservative, anti-communist government in the south under the 
leadership of 70 year-old Syngman Rhee, an ardent nationalist but one who believed in 
the reunification of Korea under his vision only. In the Soviet zone of occupation, a new 
pro-communist government headed by Kim Il-Sung, a young communist insurgent who 
had gained a reputation fighting alongside Mao Zedong in China against the Japanese 
during World War II, came into existence to challenge the pro-western regime to th  
south. Korea had become, for all intents and purposes, an Asian Germany.49 
Between the years 1948 and 1950 sporadic fighting along the border between the 
two states was a constant fact of life. American officials began to develop a concern over 
the possibility that the U.S. would be dragged into a war by the provocative actions of 
Rhee. To this end the Truman administration decided to provide no heavy military 
material to the South Korean government and in 1949 President Truman ordered the 
removal of all U.S. occupation forces from South Korea. The growing tension over 
Europe drew American attention away from Asia. In fact, in a much publicized spech in 
January 1950, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously refrained from 
listing Korea as a region integral to American security planning. These two vents, along 
with the seeming American unwillingness to support Chiang Kai-Shek’s collapse in 
China in 1949, led Kim during the winter and early spring of 1950 to push for Soviet 
acquiescence in an invasion of the south. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin gave a qualified 
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agreement but warned Kim that the Soviet Union would not openly help North Korea if 
the invasion went awry.50 
The North Korean invasion began on the early morning of June 25, 1950 when 
231,000 members of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th parallel 
supported by heavy artillery, tanks and air power. The lightly armed South Korean 
defense forces proved to be no match and were quickly overrun. The North Korean 
invasion caught many within the Truman administration off guard but they responded 
with surprising speed. Just a few hours after the invasion, the American delegation to the 
United Nations Security Council secured Council approval of a resolution denouncing the 
North Korean invasion and asking for U.N. member nations to provide assistance to the 
South Koreans. Only the absence of the Soviet delegation, which had been boycotting 
Security Council meetings over the refusal to seat the new Communist Chinese regime as 
the legitimate government of China, made the passage of the resolution possible. On June 
27, 1950, Truman ordered American ground, air and naval forces into battle to help stem 
the tide of the North Korean onslaught but by the late summer of 1950, American and 
South Korean forces were trapped within a small perimeter around the southern port of 
Pusan.  
The American decision to counter the North Korean invasion directly was almost 
certainly driven by the need to “demonstrate to the Soviet Union as well as to America’s 
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allies that the United State would respond decisively to any Communist challenge.” 51 Th  
reaction of American allies was of great importance to the Truman administration. Many 
in Washington were convinced that the North Korean invasion had been undertaken at 
the behest of Moscow and was simply a distraction for the opening of a general offnsive 
in Europe. The U.S. could ill afford to have the whole of its attention focused on Asia at 
this time and also wanted to the use the war in Korea as a way to test the effectiveness of 
the United Nations as a peacekeeping entity. 
While Australia was caught equally off guard by the North Korean invasion, the 
reaction in Canberra was milder than in Washington. This is explained by the fact that the 
early Cold War had brought a plethora of security issues to Australia’s attention. The 
burgeoning communist insurgency in Malaya, growing threats to British Commonwealth 
interests in the Middle East, the continued struggle to conclude a formal peace with Japan 
and the pursuit of a formal security alliance with the U.S. all served to divide Australia’  
attention in 1950.52 Elements within the Menzies government argued that the outbreak of 
war gave Australia an opportunity to deal with at least some of the pressing security 
issues facing the nation. Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender recognized the need 
for Australia to make some sort of commitment to the American call for aid. He argued 
that not to do so could jeopardize Australian – American relations and he pointed to the 
criticism by the Americans of the British government who had taken a cautious approach 
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to committing themselves to the war. Australia, Spender warned, could ill-afford to be 
too closely identified with London at the time.53 
A confidential report prepared for the Prime Minister’s office highlighted this 
issue further. The British government intimated to the Australians British caution “about 
becoming too involved in a situation which might develop beyond the boundaries of 
Korea. In these circumstances there is a strong presumption that, should the Americans 
require some support for their unilateral action, they will turn to Australia.”54 A separate 
report prepared by the Department of External Affairs highlighted the importance of 
responding to the Korean crisis in light of Australia’s commitment to the United Nations. 
As a member Australia should at least make “a token contribution to the efforts being 
made.”55 It was clear that Australia would benefit from answering the American call for 
aid in Korea but the question of the degree of aid was one that was more difficult to 
answer. The Australians, much like the Americans, had embarked on a demobilizatin 
program in the postwar period and had focused their efforts on increasing the domestic 
population through immigration from Europe as well as supporting the British fight 
against communist insurgents in Malaya. 
It was decided that the Australian 77th Fighter Squadron, stationed in Japan as part 
of the skeletal BCOF, as well as vessels of the Royal Australian Navy would be placed at 
the disposal of the United Nations command. The 77th Fight Squadron saw almost 
immediate action in providing ground support for retreating American and South Korean 
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forces in July 1950. This initial offering by the Australian government was met with 
gratitude by officials in Washington. A cable from the Department of External Affairs to 
the Australian embassy in Washington related that the State Department was genuinely 
gratified with the promptness of the Australian response and that there was a heightened 
sense of Australia’s worth as an ally within the State Department.56 Menzies’s 
government quickly discovered, however, that the American demand for military support 
in Korea would not be satisfied by a squadron of Mustang fighters or a few naval 
cruisers. American military planners pressed for the commitment of ground forces from 
the other United Nations members, Australia among them. The Australians faced a 
distinct quandary, namely how to balance the demands of the United States with their 
own security plans.  
Robert Menzies used his appearance before the U.S. House of Representatives to 
address this issue head on. His speech articulated an Australian position that sought to 
please all parties while offending none. He told the assembled American lawmakers: 
We, as you know, in Australia are not rich in manpower. We feel that our people 
when they go to war are first class fighters. But we are not rich in manpower. We 
are not rich in standing armies or immediately available resources … As fara  
ground forces are concerned, I think I can say this to you: our capacity is limited. 
We have no substantial standing army, and troops for service abroad must 
therefore, in the normal course, be specially enlisted, trained and equipped. But in 
my talks with your leaders here it has been completely agreed that the time factor 
is so important in Korea that a comparatively small force, speedily trained, 
equipped and dispatched, is better than a larger force postponed for many 
months.57 
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It should be noted that this stance was not one that Menzies initially favored. He had 
hoped to limit the Australian commitment to air and naval forces, especially since 
London had indicated no willingness to provide ground troops of their own. However, 
when he left for his trip to the United Kingdom and the United States in July 1950, 
Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender used this opportunity to hound Arthur 
Fadden, Menzies’s deputy, to provide for Australian ground forces. This move was 
prompted by intimations of a change of position in London. Spender wanted to avoid 
being upstaged by his British counterparts and to make sure that Australia got in first to 
receive the whole of American gratitude. Menzies was informed by radiogram of the 
decision of the Australian cabinet shortly before he arrived in New York City. Faced with 
this fait accompli, Menzies had little choice but to publicly endorse the Australian 
position in Washington. 
 Privately, Menzies continued to gripe about the level of Australian commitment, 
which he felt was limiting Australia’s ability to respond to new global crises. He wrote to 
Truman expressing Australia’s commitment to the Korean operation but also took the 
opportunity to point out “frankly that to us it would seem a serious mistake to impair, by 
sending additional ground forces to Korea, our prospects of full readiness to carry out 
responsibilities in the event of global war. It is impracticable to supply such additional 
forces without impairing our training program and our capacity to assist as planned in the 
Middle East.”58 As Robert O’Neil points out, Korea, for Menzies, remained a relatively 
                                                          
58 Robert Menzies to Harry Truman, May 15, 1951, SMOF: Korean War Files, Box 5, Truman Library. 
Menzies here is referring to the Australian program of universal military training. It was felt that a l rge 
commitment in Korea would slow the training program by not allowing the utilization of experienced 
combat troops in training centers in Australia. 
226 
 
minor affair that could not be allowed to interfere with Australian efforts t develop its 
strength to meet threats elsewhere around the globe.59 Truman responded to Menzies’s 
arguments by pointing out that any failure in Korea would almost certainly lead to 
increased danger of communist aggression in the Pacific. Because of this, Truman 
reasoned, a maximum effort had to be made in Korea to beat back communist aggression 
once and for all. This clearly meant that the United States expected a continued 
commitment from Australian ground forces in combat.60 
 The Australian military was faced with the dilemma of how many troops it could 
supply and how fast. Longstanding Australian legal precedent only allowed for the use of 
volunteer troops outside of Australia. This hampered the push to get Australian troops on 
the ground quickly. It was decided that volunteers from the 3rd Royal Australian 
Regiment (RAR) stationed in Japan as part of the BCOF would be sought. Even though 
the battalion was underequipped, the Australian Army put the troops through a rapid 
period of training and in late September 1950, the 3rd RAR landed in South Korea. It was 
almost immediately folded into the 27th Commonwealth Brigade under UN command and 
saw immediate action in helping to push North Korean forces back across the 38th 
parallel. In 1952 the 1st RAR was dispatched to Korea and was followed in 1952 by the 
2nd RAR which generally provided reinforcements for the 1st and 3rd RAR.61 
Australian officials continued to press the point throughout the war. In January 
1952, the Australian Army requested the withdrawal of two of its three infantry batalions 
to return to Australia to take part in the universal training program. General Matthew 
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Ridgway, the commander of U.N. forces who had replaced General MacArthur in the 
spring of 1951, vehemently argued against any such move and requested that the State 
Department also not support any such maneuver by the Australians. Ridgway argued that 
such a move could not be undertaken during the armistice talks because of the 
unreliability of the Communist Chinese and North Koreans, who might seek to take 
advantage of a reduction in U.N. ground forces to reinitiate a ground offensive.62 
 Such episodes reveal that, even at the height of the war, Australia sought to exer
its rights as an independent actor in the alliance. And while tensions were raised by the 
question of Australia’s commitment, they never reached the same high levels that had 
happened during World War II. The primary reason for this was, even with concerns over 
Australian security interests, the Menzies government fully believed in and utilized the 
strident anti-communist language used by the United States. American officials observed 
their Australian counterparts as being fellow cold warriors, intent on defeating the spread 
of communism in Asia. Much of the language used by the Australian government was as
much for domestic consumption as it was for international audiences, another simila ity 
shared between the two countries.  
 The Argus (Melbourne) printed an ominous editorial entitled “It Can Happen Here 
…” that warned Australians of the valuable lesson being taught in Korea. “Australians 
had to realize,” the editorial posited, “that they are now witnessing in aggressive 
Communism a movement which was as grave in its implications as the movements which 
preceded the last war. Korea was the perfect illustration of what could happen here if we 
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were not prepared.”63 The attempt to link communism in the postwar period to Nazism or 
Japanese militarism was an effort to garner public support for an aggressive policy of 
preventing communism from spreading further, something which the Allies had failed to 
act vigorously on in World War II. The loss of Korea or any other region in Asia to 
communism would have drastic consequences for the Western world in the minds of both 
American and Australian officials as well as the general public. 
An editorial in the New York Times attempted to explain exactly what the young 
American men in Korea were fighting for. “One filthy, bleary-eyed boy firing a bazooka 
at a Russian-built North Korean tank is defending the freedom of his country and 
everything Americans hold dear as surely as if he were defending the shores of California 
or Virginia against Communist hordes.”64 The idea of possible communist invasion was 
one that was certainly more real for Australians than their American partners a d as such 
the language of containment was especially effective in providing a rationale for the 
Australian support of the American position in Korea. In a broadcast on the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation in March 1951, General Edmund Herring urged Australians to 
understand the simple facts of geography. Herring agreed that Korea appeared far way 
on a map to the average Australian. But, he urged, “look at your maps and you will see
that Indochina is the gateway to Siam, Burma, Malaya, and so on to Sumatra, Java and 
New Guinea. And we know only too vividly from the last war just what New Guinea 
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means to Australia.”65 The reference to New Guinea again was a reminder to Australians 
of the fear that the nation had lived under during World War II and was a tactic often 
employed by the Australian government. A dispatch from the Department of External 
Affairs highlighted this point by drawing a comparison between Korea and the 
Rhineland. “As we stated before,” the dispatch stated, “we feel that just as in he case of 
Hitler and the Rhineland, the Russian venture in Korea is a gigantic trial balloon to test
Western reaction.”66 The harkening back to World War II also allowed the Americans 
and Australians to reintroduce another ideological factor that had proven to be central to 
their burgeoning relationship between 1941 and 1945: race. 
 The Korean War could not help but bring back memories of fighting the Japanese 
a mere eight years earlier. Of course, for the Americans the Japanese h d b come central 
allies in the Cold War in Asia and the U.S. had proven itself adept at quickly putting the 
animosity of the war behind it.67 Australians were still not convinced that the spirit of 
militarism which had animated the Japanese during World War II had been completely 
broken by the American occupation but they, just as the Americans, quickly transferred 
their long standing racial fears concerning the “yellow peril” to the North Koreans and 
more importantly, after October 1950, to the Chinese. Stories of atrocities carried out 
against U.N prisoners by the Communist Chinese brought back memories of Japanese 
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atrocities. A wounded American soldier, Jackie Brooks, recounted the story of how his 
convoy was attacked by Chinese forces during the December withdrawal by U.N. forces 
from North Korea. Brooks recalled that, “They’d [the Chinese] pour petrol and set it on 
fire and run around the truck yelling like a bunch of wild Indians. I could see their facs 
lit by the flames. All were grinning and laughing. They turned over one truck and ran 
over the wounded.”68  
American and Australian papers were filled with stories similar to this throughout 
late 1950 and into early 1951 as the war see-sawed back and forth between the two sides. 
Atrocity reports stoked furor in both nations, leading some American lawmakers to call 
for breaking off peace negotiations at Panmunjom “with the ‘sub-barbarian’ 
communists.”69 Another interesting intersection of race and the Korean War centered on 
communist propaganda that painted North Korea and Communist China as liberators of 
the Asian peoples from white domination. This line of reasoning had been a prominent 
part of the rationale that Japan had used during its expansion in World War II. Western 
observers were quick to make note of this fact and actually used it against the 
communists, arguing that it was they, and not the Western powers, who were fighting a 
race war. 70  
One Australian lawmaker, Senator E.B. Maher, wrote to Percy Spender in July 
1950, arguing that the war in Korea might possibly provide an outlet for future Japanese 
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aggression. Maher suggested that Japan be encouraged to attack Manchuria, as it had in 
1931. The reason, Maher concluded, was “the Japanese population is expanding at the 
rate of one million new Japs every year. If they do not spill over into Manchuria, then 
inevitably they will look southwards sooner or later.”71 The latent fear of Asian 
encroachment towards Australia was something that had not vanished by 1950 or even by 
1952 – 53. Proposals like Maher’s were discounted within government circles but 
underscore a final point on the role of race in the Korean War, namely how newly 
independent non-white nations of the world viewed Western actions in the war. 
Of primary concern was the reaction of India, which by 1950 under the leadership 
of Jawaharlal Nehru had become the leading proponent of neutralism in the Cold War 
and a leading voice for the non-aligned nations of the globe. India had offered its services 
as a mediator between the U.S. and Communist China but had consistently been rebuffed 
by Washington, which viewed Nehru with distrust. Initially, Indian reaction to the United 
Nations response in Korea had been positive but by 1951, with the emergence of a 
protracted stalemate, Indian popular opinion began to turn. Key to this was increased 
reliance by American and UN forces on heavy firepower in the form of artillery and 
bombing, the infamous “meat grinder” tactics developed by Matthew Ridgway. Both 
American and Australian foreign policy officials noted the change in the mood of India.
A special report prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research highlighted the changes 
in the Indian press’s coverage of the war. The report cited claims that American and UN 
tactics had “been carried out in a vengeful, terrorist spirit,” and asserted that Western 
powers had shown “special solicitude towards the European enemy” during World War II 
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but demonstrated no such restraint in dealing with an Asian people.72 Reactions such as 
this contributed to a growing division between the Western powers and the emerging 
Third World nations who would find themselves torn between the two poles of the Cold 
War.73 
The bloody fighting in Korea brought the U.S. and Australia once again into close 
cooperation. The combined effort of both nations was not without contention, especially 
over the strategic approach used by the U.S. However, the Korean War provided 
Australia with a unique opportunity to expand its relationship with the U.S. and to 
achieve a favorable outcome to two key security issues that had dominated the American 
– Australian alliance since World War II: a formal peace treaty with Japan nd the 
signing of a formal security alliance between the two powers. Both of these issues were 
intimately linked together for both countries. It would be in the search for a successf l 
conclusion to these issues that Australia and the United States would become inextricably 
bound together for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
The issue of the formal peace with Japan was something that had been broached 
by the Americans prior to the Korean War but had been rebuffed by the Australian 
government. The two primary reasons for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the 
Australians were that the proposed treaty contained no mechanism to limit the possible 
rebirth of Japanese military aggression and did not address the issue of reparations for 
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those nations who suffered because of Japanese aggression.74 Both of these issues had to 
be addressed by the U.S. if any progress were to be made on the peace treaty. Ini ially, 
though, Washington felt little reason to give in to what were seen as inordinate demands 
by the Australian government. 
 Washington policymakers consistently assured their Canberra counterparts that 
the American-led occupation of Japan had succeeded in rooting out the spirit of 
militarism that had guided the Japanese war effort during World War II. This point was 
met with skepticism by many Australians, both in government and among the common 
people. Richard Casey confided to his personal diary that, “It must be remembered that 
the Japanese have shown themselves to be a traditionally warlike and vigorous people 
and it is hard to believe that this will disappear in a short time.”75 The issue of reparations 
was a far more delicate one. The U.S. wanted to revive the Japanese economy as quickly 
as possible in order to ensure the country did not fall under the sway of communist 
influences. Any reparations paid would detract from that and so the U.S. proved 
unwilling to even discuss such an issue with Japan. The Korean War however, changed 
all of this. American need for Australian political and military support began to outweigh 
their reluctance to address these issues with the Australians. 
The settlement of the issue of a resurgent Japan capable of striking out against its 
Pacific neighbors became irrevocably linked to discussions concerning a wider general 
security arrangement between the U.S. and Australia. A memorandum prepared by th  
State Department pointed out to President Truman that, “There is a continuing strong 
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distrust of Japan in Australia and the Treaty was not popular with the rank and file voters 
of any party because of the absence of restrictions on Japanese rearmaments.”76 
Australian reminders about this worry were commonplace through the discussions over 
the ratification of the peace treaty. Percy Spender reminded Prime Minister Menzies of 
this during the latter’s talks with President Truman in 1950. Spender pointed out that the 
Australian people felt “great bitterness” towards the Japanese for what were seen as their 
barbarous acts during World War II.77 An editorial from The Advertiser (Adelaide) 
mocked American assurances about a new spirit of pacifism that had developed in Japan 
and sought to defend Australian worries about Japanese resurgence. “But is it asking oo 
much of human nature,” the editorial queried, “to expect them to assume that in five 
years the Japanese have become democratic and peace-loving and are now in a mood, as 
Mr. John Foster Dulles said recently, ‘to reject militarism in all its aspects and to enter 
into a fellowship with those nations which genuinely seek peace through collective 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations’.”78 The seeming leap of 
faith that the U.S. was asking of Australia was something which seemed impossible. 
During the formal treaty meeting in San Francisco in 1951, the Australian deegation 
consistently raised this point time and again with their American counterparts. 
Australians believed only when Americans acknowledged that their fears were well 
grounded would any progress be made on the treaty.  
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American officials would eventually begin to make attempts to assuage Australian 
fears and to demonstrate that the United States was as keenly concerned with Australia’s 
security as were the Australians themselves. During a meeting with Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs John Allison on December 11, 1951, Richard Casey inquired 
as to why the U.S. was so sure that Japan would not pose a threat to Australia. Allison 
pointed out two main reasons why the U.S. felt Australian fears were ungrounded. The 
first was economic. The Japanese, Allison pointed out, worried that rearmament might 
impair their ability to raise their own standard of living. The second point Allison made 
was that the Japanese people were every bit as afraid of a revived militarism as were the 
Australians. The dire consequences that World War II had for Japan had convinced the 
vast majority of the people that their nation’s military exploits in World War II had not 
been worth the military punishment the nation had received.79 The Japanese government 
itself sought to ally fears about a resurgence of militarism within that country. Japanese 
leaders argued that nations like Australia had little reason to fear aggression from Japan 
because it was Japan itself that was most in fear of aggression by communist regimes in 
China and North Korea.80 
Other American officials also sought to calm Australian worries. In a 
conversation with interim ambassador to the UN, Philip C. Jessup, General Omar 
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wanted it made clear to the Australian 
government that the U.S. intended to always hold the line of Okinawa and the Philippines 
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“come hell or high water.”81 In a radio address carried over the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, John Foster Dulles admitted that Americans perhaps had a difficult time 
understanding Australia’s preoccupation with a rearmed Japan but that he and other 
leaders in the U.S. had come to recognize the fear that Australia had was a real one. 
Australia, Dulles stated, “had felt the hot breath of Japan’s war effort” and “the 
possibility of another Japanese invasion seemed a reality to those who had recently
experienced that danger first hand.”82 Dulles’s recognition of the importance of this issue 
for the Australians led him to conclude that “Australia and New Zealand will give way if 
we can find some formula for assuring them of U.S. protection in the event of attack.”83 
The formula that would emerge at the urging of the Australians was a formal defensiv  
alliance, something that Australia had been seeking from the U.S. since the 1930s. Only 
such an agreement would make a lenient peace with Japan palatable to the Australian 
people whose support was necessary for the passage of any such treaty in the Australian 
parliament.84 
But before any such agreement could move forward the thorny issue of 
reparations had to be settled. The Menzies government, much like its Labor predecessor, 
pushed for Australian claims to reparations payments for Australian citizens who had 
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suffered in Japanese prison camps as well as for the destruction of Australian property by 
the Japanese. Ambassador Percy Spender emphasized this point in a conversation with 
John Foster Dulles. Spender remarked that Australia found American emphasis on the 
resurrection of the Japanese economy at the expense of payments to prisoner of war to be 
somewhat bewildering.85 When the United States proved unwilling to accommodate the 
Australian demands for reparations, the Menzies government took the step of seizing 
Japanese assets in Australia and liquidating them. The profits from the sale ofthese 
holdings would be distributed among former prisoners of war with a small percentage 
being set aside to provide for Australian citizens who had also suffered at the hands of the 
Japanese.86 
Actions like this caused consternation in Washington. Unlike their Australian 
counterparts, American officials had a first-hand understanding of how tenuous the 
Japanese economic recovery of the late 1940s and early 1950s was. In many ways it was 
an economic recovery being funded primarily by the American government. Most in 
Washington held that to force reparations payments from Japan would be to simply have 
the U.S. pay the bill, albeit indirectly. American officials were also suspicious of 
Australian claims for reparations for a separate reason. Some observers f lt that the 
Australian protests over the issue were not motivated by altruism but rather by a craving 
for lessened economic competition in the Pacific region. One of several background 
memorandums prepared for President Truman prior to his first meeting with Menzies 
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underscored this American suspicion. “In principle,” the memo stated, “Australia accepts 
the need for permitting Japan to again become self-supporting through revived industrial 
production and trade. At the same time the fear of commercial competition with Japan 
has caused Australia to oppose steps which we have believed necessary to make the 
Japanese economy self-supporting.”87 This view was reminiscent of the same suspicions 
that had clouded the relationship between the two powers during World War II over lend-
lease materials being used by the Australians to develop a competitive economic 
advantage for the postwar period.  
It was only the exigencies of the Korean War that forced the U.S. to come to an 
accommodation of Australian demands. Australia’s willingness to be one of the first 
nations to offer military aid, especially ground forces, had served the Menzies 
government well. Opinion in Washington had begun to swing in favor of establishing a 
more formal defense relationship with Australia in order to gain what the U.S. saw as an 
important step in constructing a strong defensive perimeter in the Pacific against the 
spread of communism. Robert O’Neill declared that both nations recognized what they 
had to gain from putting aside their sometimes obstinate support for their own positions 
and reaching a middle ground.88 What emerged from the discussions between American 
and Australian representatives during the 1951 San Francisco Conference representd a 
step forward in the relationship between the U.S. and Australia. Article 14 of the treaty is 
most representative of this forward movement. It stated: 
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It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the 
damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless, it is also 
recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to 
maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparations for all such damage and 
suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.89 
 
Both the Australian and the American viewpoints are encapsulated in Article 14. For the 
first time, Australia had achieved a longtime goal, equal treatment for its viewpoint from 
the U.S. and had gained the promise of a formal defensive alliance between the two 
nations. The U.S. for its part had gained the Japanese the time and resources necessary to 
reestablish their economy on sound footing without the specter of reparations payments.  
 The ANZUS (Australian – New Zealand – United States) tripartite agr ement that 
emerged from the debates over the Japanese peace treaty was at once the culmination of 
Australian aspirations but at the same time it fell short of being the all encompassing 
alliance that had been worked for by a generation of Australian leaders. Many critics 
have looked at ANZUS as a simple diplomatic quid pro quo, an example of pragmatic 
choices being made by both sides. But this rather simplistic viewpoint hides the subtl ties 
of the debate that went on between Canberra and Washington in fashioning such an 
agreement. Factors related to the Korean War, the growing threat of Communist Chi a, 
plus concerns over the West’s ability to meet communist threats around the globe all 
played an important role in the creation of ANZUS.90 In an interview in 1964, Percy 
Spender addressed the issue of the supposed quid pro quo directly. “So often I’ve heard 
this so-called deal spoke about by people who want to write their stories – or have written 
their stories in newspapers and elsewhere,” Spender stated, “I think it’s even ben 
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repeated in some of the published books about it. Nothing was further from the truth. It 
was a matter of cold, hard politics – that’s all. No deal was made of that kind at all.” 91 
Spender’s claim that ANZUS was not a backroom deal struck to secure Australian 
support for the lenient peace with Japan holds up upon examination. The alliance was 
warmly received in Canberra but would come to cause several major headaches for both
the Australians and their new American allies. 
 Two key factors came to complicate the ANZUS relationship and contributed to 
the alliance never truly fulfilling the role that Australian policymakers envisioned for it. 
The issue of how Australia’s relationship with Great Britain would be affected vis-à-vis 
ANZUS was the largest problem. Almost from the beginning the question of membership 
in ANZUS became a point of contention between the U.S. and Australia. For their part, 
the U.S. hoped to include the Philippines as a member state, something which Australia 
opposed for fear of the loss of American focus on their nation. In return, the U.S. clearly 
made it known that they would not support British membership in ANZUS, even though 
the British could make the argument that they held as great an interest in the Pacific 
region as did the Philippines. The decision to exclude Great Britain also certainly 
represented a continuation of American post-World War II fears concerning eco omic 
competition from the British in the Pacific.  
 The Australian government proved amenable to the exclusion of Great Britain, 
partly because ANZUS provided an avenue to focus American attention on the Pacific
region at the expense of Europe. In many ways, the situation that arose mirrored that 
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which had come to exist during World War II when both the British and Australians 
fought over a finite amount of American aid. The Menzies government accepted that in 
order for the Pacific to maintain a place of prominence in American planning tha cert in 
sacrifices were to be made, among them a more contentious relationship with London.92 
Australia would have to play a careful balancing game between London and Washington. 
Menzies and his government could ill afford the anger Washington at this moment but 
also did not want to permanently harm British Commonwealth relations.  
To the British, the Australians presented their exclusion from ANZUS in terms of 
its effect on the Americans. An editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald outlined this 
rationale for its readers, “Unfortunately, any widening of the Pact which would have 
extended America’s military commitments to territories on the mainland of Asia was 
unacceptable to Washington for purely strategic reasons.”93 To the Americans, Menzies 
made the argument that ANZUS actually served to strengthen the American anti-
communist wall in Europe because it allowed Great Britain to focus its few resourc  
there rather than have to worry about providing for the defense of the British 
Commonwealth in the Pacific.94 In many ways, Australia practiced the diplomatic 
equivalent of throwing their hands in the air and telling both the British and Americans 
that they could not be blamed for the position that they had adopted concerning Britain’s 
membership in ANZUS. 
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Such arguments, though, fell on deaf ears in London. Winston Churchill, who had 
returned to power as Prime Minister in Great Britain in 1951, began to push Canberra on 
this issue of British exclusion from ANZUS.95 The ANZUS alliance for the British 
represented a threat to the British Commonwealth relationships that had become a 
cornerstone of British foreign policy in the post World War II period. Australia, nd New 
Zealand to a lesser extent, could now look outside of the British Commonwealth for aid. 
Churchill and other British leaders were also worried about how Australia’s dalliances 
with the U.S. might affect India’s own views about how it should interact with the British 
Commonwealth. If Australia could turn to the U.S. for security in the Cold War then the 
policy of neutralism pursued by Jawaharlal Nehru certainly could not be criticized by 
London.96  
The possibility of a security alliance between the U.S. and Australia had first been 
broached at the British Commonwealth meeting in Colombo in January 1950. The 
reaction from the British delegation was immediately negative but could not be term d 
confrontational in any real sense.97 The tone of the debate, though, had changed greatly 
by late 1951. Many within the Australian government came to see British opposition as 
being not so much about Britain’s interest in Pacific affairs than being an attempt o 
reestablish imperial control over a former colony. Richard Casey posed the question in 
his personal diary whether “one might well ask whether membership of the [British] 
                                                          
95 It can be argued that Churchill’s aggressive stance can be explained from his own personal dislike for 
Robert Menzies going back to their interactions in 1939 – 40. See David Day, Menzies and Churchill at 
War (New York, 1994). 
96 Barclay, Friends in High Places, 41. 
97 O’Neil, Australia in the Korean War 1950 – 53 Vol. I, 192. 
243 
 
Commonwealth precludes any of us from having any friends outside.”98 A government 
report on the British reaction to ANZUS highlighted the fact that by 1953, Australia h d 
come to see Great Britain as an antagonist when it came to ANZUS. “The United 
Kingdom,” the report stated, “desires to circumscribe Australia’s influence in the Pacific 
and growing closer relationship with the United States of America.”99 British opposition, 
in Australian opinion, had moved from being about British interests to a clear attempt o 
curtail Australia’s role as a Pacific power.  Australian leaders had fought since the 1930s 
to have London view them as the leader of British Commonwealth interests in the 
Pacific. As Percy Spender told John Foster Dulles in a conversation during the ANZUS 
negotiations, “We live in the Pacific.”100 The debate over ANZUS only represented 
another chapter in the long on going battle between the old imperial center and the former 
colonial outpost. 
Washington for its part found itself in an unenviable position of trying to mediate 
between two powers that were deemed essential to the growing fight against world 
communism. Because of this, the American government generally adopted a position of 
neutrality in the fight between London and Canberra. Many American leaders secretly 
welcomed the Australian position concerning not wanting to further expand the possible 
commitments entailed by ANZUS by allowing the British to join in. This three way fight 
over membership helped to undercut the effectiveness of ANZUS because it drew 
attention away from practical matters that the alliance could have focused on in favor of 
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dealing with more procedural issues.101 The membership question also tied into the 
second factor that helped to lessen the effectiveness of the alliance. 
Two major wars in the eastern Pacific against Asian forces and the close 
relationship that had been forged with Australia had served to make American 
policymakers more cognizant of race and the role it played in American foreign policy. 
Race had become a sore spot for American leaders by the early 1950s. The internal racial 
problems of the U.S. provided the Soviet Union and Communist China with an almost 
endless source of propaganda material by the mid 1950s. Critics of American claims to 
be the champions of liberty and democracy pointed out that large segments of the 
American domestic population could not claim to enjoy those same rights that America 
sought to bring to the wider world. The problem became so acute that American 
ambassador to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. famously remarked that racial 
discrimination was the U.S.’s “Achilles heel before the world.”102 The issue of race had 
become central to American foreign policy by 1951 – 52 and because of this ANZUS 
came under intense scrutiny by American policymakers and their Australian counterparts. 
H.W. Brands, Jr. highlighted the problem that American policymakers faced in 
dealing with ANZUS. The alliance, to many in Asia, was seen as “an alliance of 
predominantly white nations” and highlighted for the newly independent nations of Asia 
and Africa the continued intent of white nations to control their foreign policy with no 
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acceptance of the existence of these new Third World nations.103 American policymakers 
were deeply aware of this perception, however, and sought to counter the perception of 
the alliance as a white man’s pact. The first measure proposed by the U.S. was to convert 
ANZUS from tripartite agreement into a more loosely affiliated, regional alli nce 
including the Philippines and even Japan. However, such a move was strenuously 
opposed by Canberra. There are two possible explanations for this stance. First, it mu t 
be kept in mind that ANZUS was the culmination of nearly twenty years of foreign 
policy maneuvering by Australia. The development of a more reciprocal relationship with 
the U.S. that provided for both Australian security as well as recognition of Australia’  
role as a regional power was central to both ends of the political spectrum in Australia. 
Any expansion of the alliance would serve only to dilute that special relationship and 
influence. A second rationale was the pervasive racial fear that Australia continued to 
display towards the non-white nations of the region. The end of colonialism in Southeast 
Asia served to heighten Australian concerns over the future of White Australia. In re lity, 
both factors contributed to the Australian stance. The U.S., though, chose to focus solely 
on the racial aspect, demonstrating how deeply race had become bound up in the 
American – Australian bond. 
The American State Department continually pushed the idea of including nations 
like the Philippines in ANZUS as a way to undercut criticism of the pact by non-white 
nations. The American government highlighted what it saw as the political value for 
Australia in participating in such a regional organization but for the Australians the idea 
                                                          
103 H.W. Brands, Jr., “From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy Towards Australia and New 
Zealand, 1952 – 1954,” International History Review 9 (1987): 251. 
246 
 
of expanding ANZUS “served no immediate political purpose.”104 In meetings with 
Australian ambassador Sir Percy Spender, American officials such as Assistant Secretary 
of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk continually stressed the American thinking on 
the subject, pointing out to the Australians that the U.S. “would not wish an exclusively 
white association and regarded participation of Asiatics as essential.”105 One point that is 
important to understand is that the American push for including non-white nations into 
ANZUS was not motivated by any sort of altruistic attitude about the relationsh p 
between the white powers of the Pacific and the newly independent non-white states. It 
was in fact motivated by far more selfish reasons, namely to keep those new states from 
slipping into the Soviet sphere. The neutrality of nations such as India was already 
disconcerting for the U.S. and it was worried that an agreement like ANZUS would 
provide more propaganda for the Soviet Union and Communist China to use to sway 
opinion in the region. Washington even enlisted the aid of Great Britain in trying to 
persuade Canberra of this point.106 
The issue of the Philippines inclusion in ANZUS in particular caused dissension 
between Washington and Canberra. With the longstanding relationship that existed 
between the Philippines and the U.S., Australian concerns over their own position in 
ANZUS were certainly understandable. But observers in Manila found it difficult to 
separate Australian protectiveness of their place in ANZUS from the issue of race. 
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Tempers flared and there was talk of severing ties between the two nations over 
Australia’s resistance to allowing the Philippines to join the alliance. Reports from 
Australian embassies throughout eastern Asia gave widespread testimony to the gr wing 
anger aimed at Australia by the Filipinos. A cable from the Australian embassy in Tokyo 
revealed just how far the Filipino government had allowed anger within the country to 
boil up. A motion had been presented in the Filipino Senate to close their legation in 
Canberra, thus severing diplomatic relations with Australia. This move, the cable st ted, 
was a direct “Filipino reaction to reports that Australia bitterly opposed any alliance with 
non-Caucasian nations for racial reasons.”107 
Washington reacted in much the same manner as they had to the issue of allowing 
Great Britain to join. In some ways, the imbroglio over the Philippines provided the U.S. 
with the opportunity to shape the alliance into a form which was much more comfortable 
for Washington. The perception of ANZUS as a “white man’s pact” provided another 
tool for the U.S. to use to keep Great Britain out of Pacific affairs and ensure one lss 
economic competitor in the region.108 It also allowed the U.S. to maintain some distance 
from the alliance, to not commit to the relationship as fully as Canberra would have liked. 
ANZUS became for each party something different. For Australians, the formal treaty 
represented the promise of security from a revived Japan and acceptance of its role as a 
                                                          
107 Australian Embassy, Tokyo to Department of External Affairs, May 20, 1952, Department of External 
Affairs Records, Series # A1838, Control # TS686/1 Part 2, NAA. 
108 Brands, Jr., “From ANZUS to SEATO,” 261. 
248 
 
Pacific power. For the U.S., the alliance became another block in the growing defensive 
wall being erected to contain the spread of communism.109 
ANZUS represented the culmination of a twenty year courtship between two 
powers who often found themselves more often at odds than in agreement. The 
relationship between Australia and the U.S. between 1950 and 1953 was a microcosm of 
the relationship as a whole. Race, which had formed a cornerstone of how each nation 
came to see and understand the others position, was again put on display during the 
Korean War and the creation of ANZUS. This three year period also demonstrated how 
seamlessly race bled over into an ideology of anti-communism. These two factors had, by 
1953, become indispensable to the American – Australian bond but still did not make it a 
relationship devoid of friction. Both parties still insisted on pursuing their own aims in 
the Pacific but by 1953, through both rational choices and irrational fears, had come to 
rely on each other as central pillars of both their Pacific and world wide foreign policy. 









                                                          





The twentieth century wrought great changes in how the U.S. approached its 
interactions with the wider world. The nation moved from a position of reserved 
unilateralism, as evidenced by Woodrow Wilson’s decision to fight in World War I as an 
associated rather than an allied power, to by 1953 being one of the world’s two great 
superpowers. One of the central explanations for this change was the move towards a 
multilateral approach to dealing with the wider world. World War II fundamentally 
altered American military and foreign policy thinking about the country’s ability to 
pursue a vigorous foreign policy alone. U.S. policymakers found that alliances were not 
just something for wartime expediency and that the new world order that came into 
existence post-1945 forced the U.S. to actively pursue the creation of alliance systems.1 It 
is worth noting that John Foster Dulles, one of the principal architects of American Cold 
War foreign policy and nuclear deterrence, cited alliances even ahead of deterrence as 
“the cornerstone of security for the free nations.”2 
The topic of alliances and alliance building has received some consideration from 
historians, generally within the context of the creation of wartime alliances or the larger 
alliance systems of the twentieth century, NATO being a prime example. This 
historiography, though, still has several areas that need to be filled in with more 
examination. Namely, the issues of American alliances with individual British 
Commonwealth nations and a deeper examination of the role of ideology in alliances are 
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prominent areas which require further study. This work has attempted to add to our 
understanding in both areas. First, it is clear that American policymakers them elves 
often struggled with the question of how to approach Australia, whether as an 
independent actor or as part of the larger association of the British Commonwealth. 
Examining the period between 1933 and 1953 it is clear that more often than not, it was 
the Australian government and people who took the lead in establishing their own 
independent alliance with the U.S. It must be acknowledged that Great Britain played a 
role the development of this bond but more often as a foil against which the Australians 
presented themselves to the U.S. as a more appealing partner in the Pacific region. The 
U.S. slowly over the twenty year period acceded to the fact that Australia was  nation 
that had to be included in any American plans in the Pacific region as well as rcognition 
of Australia’s important global role in any possible armed conflict with the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.3 The American – Australian bond forged in this period 
demonstrates the complex interplay between diplomatic pragmatism on the one hand and 
ideological conviction on the other. 
Over the past twenty-five years, American diplomatic historians have granted 
more attention to the powerful role that ideology has played in American foreign policy. 
Often, these studies focus on a strain of ideology in American diplomacy that is labeled 
as “Wilsonianism.”4 This term has never been well defined by historians and has served 
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as a catchall phrase that includes varying elements of the American progressive 
movement, itself an amorphous term, internationalism as well as religious and racial 
aspects. It is this last point that stands out most in this study. Race as a distinct element 
within American foreign policy has been noted by numerous historians, among them 
Michael Hunt, Akira Iriye and Michael L. Krenn to name a few. Often though, the issue 
of race has been presented strictly in terms of American interactions with non-white 
groups. While this road of inquiry has contributed much to our understanding of 
American views on race and how this translates into action in the foreign policy sphere it 
has overlooked an equally important aspect of race as an ideology in foreign policy, 
namely how race was used to construct relations with other predominantly white nations. 
Some might argue that this topic has not been deserving of study because there is 
no real complexity in the relationship between the U.S. and other white nations. It is 
assumed that simply because both nations are primarily white or European then any 
relationship that develops will not be focused on race. This is a somewhat narrow sighted 
view. First, it must be kept in mind that to identify the U.S. as a wholly “white” natio  
ignores the realities of historical development in the country.5 The evolution of the 
American nation has been the result of complex and contentious relationships between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Baltimore, 2008), John 
Ikenberry, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, 
2009) and Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American Strategy for 
Peace & Security (Kent, OH, 2009). 
5 Some works to consult on the multi-racial formation of the United States include Gary Nash, Red, White, 
and Black: The Peoples of Early North America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982), James Axtell, The Invasion 
Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York, 1985), Roger Daniels, Not Like 
Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890 -1924 (Chicago, 1997), Thomas Gossett, Race: The 
History of an Idea in America (New York, 1997), Susan Scheckel, The Insistence of the Indian: Race and 
Nationalism in Nineteenth Century America (Princeton, 1998), Arnoldo Vento, Mestizo: The History, 
Culture, and Politics of the Mexican and the Chicano: the Emerging Mestizo – Americans (Lanham, MD, 
1998) and Frank Wu, Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White (N w York, 2002). 
252 
 
numerous racial groups. While European whites have maintained a dominant position in 
the economic and political spheres through much of the country’s history, the society that 
surrounded them drew as much on African, Latin American, Native American and Asian 
sources as it did on Europe.  This approach also ignores the fact that for much of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the question of who exactly was white was open to 
debate in the U.S. and the wider Anglo-Saxon world. The U.S. – Australian friendship 
demonstrates that race was used by Americans, and Australians, to help define 
themselves and their relationship with each other every bit as much as it was used to
define the Other.6 
A study of the U.S. – Australian relationship between 1933 and 1953 also gives 
several insights into the broader topic of alliances and alliance building. One must keep 
in mind when considering the American – Australian alliance that it was as much about 
the internal relations between the two nations as it was about external relations.7 The 
growing American orientation towards the Pacific in the twentieth century meant that 
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eventually the U.S. and Australia would come into contact, and almost certainly conflict, 
over economic resources and political influence in the region. By crafting a bond between 
the two states, American and Australian policymakers helped moderate those level  of 
conflict. It also helped ensure that the U.S. could maintain a tighter control over the 
development of events in the Pacific, most especially after the end of the Pacific War in 
1945. The union between both powers also helped fulfill a crucial function of alliances, 
the maintenance of international order.8 This one factor has been a central theme 
throughout American diplomatic history but became especially crucial in the twentieth 
century.9 
Examining the alliance also reveals an insight into alliance cohesion, specifically 
that alliances that face low levels of internal threat generally have a gr ater chance to 
maintain their cohesiveness after the external threats that had brought the allianc  into 
being had passed.10 This is true in the case of the U.S. and Australia. Even though the 
relationship was a contentious one for long periods and was marked by heightened levels 
of suspicion and even dislike for the other by both parties, at the basic level neither 
country saw the other as a threat. This fact allowed for both countries to maintain 
exceptionally close dealings after the pressures of World War II had subsided. One could 
argue that those pressures were almost immediately replaced by the Cold War but this 
would be an overstatement. Between 1945 and 1950, the Soviet Union or its client states 
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posed no direct threat to the South Pacific region on the same level as the Japanese threat 
of 1941 – 1942. This is evident in the U.S. – Australian relationship as one sees the 
resurfacing of points of contention between the two states as each sought to define its role 
in the postwar Pacific between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold 
War. However, the relationship flourished in spite of those periods of contention and 
acrimony. 
This examination also provides some insight into the nature of coalition warfare. 
Jehuda Wallach’s study of the Triple Entente of World War I detailed the numero s 
shortcomings of fighting a war as part of a multi-state organization. He listed several key 
areas where coalitions often fail during times of war: a divergence of war aims, the 
political – military relationship, a language barrier, amalgamation of forces, development 
of  a unified command structure and the role of public opinion.11 I  each of these areas, 
both the U.S. and Australia overcame the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. A 
study of the bond between both nations provides a possible blueprint to construct a sound 
partnership in times of war.   
On the issue of war aims, there was some divergence between Australia and the 
U.S. over the Europe first strategy favored by Roosevelt and George Marshall. Australian 
fears about the Pacific being abandoned to the mercy of Japan were constantly overstated 
by Canberra, even after the strategic victory achieved at the Battle of th  Coral Sea in 
May 1942. The American decision after 1942 to pursue a limited, but highly effective, 
offensive in the Pacific kept the issue from rupturing the relationship between the two 
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powers as well as providing an avenue for the U.S. to maintain a position of dominance 
in the Pacific over the Australians. The political – military relationship t at developed 
between the two powers was exceptionally close. The prime example of this was the 
symbiotic relationship that emerged between General Douglas MacArthur and Australian 
Prime Minister John Curtin. Both men worked closely together during the war to 
maintain an active front against Japan while still allowing their own particular national 
interests to be met. Claims that Curtin surrendered Australian national sovereignty to 
MacArthur or the Americans do not stand up upon closer examination. Curtin and others 
within his government, most notably Herbert Evatt, struggled to maintain a separate 
identity from the Americans as well as their British cousins. The language or cultural 
barrier that did exist between Americans and Australians did create some conflict. 
However, this study has shown that a larger cultural concept, race, served to bridge those 
cultural divides which did exist between the two peoples.  
World War II and the Korean War demonstrated that the U.S. and Australia had 
learned the important lessons of World War I concerning combined forces and a unified
command structure. Australian troops under the overall command of Douglas MacArthur 
performed brilliantly in Papua and New Guinea, though often with little gratitude from 
MacArthur. In Korea, Australian and American forces demonstrated again their ability to 
be part of an effective multi-national force. This should not be taken to mean that no 
disagreements arose between the two states, especially in Australia’s opinion of 
MacArthur. Both nations initially had low opinions of the other’s ability as a military 
force. However, in each instance the Americans and Australians were able to overcome 
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these differences. The real credit for the effective way in which American and Australian 
forces cooperated must go to those immediate subordinates of MacArthur. Men like 
Robert Eichelberger and George Kenney on the American side and Edmund Herring and 
George Vasey on the Australian smoothed over numerous disruptions between the two 
sides. The importance of individual actions in forging history is amply demonstrated by 
the association of the U.S. and Australia in World War II and Korea.  
Public opinion never became a major issue between the two powers. The 
Australian government and press did a highly effective job of presenting an image of 
their nation as an effective, and more importantly, indispensable partner in the Pacific to 
the American public. The use of racial and familial language that was so prevalent 
through the 1940s and early 1950s helped to create an image of Australia as another 
America, a place where Americans were wanted and would immediately find a place both 
understandable and welcoming. In the end, the American – Australian alliance worked 
because it met the central criteria of alliance building, namely that “an alli nce must 
enhance a nation’s security, or at least not undermine it.”12 This point was of central 
importance to Australia and represented the greatest possible reward of a close
relationship with the U.S. The seemingly never ending search for security was abated for 
Canberra by the development of the trans-Pacific bond with the U.S.  
The prime trophy of this Australian quest for security was ANZUS. The pact 
though never quite lived up to the expectations of Australian policymakers who hoped it 
would provide the final shield to defend their island nation. Instead, the ANZUS 
                                                          
12 Alan Ned Sabrosky, Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 2. 
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relationship initially languished due to the U.S.’s unwillingness to commit fully to the 
alliance and Washington’s insistence on developing other regional alliance p rtn rships. 
A study of the ANZUS pact that emerged from the U.S. – Australian alliance also 
provides an important starting point for discussing the creation of the other major alli nce 
bloc in Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO 
became in many ways what Australia hoped ANZUS would be: a counterpoint to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Unlike ANZUS, SEATO provided a more 
structured understanding of collective defense and military cooperation. Another 
difference was that SEATO was a clearly aimed defensive organizatio  aimed at halting 
the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The U.S. hoped that SEATO would help to 
provide both political legitimacy as well as active military support for U.S. initiatives in 
growing trouble spots such as Vietnam. 
The debates over membership in ANZUS between the U.S. and Australia helped 
to pave the path for a more expansive collective security body in the region. 
Washington’s dissatisfaction with the exclusion of countries like the Philippines and 
Japan made the U.S. more interested in the creation of a far broader alliance system in the 
region. Eventually SEATO would come to include Australia, Bangladesh, France, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Great Britain, France and the U.S. SEATO 
may have been seen as a potential threat to Washington’s special relationship with 
Canberra by Australian leaders. However, they chose to look at SEATO as a way to 
reengage with their Asian neighbors as well as to further demonstrate Australia’s 
leadership position among British Commonwealth nations in the Pacific and Asia. It i  
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worth nothing that Australia also played a key role in another blueprint organization for 
SEATO, the Colombo Plan that was established out of a British Commonwealth 
Conference of Foreign Minister held in Ceylon, Sri Lanka in 1950.  The Colombo Plan, 
like SEATO, was focused primarily on Southeast Asia and the south Pacific. SEATO and 
the Colombo Plan have one striking similarity: both organizations’ primary goal was to 
challenge the spread of communism, SEATO through military power, the Colombo Plan 
through economic and human resource improvement in the region.13 
SEATO was by no means a direct offshoot of ANZUS or the discussions that had 
taken place between the U.S. and Australia in 1951. SEATO was much more directly 
intended to be an anti-communist pact, aimed at curtailing the spread of communism 
throughout Southeast Asia and possibly the Pacific basin whereas ANZUS was a security
guarantee against the resurgence of a militaristic Japan. However, provisions withi  the 
SEATO charter virtually insured that the organization would be unable to meet the 
security demands that both the U.S. and Australia had hoped it would. Unlike NATO, an 
attack on any SEATO nation would not automatically be considered an attack on all 
members. Because of this limitation, the defensive reliability of SEATO was in question 
from the beginning of the organization’s existence. The crises in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam in the late 1950s and 1960s demonstrated the limitations of SEATO in providing 
collective security for the region. By the late 1960s it had become evident to Washington 
that ANZUS and not SEATO would have to be the primary way through which the U.S. 
                                                          
13 Some works to consult on the Colombo Plan include Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The 
ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (New York, 1969), P.R. Chona, The Colombo Plan, 1951: Vision 
Into Reality (Colombo, 1976) and David Lowe and Daniel Oakman, eds., Australia and the Colombo Plan: 
1949 – 1957 (Barton, ACT, 2004). Spender’s work is highly useful since it provides insight from one of the 
principal architects of the Colombo Plan. 
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approached political developments and military challenges in the Pacific.14 And with 
these growing crises in the region, American and Australian forces would find 
themselves once again drawn into combat against another opponent in Asia. 
The Korean War did not mark the last time that American and Australian forces 
fought together in Asia. The close ideological relationship that had come out of the 
period between 1933 and 1953 and supplemented by the political bonds of ANZUS 
brought both nation’s fighting men together in the jungles of Vietnam. The American 
experience in Vietnam has been well documented.15 However, the sheer size of the 
material available creates the impression that Vietnam was only America’s war and 
ignores the fact that Vietnam had an equally significant effect in Australia. Out of a 
population of almost 12 million, over 50,000 Australians served in Vietnam during the 
course of the war with just over 500 dead. These numbers, in comparison to the 
American commitment of just over 2.7 million servicemen during the whole of the 
American commitment, may seem insignificant but hide the fact that the war was just as 
important in transforming Australian society as it was for America.16 
                                                          
14 The literature on SEATO is minimal and the system is often examined within the context of other issues 
such as American and Australian involvement in Vietnam. For works dealing with the establishment of 
SEATO and effectiveness see George Modelski, SEATO, Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962), Justus van der 
Kroef, The Lives of SEATO (Singapore, 1976) and Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance 
Strategy (Singapore, 1983). 
15 Some works to consult include Ronald Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 – 1960 
(Washington D.C., 1983), James Olson and Randy Roberts, Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 
1945 to 1990 (New York, 1996), Robert Buzzanco, Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life 
(Malden, MA, 1999), David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam 
War (Cambridge, MA, 2000), Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New 
York, 2001), George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975 4th 
Ed., (Boston, 2002) and George Donelson Moss, Vietnam, an American Ordeal (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 
2010). 
16 Works to consult on the Australian experience in Vietnam include Henry Albinski, Politics and Foreign 
Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription (Durham, NC, 1970), Glen St. John Barclay, 
A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian Involvement in Vietnam, 1954 – 1967 (St. Lucia, 
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The Australian and American experiences in Vietnam highlight a unique parallel 
with the relationship the two parties had forged during World War II and the Korean 
War. Just as in the previous conflicts, both the U.S. and Australia came to the table with 
very different conceptions of what the war meant to them. For the U.S., as the 
superpower, the fighting in Vietnam was simply another brick in the wall holding back 
the sweep of communist expansion in Asia. Concerns over maintaining France as a stable 
party in Asia and in helping to reintegrate Japan as a viable economic force also played 
roles for the U.S. Australian policymakers, at least initially, took this as the tarting point 
for their commitment. However, Australia was also much more concerned with the effect 
of the war on, and a possible communist victory in, the immediate region.17 Australian 
willingness to send troops into Vietnam was also colored by the memories of the 
communist insurgency in Malaya in the late 1950s.18 These strategic differences would 
lead to increased friction between the two powers over the direction of the war asell  
Australian fears that America’s increasing frustration with the direction of the war might 
lead to the employment of American nuclear weapons.19 Culturally, the war proved to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
QLD, 1988), Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey and Peter Pierce, Australia’s Vietnam War (College Station, TX, 
2002), Andreas Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds., America, the Vietnam War, and the 
World: Comparative and International Perspectives (New York, 2003) and Bruce Davies, The Battle at 
Ngok Tavak: Allied Valor and Defeat in Vietnam (Lubbock, TX, 2008). 
17 Peter Edwards, “The Strategic Concerns of a Regional Power: Australia’s Involvement in Vietnam,” in 
Andreas Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner and Milfried Mausbach, eds., America, the Vietnam War, and the World: 
Comparative and International Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 223 – 224. 
18 Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey and Peter Pierce, Australia’s Vietnam War (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2002), 7.
19Edwards, “The Strategic Concerns of a Regional Power,” in Daum, Gardner and Mausbach,, eds., 
America, the Vietnam War, and the World , 227. This was also a serious point of worry for the Australian 
government during the Korean War. In fact some in Ca berra referred to the possibility of the “MacArthur 
option” by the United States in reference to General Douglas MacArthur’s suggestion of using nuclear 
weapons against China during the Korean War. 
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a divisive element in both nations, although the scars of Vietnam have persisted far 
longer in the U.S. than in Australia.20 
The shared experience in Vietnam built upon the previous decades of the 
American – Australian relationship. It highlighted how effective the strident 
anticommunism of the 1950s had been in conditioning a generation of American and 
Australian policymakers to see communism as an absolute threat. Even while Canberra 
sought to convince the American government that it could offer no further direct military 
support due to growing budget concerns and the growing anti-war movement in 
Australia, Australia policymakers urged the U.S. to stand firm in Vietnam. In fact, the 
Australian pressure actually served to help convince Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford 
to begin to scale back the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. Clifford wrote that if Australia 
could send 300,00 men overseas to fight during World War II but was reluctant to send 
an additional 7,000 men to Vietnam, then perhaps the communist threat had been 
overblown all along.21 With the beginning of the drawdown of American forces that was 
accelerated under President Richard Nixon’s policy of “Vietnamization,” support for a 
continued Australian presence in Vietnam collapsed. By the end of 1971, the last 
Australian forces had been removed from Vietnam. 
The shared experience of Vietnam highlights how one of the major ideological 
factors that had been used to construct the relationship between 1933 and 1953, anti-
communism, continued to play an important role even twenty years afterwards. But what 
of the other major ideological underpinning, race? It would be folly to think that race as 
                                                          
20 Doyle, Grey, and Pierce, Australia’s Vietnam War,  xvii. 
21 Edwards, “The Strategic Concerns of a Regional Power,” in Daum, Gardner and Mausbach,, eds., 
America, the Vietnam War, and the World, 232. 
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an influencing factor on either nation’s foreign policies disappeared after 1953. Race, 
though, as a major factor in the U.S. – Australian alliance decreased in importance ver 
the years after 1953. This was driven by two differing factors, one American and one 
Australian. American policymakers became far more cognizant of how racial issues were 
perceived by the wider world in the last half of the twentieth century. Oftentims, this 
cognizance failed to be translated into positive action but the increased awareness h lp d 
the U.S. understand that the continued appearance of being a pro-European or pro-white 
power in Asia and the Pacific served only to hinder American progress in those regions. 
Much of the increased racial awareness within the U.S. was driven by the American Civil 
Rights movement and the work of men such as Andrew Young, who served as American 
ambassador to the United Nations under President Jimmy Carter, and drew heavily on his 
experiences in the civil rights movement. Young attempted to highlight the importance of 
Third World nations, especially in Africa, for U.S. foreign policy and to convince 
American policymakers of the shortsightedness of continuing to hold to what appeared to 
be a rather one-sided dialogue with the wider world. And while the effectiveness of 
people like Young  in changing American perceptions of non-white nations can be 
debated, their work unquestionably influenced how American policymakers thought 
about the perception of the U.S in the wider world. 
Changing Australian perceptions about race can best be examined by following 
the career of the White Australia policy after 1953. One must keep in mind that 
oftentimes, the whole of Australian foreign policy between 1933 and 1953 was aimed at 
defending the final bastion of white rule in the Pacific. The commitment to White 
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Australia immediately after the war did not waver but it did undergo some modifications 
as Australian concerns over increasing the population of their country became more 
prevalent. During the war, a large number of Asians had fled to Australia to escape the 
Japanese onslaught. Many had been granted temporary entrance with the understanding 
that they would return to their home after the war ended. When that time came, however, 
many refused to do so.  
One famous incident revolved around Annie O’Keefe, an Indonesian whose 
family had been rescued from the jungles of that nation and brought to Australia where 
she eventually met and married an Australian national. After the war, the Ministry of 
Immigration, headed by Arthur Caldwell, attempted to force O’Keefe to leave, arguing 
that her marriage did not confer any special status on her. Supported by a public outcry 
she appealed to the Australian High Court who overturned the Immigration Ministry’s 
decision in 1947. This decision in effect allowed hundreds of Asians to avoid deportation 
after the war and led the Immigration Ministry to propose new, more stringent standards 
that would give that department greater control over the alien populations who had come 
to Australia during the war.22 This attempt to shore up White Australia, however, was too 
little too late as the tide of racial awareness in Australia was moving in favor of a more 
open and diverse society. 
In the 1950s many both inside and outside of Australia noticed a gradual easing of 
the White Australia policy. Asian immigrants found it easier to enter into the country. 
Importantly, whites from southern and eastern Europe, such as Italians and Greeks, wer  
                                                          
22 H.I. London, Non-White Immigration and the “White Australia” Policy (New York: New York 
University Press, 1970), 16 – 17. 
264 
 
more openly welcomed than they had been before the war indicating a change in view on 
who counted as “white” in Australia. Previous to World War II, only immigration from 
the British Isles and northern Europe had been supported by the Australian government. 
The softening of perspective on Asians has been attributed to the interactions that had 
occurred between Australians serving abroad during World War II and groups such as the 
Filipinos and Malayans.23 The policy was also weakened by the Colombo Plan which 
allowed for the first time a large number of Asian students to study in Australian 
universities, further exposing more of the white population of Australia to Asians and 
helping to lessen previously held conceptions about non-whites. 
The major factor that contributed first to a slackening of White Australia and then 
its eventual repeal was continued fear about the military security of Australia. This was 
especially true in light of the rabidly anti-colonial statements emanating from some of the 
newest nations in the Third World in Asia and Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s. The 
Australian government recognized that only a more sizeable population would allow the 
nation to expand its economy and create a more sizeable defense force to shield Austra ia 
from possible attack. In March 1966, Immigration Minister Hubert Opperman proposed a 
change in Australia’s formal immigration system that would evaluate petition rs for 
immigration solely on their suitability as settlers and what contributions they could make 
to Australian society and the economy.24 This led to almost 3,000 persons of Asian 
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descent being accepted for Australian citizenship between 1966 and 1968. This was 
almost equal to the number that had gained citizenship between 1957 and 1966.25 
The end of the White Australia policy began under the Labor government of 
Gough Whitlam, who in 1973, proposed three major changes designed to end race as a 
factor in Australian immigration policies. First, all emigrants would be able to obtain 
citizenship after three years. Second, the issuance of policy instructions to verseas posts 
ordering that race not be considered as a factor when examining an application for 
immigration and finally, ratification of all international agreements relating to race and 
immigration would be carried out by the Australian government.26 These three factors 
contributed to an important reorientation in how the Australian government and people 
looked at immigration by non-whites. The official end of White Australia came in 1975 
with the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act by the Australian Parliament which 
forbade race to be used as a factor in any official purpose. The end of White Australia did 
not necessarily spell the end of racism in Australia but it did demonstrate the 
establishment of a far more nuanced and subtle understanding of how important a factor 
race was not just in domestic politics but in foreign affairs as well. 
Even though the U.S. and Australia effectively overcame many of the 
shortcomings inherent in alliance or coalition warfare this should not be interpreted to 
mean that it was an association without complexity. The relationship that develop d 
between the U.S. and Australia presented both nations with positives and negatives. For 
Australia, their position as a Pacific power had been recognized and fortified through 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 51. 
26 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Fact Sheet 8 – Abolition of the ‘White Australia’ Policy,” 
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their relationship with the U.S. The existence of the White Australia policy had been 
assured thanks to American aid in World War II and would continue to survive through 
much of the Cold War. Even when the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s began to attack the 
South African system of apartheid, White Australia was never targeted by American 
policymakers. For the Americans, the relationship with Australia provided a strong and 
stable partner in a region of the world that would take on increasing importance in the 
fight against communism. By the end of the twentieth century the U.S. had become a 
Pacific oriented nation, focused on challenges from an economically revived Japan, a 
growing China and most notably the twenty year war in Vietnam which haunted 
American military and foreign policy thinkers even into the twenty-first cen ury. The 
relationship with Australia also brought the role of ideology in American foreign policy 
back into focus. One sees many of the discussions occurring between the two powers 
being framed in ideologically driven language, primarily about race and anti-
communism. For the U.S., this dialogue helped to, over time, heighten awareness of how 
important race was to American foreign policy, especially by the late 1970s. 
The alliance was also not without its drawbacks. Arguably the most important 
was one that affected both nations. Both Australia and the U.S. by the mid-twentieth 
century, found themselves blinded to the nuances of world affairs. A relationship built on 
race served to only reinforce both nation’s leaders wish to see the world in black and 
white terms.  Both countries failed to recognize that the emergence of the Third World 
starting in the 1950s was driven by nationalist impulses. Rather, leaders in Washington 
and Canberra chose time and time again to view their interactions with these new nations 
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through the lens of race. Challenges from leaders like Nehru and Ho Chi Minh were not, 
in Australian and American opinions, nationalist impulses. Rather they represented 
challenges to the established racial order of the world or were part of a larger communist 
plot, itself tinged with race, to overthrow the white, western world. By committing 
themselves to an ideological worldview, both powers failed to see the divisions within the 
supposedly monolithic communist world structure that contributed to events such as the 
Korean War and later crises such as the Taiwan Straits.  
The bond between the two powers was also one that never developed smoothly. 
Both Australia and the U.S. had strong preconceptions about how the relationship was 
supposed to work. For Australia, they believed they would be seen as an equal in Pacific 
affairs. In reality, Australian leaders from John Curtin and Robert Menzies onwards came 
to recognize that “small partners in an alliance had little influence over larger ones.”27 
Australian self-interest in the economic and security spheres led to numerous clashes with 
their American counterparts who believed that often Australian leaders used world events 
to their own advantage. The U.S. never intended to have as close a relationship as the one 
that developed. The U.S. sought to use Australia only as part of its arsenal to defeat Japan 
in World War II and contain communism in the decades after the war. A consistent theme 
throughout the twenty year period in question was the American attempt to lessen their 
commitments to Australia and avoid anything resembling a formal alliance. However, in 
the end that is exactly what occurred. 
 The primary reason for this alliance was that both nations, regardless of the 
numerous differences that often existed between them, found a common worldview, one 
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based on the ideological twining of race and anti-communism. The roots lay in World 
War II but the bond would not have flourished if not for the events of the early Cold War 
period. Between the years 1946 and 1953, the American – Australian alliance was 
cemented by the shared experiences of two wars and the often misunderstood challenges 
presented by non-white nations in the Pacific and Asia. After 1953, American and 
Australian policy aims often dovetailed with little questioning from either party and 
would lead Australia to become one of the principal supporters of American ventures i 
the twentieth century. The relationship between the two powers would change over time 
but the ideological underpinnings put in place in the twenty years between 1933 and 1953 
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